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ABSTRACT
Under the framework of intelligent management of power grids by leveraging
advanced information, communication and control technologies, a primary objective
of this study is to develop novel data mining and data processing schemes for several
critical applications that can enhance the reliability of power systems. Speci¯cally,
this study is broadly organized into the following two parts: I) spatio-temporal wind
power analysis for wind generation forecast and integration, and II) data mining and
information fusion of synchrophasor measurements toward secure power grids.
Part I is centered around wind power generation forecast and integration.
First, a spatio-temporal analysis approach for short-term wind farm generation fore-
casting is proposed. Speci¯cally, using extensive measurement data from an actual
wind farm, the probability distribution and the level crossing rate of wind farm gen-
eration are characterized using tools from graphical learning and time-series analysis.
Built on these spatial and temporal characterizations, ¯nite state Markov chain mod-
els are developed, and a point forecast of wind farm generation is derived using the
Markov chains. Then, multi-timescale scheduling and dispatch with stochastic wind
generation and opportunistic demand response is investigated.
Part II focuses on incorporating the emerging synchrophasor technology into
the security assessment and the post-disturbance fault diagnosis of power systems.
First, a data-mining framework is developed for on-line dynamic security assessment
by using adaptive ensemble decision tree learning of real-time synchrophasor measure-
ments. Under this framework, novel on-line dynamic security assessment schemes are
devised, aiming to handle various factors (including variations of operating conditions,
forced system topology change, and loss of critical synchrophasor measurements) that
can have signi¯cant impact on the performance of conventional data-mining based on-
i
line DSA schemes. Then, in the context of post-disturbance analysis, fault detection
and localization of line outage is investigated using a dependency graph approach.
It is shown that a dependency graph for voltage phase angles can be built accord-
ing to the interconnection structure of power system, and line outage events can
be detected and localized through networked data fusion of the synchrophasor mea-
surements collected from multiple locations of power grids. Along a more practical
avenue, a decentralized networked data fusion scheme is proposed for e±cient fault
detection and localization.
ii
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
The age of a \smart" grid is upcoming. In the past decades, tremendous national
e®orts have been dedicated to building the elements of a modern electric power grid,
which will ultimately become a smart grid. Futuristic smart grids are envisaged to
dramatically increase the e±ciency of electricity production and distribution, reduce
greenhouse gas emissions and support a sustainable energy infrastructure. According
to the Energy Independence and Security Act [3], some key distinguishing character-
istics of smart grids are given below:
² increased use of digital information and communication technology (ICT) con-
cerning grid status and situational awareness;
² deployment of advanced wide-area monitoring, protection and control (WAMPAC)
schemes to improve the reliability and the e±ciency of electric power grids;
² high penetration of renewable power generation and distributed energy re-
sources (DER).
The aforementioned three characteristics of smart grids de¯ne the scope of this study.
In what follows, some basic concepts are ¯rst introduced.
1.1 Big Data in Smart Grid
The future smart grid is expected to leverage advanced ICTs to improve grid op-
erations and planning. For example, widely dispersed phasor measurement units
(PMUs) and PMU-enabled intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) make WAMPAC pos-
sible; smart meters and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) enable two-way com-
munications between end-users and utilities and sophisticated demand side manage-
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ment; at wind farms, measurement data of individual turbine's power output at high
temporal resolutions facilitates wind power generation analysis and forecast.
Figure 1.1: Big data emerging in smart grids [1].
Therefore, future smart grids have the potential to generate massive amounts
of data from widely deployed measurement devices. Massive amounts of more detailed
data collected from networked measurement devices provides great opportunities for
enhanced situational awareness. On the other hand, it also raises new challenges for
the e®ective extraction of relevant information from massive data so as to support
decision making. Under increasingly dynamic and uncertain conditions of the power
grid, new computational methods are necessary for e±cient management of massive
data. New algorithms for data fusion, data mining and data analytics have to be
developed based on deeper understanding of the spatial and temporal dynamics of
power systems.
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1.2 Synchrophasor Technology
A phasor is a representation of sinusoidal signals using magnitude and phase. In power
system monitoring and control applications, bus voltage and branch current are usu-
ally represented as phasors. Given the sinusoidal function of a voltage/current signal,
the magnitude of the voltage/current phasor is the e®ective value, i.e., the root mean
square (RMS) value of the sinusoidal function, and the phase of the voltage/current
phasor is calculated with regard to a speci¯ed reference, by using an angular measure.
Fig. 1.2 illustrates the phasor representations of the voltages measured at two termi-
nal buses of a transmission line. Here, the common reference for the phase angles is
90 degrees (at time 0).
time = 0 
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Figure 1.2: Phasor representation of bus voltage with a common reference [2].
The phasor measurements collected from widely dispersed locations of a power
grid are precisely synchronized to a common reference, by using GPS receiver embed-
ded in PMUs. The block diagram of PMUs is provided in Fig. 1.3. Basically, a PMU
is an electronic device that uses state-of-the-art digital signal processing techniques
3
that converts analog waveforms from current/potential transformers into digital data.
This analog-to-digital conversion is typically carried out at a rate of 48 samples per
cycle (2880 samples per second), and the output rate of PMU data can reach up
to 60 samples per second. A phase-locked oscillator, together with a GPS reference
source with 1 microsecond accuracy, guarantees that all phasor measurements are
time-tagged and all phase angles are synchronized to the same reference. By use of
synchronized phasor (thus called \synchrophasor") data, the system-wide snapshots
of a power grid can be obtained at a very high temporal resolution.
Anti-aliasing filters
Anolog Inputs
A/D converter
Phase-locked
oscillator
GPS receiver
Phasor micro-
processor
Modems
Figure 1.3: PMU block diagram [2].
Synchrophasor technology has been recognized as one of the most critical
measurement technologies of smart grids. Compared to existing supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, wide area monitoring systems (WAMS) built
on synchrophasor technology o®er greater °exibility to WAMPAC applications:
² The precise synchronization of phasor measurement data o®ers wide-area visi-
bility of power grids. Further, it also makes distributed synchrophasor data pro-
cessing and information fusion possible, facilitating coordinated decision making
and control actions.
² In conventional SCADA systems, grid status awareness is achieved through
static state analysis, and therefore the dynamic behavior of power grids cannot
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be observed. Whereas in WAMS, synchrophasor data is typically collected at
20, 30 or 60 samples per second. Therefore, the limitations of conventional
SCADA systems are overcome by the high sub-second visibility of power grids
provided by synchrophasor data.
² PMUs directly measure the phasor angles of bus voltage and branch current.
In conventional SCADA systems, those values are obtained from static state
estimation, which is highly susceptible to unsynchronized measurements and
bad data.
² Synchrophasor data provides enhanced post-contingency assessment capability
and can improve the agility of protective and corrective control actions.
1.3 Reliability of Power Systems
For bulk power systems, reliability is de¯ned by the North American Electric Reli-
ability Corporation (NERC) as the capability to meet end-users' electricity demand
with a reasonable assurance of continuity and quality [4]. Further, NERC subdi-
vides the reliability of power system into adequacy and security. Speci¯cally, power
system adequacy refers to \having su±cient resources to provide customers with a
continuous supply of electricity at the proper voltage and frequency, virtually all of
the time" [4]. Here, the \resources" include a combination of generation, transmis-
sion and distribution facilities, as well as demand side management (DSM) which
may reduce end-users' electricity demand as needed. Power system security relates
to the ability of bulk power systems to withstand unexpected disturbances, such as
transmission line outage, loss of generator and transformer failure.
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1.3.1 Impact of Wind Generation Integration on Power System
During the last decade, wind power has been the fastest in growth among all renew-
able energy resources [5]. With a prospective high penetration level, wind generation
integration is expected to change dramatically the existing operating practices (e.g.,
unit commitment, economic dispatch and ancillary services procurement) that are
critical to the adequacy of bulk power systems. Compared to conventional genera-
tion (e.g., thermal, hydro, nuclear), wind generation has three distinct characteristics:
non-dispatchability, variability and uncertainty. Wind generation is generally non-
dispatchable, in the sense that the power output of a wind farm cannot be simply
dispatched at the request of power grid operators. This is because, unlike conventional
generators, the \fuel" of wind turbines, i.e., wind, cannot be controlled or stored. Due
to the aforementioned characteristics, timely and accurate wind generation forecast-
ing is critical to ensure that adequate resources for dispatch, ancillary services and
ramping requirements are available all the time. Several balancing authorities in
North America have been implementing wind generation forecasting systems [6].
1.4 Scope of The Dissertation and Summary of Main Contributions
1.4.1 Part I: Spatio-temporal Analysis for Wind Farm Generation Forecast and
Integration
In Chapter 2, a Markovian model for wind farm generation forecast is developed.
This model takes into account both the spatial and temporal dynamics of the power
outputs from widely dispersed turbines within a large wind farm. Using extensive
data from a wind farm in the western U.S., a spatio-temporal analysis of the aggregate
wind generation from the farm is performed. It is observed from actual measurement
data that the power outputs from the turbines are often not equal. Motivated by
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this observation and using tools from graphical learning, a rigorous step-by-step pro-
cedure to characterize the probability distribution of the aggregate wind generation
from the farm is carried out, while the diurnal non-stationarity and the seasonality
of wind speed are also accounted for. The temporal dynamics of the aggregate wind
generation are then characterized using auto-regression analysis. Built on these spa-
tial and temporal characterizations, a ¯nite state Markov chain for aggregate wind
generation forecast is then derived in a rigorous optimization framework. Numerical
study using realistic data demonstrates the signi¯cant gain in the forecast accuracy
by using the designed Markov chain compared to the wind-speed-based forecasting
methods. The procedure developed here is amenable to the case when the farm has
turbines from multiple classes, e.g., when they belong to multiple manufacturers or
when they are deployed at di®erent hub heights.
Chapter 3 addresses the challenges of integrating volatile wind generation into
the bulk power grid. Notably, wind generation is among the renewable resources that
has most variability and uncertainty, and exhibits multi-level dynamics across time.
To enhance the penetration of wind energy, multi-timescale scheduling and dispatch
of both conventional energy sources (e.g., thermal) and wind generation is studied, for
a smart grid model with two classes of energy users, namely traditional energy users
and opportunistic energy users (e.g., smart meters or smart appliances). Speci¯cally,
the system operator performs scheduling at two timescales. In day-ahead scheduling,
with the statistical information on wind generation and energy demands, the operator
optimally procures conventional energy supply and decides the optimal retail price
for the traditional energy users for the next day. In real-time scheduling, upon the
realization of the wind energy generation and the demand from traditional energy
users (which is stochastically dependent on the day-ahead retail price), the operator
decides the real-time retail price for the opportunistic energy users. In particular,
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two types of opportunistic energy users are considered: non-persistent and persistent
users. The non-persistent users leave the power market when they ¯nd that the
current real-time price is unacceptable, whereas the persistent opportunistic users
wait for the next acceptable real-time price. Closed-form solutions for the scheduling
problem are obtained for non-persistent case. For the persistent case, the scheduling
problem is ¯rst formulated as a multi-timescale Markov decision process (MMDP),
which is then recast explicitly as a standard Markov decision process (MDP) that can
be solved via standard solution techniques. Numerical results demonstrate that the
proposed two-timescale scheduling and dispatch improves the overall e±ciency with
high penetration of wind generation, by enabling two-way energy exchange between
energy providers and end-users, and by facilitating both information interaction as
well as energy interaction.
1.4.2 Part II: Synchrophasor Data Mining and Information Fusion
In Chapter 4, a robust on-line dynamic security assessment (DSA) scheme is de-
veloped by using adaptive ensemble decision tree (DT) learning, with an objective
to handle the variations of operating condition (OC) and system topology changes.
Speci¯cally, the classi¯cation model for DSA is built on boosting multiple unpruned
small-height DTs. In o®-line training, the small DTs and their voting weights are se-
quentially identi¯ed in a \gradient-descent" manner to minimize the misclassi¯cation
cost. The small DTs, together with their voting weights, are then periodically up-
dated throughout the operating horizon, by using new training cases that are created
to account for any change in OC or network topology. Di®erent from conventional
DT-based DSA schemes, the training cases are assigned di®erent data weights by each
small DT; and higher data weights are assigned to a new training case if it is misclas-
si¯ed by the small DTs. The aforementioned techniques are utilized to minimize the
misclassi¯cation cost as new training cases are added to the knowledge base, so that
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the classi¯cation model can smoothly track the changes in OCs or system topology.
The results from a case study using a variety of realistic OCs illustrate the e®ec-
tiveness of the proposed scheme in dealing with OC variations and system topology
changes.
Chapter 5 extends the e®ort made in Chapter 4 to develop a on-line DSA
scheme that is robust to missing synchrophasor data. In on-line DSA, synchrophasor
data can become unavailable due to the expected failure of PMUs or communication
links. Similarly to the scheme of Chapter 4, the proposed scheme consists of three
processing stages; the di®erence is that the random subspace technique is employed
in the latter scheme. First, multiple small DTs are trained o®-line, each by using
a randomly selected attribute subset. In near real-time, new cases are used to test
the small DTs. The test results are then utilized in on-line DSA to choose a few
viable small DTs (i.e., the DTs without missing data from their attribute subsets)
and calculate the voting weights via a boosting process. Finally, security classi¯cation
decisions of on-line DSA are obtained via a weighted voting of the chosen small DTs.
Speci¯cally, the randomized algorithm for selecting attribute subsets exploits the
locational information of attributes and the availability of synchrophasor data, so
as to guarantee that a signi¯cant portion of small DTs are still viable when some
synchrophasor data become missing. Further, the process of boosting viable small
DTs in on-line DSA guarantees that accurate decisions can be obtained by making use
of the viable small DTs, in the sense that the viable small DTs are iteratively chosen
in a gradient descent manner and assigned proper voting weights, leading to the high
robustness and accuracy of the proposed approach in case of missing synchrophasor
data.
Chapter 6 discusses the fault detection and localization of line outage by using
synchrophasor data. For large-scale power grids, this task is challenging, due to the
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massive scale, system uncertainty and inevitable measurement errors. It is clear
that deterministic approaches would not work well. With this insight, probabilistic
graphical models are utilized to model the spatially correlated synchrophasor data,
and statistical hypothesis testing method is utilized for the task of fault detection and
localization. The contributions of this study are twofold. 1) Based on the DC power
°ow model, a Gaussian Markov random ¯eld (GMRF) model is developed for the
phasor angles across the buses. Speci¯cally, based on the stochastic characteristics of
power °ows, phasor angles are modeled as Gaussian random variables, which have a
latent dependency graph governed by the interconnection structure of the power grid.
The relationship between the partial correlations of phasor angles and the physical
parameters of power systems is also revealed. 2) A decentralized networked data
fusion algorithm for fault detection and localization is developed, by exploiting the
multi-scale decomposition property of GMRF.
Finally, Chapter 7 discusses future research directions.
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PART I
SPATIO-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS FOR WIND FARM
GENERATION FORECAST AND INTEGRATION
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Chapter 2
SPATIO-TEMPORAL ANALYSIS FOR SHORT-TERM WIND FARM
GENERATION FORECAST
2.1 Introduction
A critical aspect in meeting the renewable portfolio standard (RPS) goals adopted
by many states in the U.S. includes the integration of renewable energy sources, such
as wind and solar [7]. Given the fact that the power outputs of wind turbines are
highly dependent on wind speed, the power generation of a wind farm varies across
multiple timescales of power system planning and operations. With increasing pene-
tration into bulk power systems, wind generation has posed signi¯cant challenges for
reliable system operations, because of its high variability and non-dispatchability [8].
Speci¯cally, one key complication arises in terms of committing and dispatching con-
ventional generation resources, when the short-term forecast of wind farm generation
is not accurate. Currently, wind generation forecast for an individual wind farm typ-
ically has an error of 15% to 20% [6], in sharp contrast to the case of load forecast.
When the actual wind generation is above the forecasted value, i.e., more conven-
tional generation capacity has been committed than needed, it could result in less
e±cient set points for thermal units. In some cases, wind generation may need to be
curtailed [9]. On the °ip side of the coin, when the actual wind generation is less
than the forecasted value, costly ancillary services and fast acting reserves have to
be called upon to compensate for the de¯cit. Therefore, it is imperative to develop
accurate forecast approaches for wind farm generation.
State-of-the-art short-term wind power forecast approaches include time-series
models (e.g., auto-regressive models [10], Kalman ¯ltering [11]), Markov chains [12,
13], and data mining [14, 15]. A comprehensive literature review on wind power
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forecast can be found in [16] and [17]. Time-series models and data mining-based
regression models, while being able to provide continuous-value wind power forecast,
could su®er from high computational complexity. Compared to other forecast models,
¯nite-state Markov chains strike a good balance between complexity and modeling
accuracy. In particular, given the state space and historical data, the state transition
matrix can be computed by using the maximum likelihood estimation technique [12];
when new data points are available online, it is also very easy to update the transition
matrix. Generally, aggregate wind power data is a double-bounded non-Gaussian
time series [18]. In reference [19], the logit transform is carried out as preprocessing,
so that such a bounded time series can be studied by using auto-regressive models
in a Gaussian framework. In this chapter, ¯nite-state Markov chains are utilized to
model the bounded wind power time series with a general probability distribution. It
is worth noting that ¯nite-state Markov chains inherently have bounded support, and
the stationary distribution of a Markov chain can be general. Despite the appealing
features of Markov chains, there is no systematic method to design the state space
of Markov chains for wind power modeling. The proposed approach in this chapter
addresses this issue by developing a general spatio-temporal analysis framework. An
overview of the main contributions is presented below.
2.1.1 Summary of Main Results and Contributions
One key observation of this study is the wind farm spatial dynamics, i.e., the power
outputs of wind turbines within the same wind farm can be quite di®erent, even if
the wind turbines are of the same class and physically located close to each other.
The disparity in the power outputs of wind turbines may be due to the wake e®ect
of wind speed, diverse terrain conditions, or other environmental e®ects. Motivated
by this observation, graph-learning based spatial analysis is carried out to quantify
the statistical distribution of wind farm generation, with rigorous characterization of
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wind farm spatial dynamics. Then, time series analysis is applied to quantify the level
crossing rate (LCR) of the wind farm's aggregate power output. Finite-state Markov
chains are then constructed, with the state space and transition matrix designed to
capture both the spatial and temporal dynamics of the wind farm's aggregate power
output. Based on [66], the distributional forecast and the point forecast of wind farm
generation are provided by using the Markov chains and ramp trend information. In
this work, another ¯nding of independent interest is that the tail probability of wind
farm's aggregate power output exhibits a \power-law" decay with an exponential cut-
o®, where the power-law part has a much heavier tail than the Gaussian distribution.
This indicates that one cannot simply apply the central limit theorem (CLT) to
characterize the aggregate power output, because of the strong correlation across the
power outputs of wind turbines within a wind farm.
The main contributions of this study are summarized below:
² A general spatio-temporal analysis framework is developed, in which the spatial
and temporal dynamics of wind farm generation are characterized by analyti-
cally quantifying the statistical distribution and the LCR.
² Built on the results of spatio-temporal analysis, a systematic approach for de-
signing the state space of the Markov chain is introduced.
² By modeling variable wind power as a Markov chain, stochastic unit com-
mitment and economic dispatch problems can be studied by using Markovian
state-space approaches instead of scenario-based approaches [20,21]. Thus, the
complexity induced by exponentially-growing scenarios of scenario-based ap-
proaches can be avoided. Therefore, this study is a timely contribution to the
recent e®orts on wind generation integration that involves Markov-chain-based
stochastic optimizations.
14
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. A few critical observations
from the measurement data are ¯rst discussed in Section 2.2. Spatio-temporal analy-
sis and the design of Markov chains are presented in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses
the proposed Markov-chain-based forecast approach and numerical examples. Con-
clusions are provided in Section 2.5.
2.2 Available Data and Key Observations
In this chapter, spatio-temporal analysis is carried out for a large wind farm with a
rated capacity of Pmaxag =300.5MW. There are M = 2 classes of wind turbines in this
wind farm, with N1 = 53 and N2 = 221, respectively. The power curves of the two
turbine classes are provided in Fig. 2.1. For each class Cm, a meteorological tower
(MET) Hm is deployed and co-located with a wind turbine, denoted by rm. The
power outputs of all wind turbines and the wind speeds measured at all METs are
recorded every 10 minutes for the years 2009 and 2010. From the measurement data,
several key observations can be made as follows.
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Figure 2.1: Power curves for wind turbines from classes C1 and C2.
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Figure 2.2: Power outputs of three wind turbines in C1.
2.2.1 Spatial Dynamics of Wind Farm
A critical observation from the measurement data is that the power outputs of wind
turbines within the wind farm can be quite di®erent. Fig. 2.2 illustrates the power
outputs of three wind turbines in C1. It is clear that the power outputs are not equal,
despite the geographic proximity of r1 and its nearest neighbor (the disparity in the
power outputs of the wind turbines belonging to C2 has also been observed; the plots
are not included for the sake of brevity). This disparity has been largely neglected in
the existing literature.
Although the variable power outputs of wind turbines are not identical, it
is reasonable to assume that they follow the same probability distribution if the
wind turbines are of the same class. A natural question here is whether the CLT,
either the classic CLT or the generalized CLT, can be applied to characterize the
probability distribution of the aggregate power output of a large number of wind
turbines. To this end, the tail probability distribution of the wind farm's aggregate
power output is examined and plotted in Fig. 2.3. As illustrated in Fig. 2.3, the tail
probability demonstrates a \power-law" decay with an exponential cut-o® and the
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power-law part has a much heavier tail than the Gaussian distribution. It is useful
to note that this kind of tail behavior has been observed in many natural phenomena
(e.g., size of forest ¯res) that have strong component-wise correlations [22]. Because
of the strong correlation between the power outputs of wind turbines, particularly
from adjacent wind turbines, the classic CLT cannot be applied to characterize the
probability distribution of the wind farm's aggregate power output. In fact, even the
\CLT under weak dependence" cannot be directly applied, despite the fact that the
correlation between the power outputs of wind turbines weakens with the distance
between them (the \mixing distance"). Hence, the probability distribution of the
wind farm's aggregate power output cannot be characterized using the classic CLT;
and it may not even be governed by stable laws [23]. With this insight, the proposed
approach resorts to graphical learning methods to model the dependence structure
in the power outputs of individual wind turbines and carries out spatio-temporal
analysis accordingly.
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Figure 2.3: Tail probability of the wind farm's aggregate power output.
2.2.2 Diurnal Non-Stationarity and Seasonality
Another key observation, as illustrated in Fig. 2.4, is the diurnal non-stationarity
and the seasonality of wind farm generation. Speci¯cally, it is observed that within
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Figure 2.4: Empirical distribution of wind farm generation over various 1-hour inter-
vals of di®erent epochs of the day and di®erent months.
each three-hour epoch, the probability distributions of wind farm generation over
three consecutive 1-hour intervals are consistent. However, these CDFs from di®erent
epochs of three hours and di®erent seasons can be quite di®erent, indicating the non-
staionarity of wind farm generation. The non-stationarity of probability distributions
of wind farm generation caused by diurnal pattern and seasonality can be handled
by developing a Markov chain for each epoch of the day and for each month.
In what follows, data-driven analysis is carried out to characterize the spatial
and temporal dynamics of the wind farm's aggregate power output. The data for the
year 2009 is used in spatio-temporal analysis to guide the design of Markov chains,
and the data for the year 2010 is used to assess the accuracy of the forecast provided
by the proposed Markov-chain-based approach. Speci¯cally, the 9 AM-noon epoch
of January 2009 is used as an illustrative example in the following spatio-temporal
analysis, since this epoch exhibits the richest spatio-temporal dynamics, in the sense
that the wind farm's aggregate power output during this epoch takes values ranging
from 0 to the wind farm's rated capacity and exhibits the highest variability over time
(quanti¯ed by LCR).
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2.2.3 Weibull Distribution of Wind Speed
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Figure 2.5: Weibull-¯tted CDF (¸=11.37, k=1.54) and empirical CDF of W1 for the
9 AM-noon epoch of January 2009.
In the existing literature, wind speed is usually characterized using Weibull
distributions [24]. In this work, it is observed from the measurement data that the
wind speed Wm at each MET within the wind farm closely follows a Weibull distri-
bution during each epoch, the probability density function (PDF) of which is given
by:
fWm(x) =
k
¸
³x
¸
´k¡1
exp¡(x=¸)
k
; 8x ¸ 0; (2.1)
where k is the shape parameter and ¸ is the scale parameter. Speci¯cally, the maxi-
mum likelihood estimation technique [25] is utilized to estimate the parameters from
the measurement data. The ¯tted cumulative density function (CDF) and the em-
pirical CDF of W1 for the 9 AM-noon epoch of January 2009 are plotted in Fig. 2.5.
Note that reference [25] presents several other methods for estimating the parameters
of the Weibull distribution, in which one method with good visual interpretation is
the Weibull plot adopted by [26].
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2.3 Spatio-temporal Analysis of Wind Farm Generation
2.3.1 Spatial Analysis and Statistical Characterization
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Figure 2.6: MST of C1 (with distance to the southwest corner of the wind farm).
A key objective of spatial analysis is to characterize the statistical distribution
of Pag(t). To this end, regression analysis is applied to the measurement data of each
turbine's power output, so that Pag(t) could be expressed in terms of wind speed.
Then, the analytical CDF of Pag(t) can be obtained from the ¯tted Weibull CDF of
wind speed. In what follows, the key steps of spatial analysis are provided in detail.
Using the geographical information of wind turbines, an MST with rm as
the root node is constructed for each class Cm by using Prim's algorithm [27], as
illustrated in Fig. 2.6. It is easy to see that for each wind turbine i in Cm, there
exists only one path from rm to i in the MST of Cm. De¯ne the node which is
closest to i along this path as the \parent" node of i. Another key observation from
the measurement data is that an a±ne relationship exists between the parent-child
turbine pairs for each class, with the case of C1 illustrated in Fig. 2.7. Therefore, a
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Figure 2.7: Power outputs of parent-child turbine pairs of C1 for the 9 AM-noon
epoch of January 2009.
coe±cient ®m is introduced for Cm, and the linear regression model Pk(t)=®mPj(t) is
used for each parent-child turbine pair (j,k) in Cm accordingly. Further, de¯ne dm(i)
as the number of the nodes (excluding node i) along the path from rm to node i,
then the linear regression model Pi(t)=®
dm(i)
m Prm(t) can be used for any wind turbine
i in Cm. The value of ®m is determined by applying the minimum mean square error
(MMSE) principle to the aggregate power output of Cm, as follows:
®m = argmin
®
1
Nt
X
t
(Pag;m(t)¡
X
i2Cm
®dm(i)Prm(t))
2: (2.2)
Similarly, an a±ne relationship between the wind speeds is also observed from the
measurement data. For convenience, H1 is chosen as the reference MET, i.e., m=1.
Then, the linear regression models for wind speeds are given by Wm(t)=¯mWm(t),
where ¯m is solved using the MMSE principle as follows:
¯m = argmin
¯
1
Nt
X
t
(Wm(t)¡ ¯Wm(t))2: (2.3)
Using Prm(t)=Um(Wm(t)), the aggregate power output of the wind farm could be
characterized as follows:
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Pag(t) =
X
m
Pag;m(t) =
X
m
X
i2Cm
®dm(i)m Um(¯mWm(t))
, Gpw(Wm(t)): (2.4)
It is easy to see that due to the monotone characteristics of Um(¢), Gpw(¢) is mono-
tonically increasing. Therefore, the analytical CDF of Pag(t) can be obtained from
the ¯tted Weibull distribution of Wm(t), given by FPag(¢)= FWm(G¡1pw(¢)). The ana-
lytical CDF and the empirical CDF of Pag(t) for the considered epoch are illustrated
in Fig. 2.8. Note that the discontinuity in the analytical CDF of Pag(t) is a result of
the cut-out wind speed (25 m/s), as plotted in Fig. 2.1.
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Figure 2.8: CDF of Pag(t) for the 9 AM-noon epoch of January 2009.
It is worth noting that the linear regression models with homogeneous regres-
sion coe±cients used here are motivated by the observation from the measurement
data. The above regression analysis could be generalized by applying more general
regression analysis methods. For example, each parent-child turbine pair can have a
di®erent linear regression coe±cient or the parent-child turbine pairs can be analyzed
by using di®erent regression models.
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2.3.2 Temporal Analysis and LCR Quanti¯cation
During each epoch, both the wind speed Wm(t) and the wind farm generation Pag(t)
could be regarded as stationary stochastic processes. The LCR of a stochastic process
is formally de¯ned as the number of instances per unit time that the stochastic
process crosses a level in only the positive/negative direction [28]. Intuitively, LPag(¢)
quanti¯es how frequently Pag(t) transits between di®erent generation levels. It will
be apparent soon that LPag(¢), together with the statistical characterization FPag(¢),
is critical in designing the state space representation of the Markov chains used for
wind farm generation forecast.
It is useful to note that due to the discontinuity in FPag(¢), as illustrated in
Fig. 2.8, a smooth Gaussian transformation for Pag(t) is unattainable. Hence, the
LCR of wind speed is ¯rst characterized. In order to quantify LPag(¢) analytically,
LWm(¢) is ¯rst derived and converted to LPag(¢) by using the mapping de¯ned in
(2.4). To this end, autoregressive analysis is applied to Wm(t). As argued in [29],
autoregressive analysis preceded by transforming the stationary non-Gaussian process
Wm(t) to a Gaussian process can result in a better ¯t, compared with ¯tting to an
autoregressive model directly. Therefore, Wm(t) is transformed to a standard normal
random variable, given by
WNm (t) = F
¡1
N (FWm(Wm(t))); (2.5)
A ¯rst-order autoregressive (AR(1)) model [30] is then ¯tted to WNm (t):
WNm (t) = ÁW
N
m (t¡ 1) + ²(t); (2.6)
23
where the white noise term is modeled as a zero-mean Gaussian random variable
²(t)»N (0; ¾2² ). The parameters Á and ¾² can be estimated by solving the Yule-Walker
equations [30]. Then, the LCR of WNm (t) for a speci¯c wind speed level ° (°>0) can
be calculated using the following steps:
L
W
N (0;1)
m
(°)
=
Z °
¡1
Pr(W
N (0;1)
m (t) > °jWN (0;1)m (t¡ 1) = w)fN (0;1)(w)dw
=
Z °
¡1
Pr(²(t) > ° ¡ Áw)fN (0;1)(w)dw
=
Z °
¡1
µ
1¡ FN (0;1)
µ
° ¡ Áw
¾²
¶¶
fN (0;1)(w)dw: (2.7)
It is easy to see that LWm(¢) can be obtained from LWN (0;1)m (¢) using the inverse
mapping of the strictly increasing function de¯ned in (2.5). Further, using the mono-
tonically increasing function de¯ned in (2.4), the LCR of Pag(t) for a speci¯c wind
farm generation level ¡ (¡2(0;Pmaxag ]) is given by:
LPag(t)(¡) = LWN (0;1)m
(F¡1N (0;1)(FWm(G
¡1
pw(¡)))): (2.8)
The procedure presented above completes the characterization of the analytical LCR
of Pag(t) for an arbitrary epoch. The analytical LCR and the empirical LCR of Pag(t)
for the 9 AM-noon epoch of January 2009 are illustrated in Fig. 2.9.
2.3.3 Markov Chain Model for Spatio-temporal Wind Power
A critical step in developing the Markov-chain-based forecast approach is to capture
the statistical distribution and the temporal dynamics of Pag(t) during each epoch
using a Markov chain with the following characteristics:
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Figure 2.9: LCR of Pag(t) for the 9 AM-noon epoch of January 2009.
² The Markov chain has ¯nite states. Speci¯cally, state Sk (k=1;¢ ¢ ¢ ;Ns) cor-
responds to a speci¯c range of generation levels [¡k;¡k+1), with ¡1=0 and
¡Ns+1=P
max
ag .
² The Markov chain is discrete-time and of order 1.
The above characteristics are adopted to make the Markov chains practical for fore-
casting applications, so that forecast is made based on the most recent 10-min data
only. But this can be generalized easily by using high-order Markov chains.
The procedure developed in [28] is utilized to design the state space. First,
de¯ne ¿k as the average duration that Pag(t) falls in state Sk per unit time, given by:
¿k =
FPag(¡k+1)¡ FPag(¡k)
LPag(¡k+1) + LPag(¡k)
; (2.9)
where FPag(¢) is the analytical CDF of Pag(t) that was characterized in spatial analysis,
and LPag(¢) is the analytical LCR of Pag(t) derived in temporal analysis. By de¯nition,
¿k quanti¯es the performance of the Markov chain in terms of how well the stochastic
process Pag(t) is captured:
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² A smaller value of ¿k suggests that Pag(t) is more likely to switch out of the state
Sk within a 10-min slot, i.e., non-adjacent transitions are more likely to occur,
and hence the transitional behaviors of Pag(t) are not su±ciently captured by
the discrete-time Markov chain.
² If all the values of ¿k (k=1;¢ ¢ ¢ ;Ns) are too large, there would be fewer states,
indicating that the quantization brought by the Markov chain is too crude, and
the corresponding forecast would be less accurate.
Therefore, a key objective of state space design is to make each of ¿k (k=1;¢ ¢ ¢ ;Ns)
fall into a reasonable range [28]. However, it is challenging to meet this design goal,
especially when the closed-form expressions of FPag(¢) and LPag(¢) are unattainable. A
practical solution adopted here is to introduce a constant ¿ and ¯nd the Ns¡1 vari-
ables f¡2;¡3;¢ ¢ ¢ ;¡Nsg by solving (2.9) numerically with ¿k=¿ , 8k2f1;¢ ¢ ¢ ;Ns¡1g.
Once the state space S is designed, the transition probabilities could be easily es-
timated following the approach proposed in [12]. Speci¯cally, the probability of a
transition from Si to Sj in a 10-min slot is given by
[Q]i;j =
nijPNs
k=1 nik
; i; j 2 f1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Nsg; (2.10)
where [¢]i;j denote the entry at row i and column j of a matrix, and nij is the number
of transitions from Si to Sj encountered in the measurement data. The representative
generation level for each state Sk, k2f1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Nsg, is determined using the MMSE
principle, given by (the time index of Pag(t) is dropped for simplicity):
Pag;k = argmin
Pk
EPag [(Pk ¡ Pag)2jPag 2 [¡k;¡k+1)]; (2.11)
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whereEPag [¢jPag2[¡k;¡k+1)] denotes taking expectation over Pag conditioned on Pag2[¡k;¡k+1).
Then, it is easy to see the representative generation level is given by:
Pag;k =
R ¡k+1
¡k
xfPag(x)dx
FPag(¡k+1)¡ FPag(¡k)
: (2.12)
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Figure 2.10: boundaries and average duration for each state of the Markov chain for
the 9 AM-noon epoch of January 2009.
The above procedure is applied to the 9 AM-noon epoch of January 2009, by
choosing ¿=2 mins. The designed state space S and the values of ¿k are illustrated
in Fig. 2.10, and the corresponding transition probabilities are plotted in Fig. 2.11.
In the existing literature on Markov chain models for wind power [12] (not in the
context of wind farm generation), all states of the Markov chain are simply chosen
to be of uniform length. This simplistic design method is applied to the aggregate
power output of the wind farm, by choosing ¡k+1=P
max
ag k=Ns, 8k2f1;¢ ¢ ¢ ;Ns¡1g.
The resultant state space, denoted by Sunif, is compared with S. From Fig. 2.10 and
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Figure 2.11: Transition matrix (a) by spatio-temporal analysis (b) by uniform quan-
tization, for the 9 AM-noon epoch of January 2009.
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Figure 2.12: O²ine spatio-temporal analysis (carried out for each epoch and each
month by using historic measurement data).
Fig. 2.11, it is clear that higher values of ¿k are achieved for most of the states in S,
whereas more non-adjacent transitions are incurred by the Markov chain with state
space Sunif.
2.4 Markov-Chain-based Short-term Forecast of Wind Farm Generation
Given the current 10-min wind farm generation data Pag(t), the state of the Markov
chain at time t, denoted by S(t), is determined by searching for a state k0 so that
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Figure 2.13: Online short-term forecasting.
Pag(t)2[¡k0 ;¡k0+1). Thus, S(t+1) and hence Pag(t+1)=Pag;S(t+1) are random variables
that depend on the transition matrix Q, S(t) and R(t). Further, let R(t)=¡1 denote
a decreasing trend, and R(t)=1 for the non-decreasing case. Then, the distributional
forecast is given by
Pr(Pag(t+ 1) = Pag;jjS(t); R(t)) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
Qk0;j
NsP
k¸k0
Qk0;k
; if R(t) = 1 and j ¸ k0
Qk0;j
k0¡1P
k=1
Qk0;k
; if R(t) = ¡1 and j < k0
0; otherwise:
(2.13)
2.4.0.1 Point Forecasts
From the above distributional forecast, a point forecast can be derived by using the
MMSE principle:
P^ag(t+ 1) = argmin
Pag
E
£
(Pag ¡ Pag;S(t+1))2jS(t); R(t)
¤
(2.14)
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Then, the solution to the above problem is given by:
P^ag(t+ 1) =
8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
NsP
k¸k0
Pag;kQk0;k
NsP
k¸k0
Qk0;k
; if R(t) = 1
k0¡1P
k=1
Pag;kQk0;k
k0¡1P
k=1
Qk0;k
; if R(t) = ¡1
(2.15)
which is exactly the mean value of the Markov chain conditioned on the currently
observed state and the ramp trend.
2.4.1 Numerical Examples
2.4.1.1 Distributional Forecasts
By using the continuous rank probability score (CRPS) as a metric for distributional
forecast, the empirical skill of the Markov-chain-based distributional forecast is de-
¯ned as the average of the CRPS of the Markov-chain-based distributional forecast
over all Nt realized data points, given by:
Skill =
1
Nt
X
t
Z Pmaxag
0
³
F^ (x)¡H(x¡ Pag(t))
´2
dx; (2.16)
where F^ (x) is the CDF obtained by using the Markov-chain-based distributional fore-
cast, and H(x¡ Pag(t) is the unit step function, which takes value 0 when x<Pag(t)
and takes value 1 when x¸Pag(t). Basically, a higher skill value suggests that the
Markov-chain-based distributional forecast is less accurate. By using the above de¯-
nition, the CRPS value of the Markov-chain-based distributional forecast over all the
52560 (365*24*6) data points of the year 2010 is calculated. The Skill of the Markov-
chain-based distributional forecast over the data points of the year 2010 is provided
in Table. 2.1. Since one main objective of this work is to develop Markov-chain-based
distributional forecasting models, the Markov chain developed by the existing ap-
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Table 2.1: Skill values of Markov-chain-based distributional forecasts over the testing
data points of the year 2010.
MC (unif.) MC (¿=2) MC (¿=1)
Skill 7.14 MW 6.27 MW 6.09 MW
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
2
7
12
17
22
Month
CR
PS
 (M
W
)
Figure 2.14: Statistics of CRPS over all months of the year 2010.
proach [12, 13] (uniform quantization) is used as a benchmark. The Markov chain
developed by the proposed spatio-temporal analysis with the design parameter ¿=2
(column 3 of Table. 2.1) has a skill score that is 13% less than that of the benchmark
Markov chain that has the same number of states designed by uniform quantization
(column 2 of Table. 2.1). By reducing the design parameter ¿ to 1, the forecasting
performance of the Markov chain developed by the proposed spatio-temporal analysis
(column 4 of Table. 2.1) is further improved.
To further examine the skill of the developed Markov-chain-based distribu-
tional forecasting method over di®erent epochs and di®erent month, the mean and
percentiles of the CRPS values over the data points for each month or each epoch is
computed. In the box plots of Fig. 2.14 and Fig. 2.15, the red bar in a box repre-
sents the mean value of the CRPS values over all data points that fall into a speci¯c
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Figure 2.15: Statistics of CRPS over all 8 epochs of the year 2010.
epoch or a speci¯c month. The top edge and bottom edge of a box represent the
25th and 75th percentiles, respectively. The top bar and bottom bar correspond to
the extremes calculated from 1.5 interquartile ranges. It is observed from Fig. 2.15
that the means and standard deviations of the CRPS values are a little higher during
afternoon-night epochs. Fig. 2.14 shows that the means of the CRPS values have
little variability across di®erent months, and the standard deviations of the CRPS
values are slightly higher across the winter season. Another key observation from the
results of numerical experiments is that the CRPS of the Markov-chain-based distri-
butional forecast over a realized data points Pag(t) is highly dependent on the ramp
rate of Pag(t) at time t. Here, the ramp rate of Pag(t) is de¯ned as the absolute value
of the change in the wind farm generation in a 10-min slot. For example, the ramp
rate of Pag(t) at time t is given by jPag(t)¡Pag(t¡1)j. By using the data points of the
year 2010, the corresponding 52560 pairs of ramp rates and CRPS values are plotted
in Fig. 2.16. It is observed that the ramp rates of Pag(t) and the CRPS values of the
Markov-chain-based distributional forecast over a realized data points Pag(t) follows a
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Figure 2.16: Correlation between the ramp rates of Pag(t) and the CRPS values of
distributional forecast.
positive correlation. The above observation also explains the \phase transition" from
the noon-3 PM epoch to the 3-6 PM in Fig. 2.15, i.e., the increased wind ramp caused
by the sudden change in diurnal heating/vertical mixing conditions [31]. In summary,
the statistics (especially the mean value) of the CRPS values vary slightly di®erently
over di®erent months and epochs, which suggests that the developed Markov-chain-
based distributional forecasting methods deliver consistent forecasting performance
across the entire year.
Further, three episodes of prediction intervals are plotted to better illustrate
the developed Markov-chain-based distributional forecasts. According to the above
observation, three representative time periods are chosen: 1) the 3-6 PM epoch of
January 8th, 2) the 0-3 AM epoch of January 23rd, and 3) the 3-6 PM epoch of
April 16th. The ¯rst period is chosen because January and the 3-6 PM epoch have
the highest mean CRPS value (i.e., least accurate forecasts), and the CRPS value of
January 8th is mostly close to the corresponding mean value. For the second period,
January 23rd is an extreme day that had the highest average ramp rate among all
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Figure 2.17: 10-min distributional forecasts on January 8th, 2010.
January days, and the 0-3 AM epoch experienced a large down-ramp from 75% to
25% of the rated capacity. The third period is chosen due to similar reasons as the
¯rst period, except that April is the month that has the least CRPS values. Fig. 2.17-
2.19 illustrate the 90% prediction intervals obtained by the developed Markov-chain-
based distributional forecasts. It is observed at for all three representative periods,
the realized wind farm generation reasonably lies in the 90% prediction intervals.
2.4.1.2 Point Forecasts
By comparing the point forecast P^ag(t) with the actual wind farm generation Pag(t),
forecast errors are quanti¯ed by mean absolute error (MAE), de¯ned as
MAE =
1
Nt
X
t
jPag(t)¡ P^ag(t)j; (2.17)
mean absolute percentage error (MAPE), de¯ned as
MAPE =
P
t jPag(t)¡ P^ag(t)jP
t Pag(t)
; (2.18)
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Figure 2.18: 10-min distributional forecasts on January 23rd, 2010.
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Figure 2.19: 10-min distributional forecasts on April 16th, 2010.
and root mean square error (RMSE), de¯ned as
RMSE =
sP
t jPag(t)¡ P^ag(t)j2
Nt
: (2.19)
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Table 2.2: 10-min point forecast error of wind farm generation over the period shown
in Fig.2.17.
Error Persistent
MC MC MC
(unif) (¿=2) (¿=1)
MAE 7.45 MW 7.61 MW 6.87 MW 6.71 MW
MAPE 8.75 % 8.94 % 8.07 % 7.88 %
RMSE 8.12 MW 8.24 MW 7.47 MW 7.31 MW
Table 2.3: 10-min point forecast error of wind farm generation over the period shown
in Fig.2.18.
Error Persistent
MC MC MC
(unif) (¿=2) (¿=1)
MAE 9.63 MW 9.88 MW 7.12 MW 6.85 MW
MAPE 7.53 % 7.73 % 5.58 % 5.36 %
RMSE 10.13 MW 10.37 MW 7.54 MW 7.25 MW
Two point forecast approaches are used as benchmark:
² persistent forecast [32]: P^ag(t+ 1)=Pag(t);
² forecast by Markov Chain with uniform quantization.
The test results by using the data for the three selected epoches and the year 2010 are
provided in Table 2.2-2.5, respectively. It is observed that the proposed Markov-chain-
based forecast approach has improved accuracy compared to the persistent forecast
approach. Note that the improvements for the ramp periods shown in Table. 2.2-
2.4 are all higher than the average over the entire month in Table. 2.5. Also note
that the Markov chains based on uniform quantization give less accurate forecast
than persistent forecast. This can be attributed to the uniform quantization not
considering the spatio-temporal dynamics of wind farm generation.
Another key observation from Table 2.2 and Table 2.5 is that smaller values
of ¿ leads to higher forecast accuracy of the Markov chains, at the cost of higher
complexity of the Markov chains (in terms of the number of states). The trade-o®
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Table 2.4: 10-min point forecast error of wind farm generation over the period shown
in Fig.2.19.
Error Persistent
MC MC MC
(unif) (¿=2) (¿=1)
MAE 8.43 MW 8.84 MW 6.92 MW 6.74 MW
MAPE 7.06 % 7.40 % 5.80 % 5.64 %
RMSE 8.87 MW 9.21 MW 7.23 MW 7.05 MW
Table 2.5: 10-min point forecast error of wind farm generation (all test data of the
year 2010 is used).
Error Persistent
MC MC MC
(unif) (¿=2) (¿=1)
MAE 6.97 MW 7.14 MW 6.83 MW 6.62 MW
MAPE 6.68 % 6.84 % 6.55 % 6.34 %
RMSE 7.23 MW 7.54 MW 7.09 MW 6.89 MW
between the forecast accuracy and the complexity of the Markov chain for the 9
AM-noon epoch of January 2010 is illustrated in Fig. 2.20.
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Figure 2.20: Number of states and the forecast error of Markov chains at various ¿
for the January 9 AM-noon epoch).
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2.5 Conclusion
A general spatio-temporal analysis framework is developed for wind farm generation
forecast, in which ¯nite-state Markov chain models are derived. The state space,
transition matrix and representative generation levels of the Markov chains are op-
timized by using a systematic approach. The short-term distributional forecast and
point forecast are derived by using the Markov chains and the ramp trend infor-
mation. One main contribution of this study is that the distributional forecast can
be directly integrated into the problems of unit commitment and economic dispatch
with uncertain wind generation, so that these problems can be studied in a general
Markov-chain-based stochastic optimization framework. Further, the performance of
the proposed Markov-chain-based point forecast approach is evaluated via numerical
tests. Improved forecast accuracy of the point forecast over persistent forecast is
observed.
In a related work [20], we are investigating power system economic dispatch
with wind farm generation by utilizing a realistic test system and the Markov-chain-
based distributional forecasts of wind farm generation. The distributional forecasts
of wind farm generation are integrated into a stochastic programming framework of
multi-period economic dispatch, so as to optimize the dispatch decisions over the
operating horizon. The impact of the forecast errors of wind farm generation on
economic dispatch is also studied.
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Chapter 3
MULTI-TIMESCALE SCHEDULING WITH STOCHASTIC WIND
GENERATION AND OPPORTUNISTIC DEMAND
3.1 Introduction
Wind energy is expected to constitute a signi¯cant portion of all renewable genera-
tion being integrated to the bulk power grids of North America [5]. High penetration
of wind generation not only brings many bene¯ts, economically and environmentally,
but also puts forth great operational challenges [33, 34]. Unlike conventional energy
resources, wind generation is non-dispatchable, in the sense that wind energy could
be not harvested simply by request. Further, wind generation highly depends on ge-
ographical and meteorological conditions and thus exhibits greater variability across
all timescales, which makes it challenging for system operators to obtain accurate
knowledge of future wind generation. Therefore, volatile and uncertain wind gen-
eration would have signi¯cant impact on the reliability of power systems, since the
precise balance between the energy supply and demand at all time is of paramount
signi¯cance to the reliable operations of power systems.
Recently, a signi¯cant amount of e®ort (e.g., [35{38]) has been directed towards
integrating wind generation into the operation and planning of bulk power grids, in
which wind generation is usually treated as negative load, and auto-regressive models
(e.g., in [35]) or scenario trees (e.g., in [36,37]) are used to characterize the uncertainty
in the net load. To cope with the uncertainty in the net load, the approaches proposed
in [36{38] resort to the operating reserve (the additional generation capacities from on-
line or fast-start generators) which is co-scheduled with the energy supply. However,
as pointed out in [5], the variability and uncertainty in the demand is to a much
lesser extent to that of wind generation, and hence, the cost of operating reserve
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would increases signi¯cantly when the penetration level of wind generation is high.
Towards high penetration levels of wind generation, changes will be required to the
traditional methods used by system operators in order to maintain the reliability of
bulk power grids.
With the objectives to maintain the reliability of bulk power grids with wind
generation integration and reduce the operational cost involved, we observe that op-
erating reserve could be obtained from the demand response of an emerging class of
energy users, namely opportunistic energy users, instead of conventional generation.
It is noted in [39] that over 10% daily electricity consumption in U.S. is from (resi-
dential and small commercial) energy users such as water heater, cloth dryers, and
dish washers. Traditionally, these energy users pay a ¯xed price per unit of electric-
ity that is established to represent an average cost of power generation over a given
time-frame (e.g., a season). In smart grids with two-way communications, real-time
pricing programs could be implemented so that the prices are tied with generation
cost and vary according to the availability of energy supplies. In this scenario, these
energy users would become smart by receiving and responding to real-time price sig-
nals, and are branded as opportunistic energy users, with the following behaviors
distinct from traditional energy users : 1) they access the smart grid systems in an
opportunistic manner, according to the availability of energy supply; 2) di®erent from
the \always-on" demand of traditional energy users, the load pro¯les of opportunistic
energy users can be bursty and can be either inelastic or elastic; 3) the demand of
opportunistic energy users respond to the price signals on a much ¯ner timescale, and
thus could be used to tune the balance between the energy supply and the demand
in a real-time manner (i.e., within minutes). The prevalence of the new class of op-
portunistic energy users, if utilized intelligently, makes DSM a promising solution to
reduce the costs incurred by high penetration of wind generation [40].
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(b) Scheduling horizon and timescales
Figure 3.1: A multi-timescale scheduling framework with integrated wind generation
and two classes of energy users
3.2 A Multi-timescale Scheduling Framework
In this paper, we study multi-timescale scheduling in a framework as illustrated in
Fig. 1. Speci¯cally, the system operator procures energy supply from conventional
generation and wind generation, and manage the demand of both classes of energy
users via day-ahead/real-time prices to achieve system-wise reliability. Conventional
generation, in turn, is drawn from two sources: base-load generators (e.g., thermal)
and fast-start generators (e.g., gas turbines), in which base-load generators have
stringent requirements on the minimum on/o® time and ramp rates, and thus are
scheduled one-day ahead and on hourly basis. The energy supply procurement and
end-user pricing are performed in two stages, i.e., day-ahead scheduling and real-time
scheduling, at di®erent timescales. In day-ahead scheduling, with the distributional
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information of wind generation W and energy demands Dt, the system operator
decides the energy supply procurement s from base-load generators and the day-
ahead price u, for the next day. In real-time scheduling, upon the realization of W
and Dt, the system operator decides the real-time price v for opportunistic energy
users, and uses fast-start generation or cancels part of scheduled base-load generation,
as needed, to close the gap between demand and supply.
It is worth noting that the above framework that consists of day-ahead and
real-time scheduling is developed based on the state-of-the-art scheduling schemes of
power systems (e.g. [33,34,41]), by explicitly incorporating opportunistic energy users
and the heterogeneous demand response of two classes of energy users.
3.2.1 General Problem Formulation
As illustrated in Fig. 3.1(b), a 24-hour period is divided into M T1-slots of equal
length, and each T1-slot, in turn, consists of K T2-slots. A T1-slot and a T2-slot can
span an hour and 10 minutes, respectively. The objective of the system operator is to
¯nd a policy ¼ that dictates the multi-timescale decisions s, u and v, so that the overall
expected pro¯t across the next day is maximized. Here, the scheduling problem is
investigated from the perspective of an (vertically integrated) utility which owns the
wind generation asset. Accordingly, wind generation is utilized as much as possible
(with no curtailment). and the study could be generalized to deregulated markets
where social welfare is maximized at the discretion of ISO. A general formulation of
the multi-timescale scheduling problem is provided below:
P : max
¼
MX
m=1
Rum(¼); (3.1)
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where Rum(¼) is the total net pro¯t in a T1-slot, under policy ¼, given by
1:
Rum(¼) =
KX
k=1
E¼Ãlk;m
Rlk;m(Ã
l
k;m; ¼); (3.2)
where Rlk;m is the net pro¯t in the kth T2-slot of themth T1-slot (henceforth called the
(k;m)th slot), and Ãlk;m is the system state in the (k;m)th slot that is observable in
real time2. When the opportunistic energy users are non-persistent, the system state
consists of the wind generation and the energy demand from traditional users, i.e.,
Ãlk;m = fWk;m; Dtk;mg. When the opportunistic energy users are persistent, the system
state is Ãlk;m = fWk;m; Dtk;m ; P lk;mg, where P lk;m denotes the number of persistent
opportunistic energy users carried over from the previous T2-slot to the (k;m)th slot.
3.2.2 Energy Supply and Demand Models
3.2.2.1 Stochastic wind generation
Development of wind generation forecast techniques has been the focus of a signi¯-
cant amount of research and industrial e®ort; see [6] for a detail discussion of wind
generation forecasting in practical power systems. One insight revealed by the sur-
vey [6] is that integrating a signi¯cant amount of wind will largely depend on the
accuracy of the wind power forecast. Therefore, by following the modeling method
in [36], we model forecast error as a random variable. Thus, given a \point-forecast"
W^m, the wind generation amount in (k;m)th slot hat is known to the system operator
in day-ahead scheduling is given by
Wk;m = W^m + "wm ; (3.3)
1The notation Eyx denotes the expectation over x conditioned on y.
2The super-scripts \u" and \l" are used to distinguish between the upper-level quantities in a
T1-slot and the lower-level quantities in a T2-slot.
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where forecast error "wm is closely tied to forecasting techniques, and hence can have
arbitrary probability distributions and can also be non-stationary across T1 slots.
Another observation from [6] is that the variance of "wm can be quite large (e.g.,
the mean absolute percentage error can be as high as 20%) for existing forecasting
techniques in practice.
3.2.2.2 Generation cost
To facilitate qualitative analysis, we adopt a linear generation cost model derived from
literatures [34,41]. Speci¯cally, base-load generation incurs a cost of c1 per unit when
dispatched in real-time; fast-start generation incurs a cost c2 per unit when dispatched
in real-time as non-spinning reserves; base-load generation, scheduled day-ahead but
canceled in real-time, incur a cost of cp per unit. Typically, c2>c1>cp. Further, we
assume that wind generation is cost-free and utilized as much as possible.
3.2.2.3 Uncertain demand of traditional energy users
Based on [42], we model the energy demand of traditional energy users in the (k;m)th
slot as a random variable with mean depending on the day-ahead price um, i.e.,
Dtk;m = ®tmum
°t + "t; (3.4)
where "t is a zero-mean random variable which accounts for the uncertainty of the
demand of traditional energy users, and °t is the price elasticity which characterizes
the price response of traditional energy users, and ®tm is the normalizing constant.
The price elasticity ° of energy users (either traditional or opportunistic), is de¯ned
in [42] as the ratio of percentage change in the expected demand to that of price, e.g.,
for the case of traditional energy users,
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°t =
um
E[Dtm ]
dE[Dtm ]
dum
: (3.5)
It is worth noting that the price elasticity is typically negative.
3.2.2.4 Uncertain demand of opportunistic energy users
Under real-time pricing, we assume that opportunistic energy users have the following
behaviors:
² Opportunistic energy users arrive independently according to a Poisson process
with rate ¸o, which is constant within a T1-slot but can vary across the T1-slots;
² In each T2-slot, an opportunistic energy user i in the system decides to accept
or reject the announced real-time price v by comparing with a price acceptance
level Vi, which is randomly chosen and is i.i.d across the opportunistic energy
users.
² The expected demand of opportunistic energy users has a price elasticity °o,
which is de¯ned in a similar manner to that of traditional energy users in (3.5);
² Each active opportunistic energy user has a per-unit power consumption of Eo.
3.2.2.5 Day-Ahead and Real-Time Pricing
We consider the following multi-timescale end-user pricing model:
² Traditional and opportunistic energy users have separate contracts: traditional
energy users pay day-ahead prices, and opportunistic energy users pay real-time
prices;
² Traditional energy users are informed, one day ahead, of the day-ahead prices
u corresponding to each T1-slot;
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² Opportunistic energy users receive the real-time price v at the beginning of each
T2-slot;
² Both day-ahead and real-time prices have price cap ucap and vcap, respectively.
The price caps are motivated by the study [43] and intended to protect energy
users by hedging against the risk under variable pricing.
3.2.3 Net Pro¯t in a T2-slot
Given the amount of conventional energy supply procurement sm and the day-ahead
price um settled for each T2-slot of the m-th T1-slot in day-ahead scheduling, together
with the realizations of wind generation Wk;m and traditional energy demand Dtk;m ,
the net pro¯t in the (k;m)th slot is
Rlk;m(Ã
l
k;m; ¼) = umDtk;m +E
¼
Dok;m
[vk;mDok;m + (¡cpsm)1A
+ (¡cp²k;m ¡ c1(sm ¡ ²k;m))1B
+ (¡c1sm + c2²k;m)1C ]; (3.6)
where Dok;m denotes the energy demand of opportunistic energy users, and the quan-
tity ²k;m is given by ²k;m=Wk;m+sm¡(Dtk;m+Dok;m). Indicator 1A corresponds to the
scenario when the wind generation is su±cient to meet the demand of both classes
of energy users. Indicator 1B refers to the scenario when the wind generation is not
su±cient but there is energy supply surplus, which necessitates the cancelation of
part of the scheduled base-load generation. Indicator 1C corresponds to the scenario
when there is energy supply de¯cit and fast-start generation is necessary to close the
gap. Formally, the indicators are described as follows:
46
1A =
8><>: 1 if Wk;m ¸ Dtk;m +Dok;m0 otherwise
1B =
8><>: 1 if 1A = 0 and ²k;m ¸ 00 otherwise (3.7)
1C =
8><>: 1 if ²k;m < 00 otherwise
3.3 Multi-timescale Scheduling with Non-persistent Opportunistic Energy Users
The tight coupling between the decisions, in the sense that the energy supply pro-
curement and prices in day-ahead scheduling have signi¯cant impact on real-time
prices, and the real-time pricing policy, in turn, a®ect the realized net pro¯t of day-
ahead schedule, underscores the need for joint optimization of the day-ahead and
real-time schedules. To this end, we take a \bottom-up" approach in solving the
multi-timescale scheduling problem. Speci¯cally, we ¯rst solve the real-time schedul-
ing problem, conditioned on day-ahead decisions. Then, we investigate the day-ahead
scheduling problem by taking into account the real-time pricing policy.
3.3.1 Real-time Scheduling on Timescale T2
Recall that non-persistent opportunistic energy users response to high real-time price
v by leaving the system, thus the total demand in the T2-slot only depends on current
decisions. Then, it su±ces to examine the scheduling problem in a T2-slot, which is
formulated as3:
PRTnon¡pst : max
v
Rl(Ãl; s; u; v); (3.8)
3We drop the su±x (k;m) for notational simplicity in this section.
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where recall that Ãl=fW;Dtg is the system state, and (s; u) are the decisions made
in day-ahead scheduling. The optimal solution to PRTnon¡pst de¯nes a real-time pricing
policy #s;u:Ã
l!v, a mapping from the system state to a real-time price conditioned
on the day-ahead decisions (s; u).
3.3.2 Day-ahead Scheduling on Timescale T1
The day-ahead scheduling problem could be re-formulated by taking into account the
real-time pricing policy #s;u. Further, sinceW and Dt are independent and identically
distributed across the T2-slots of the T1-slot, the day-ahead scheduling problem can
be optimized by simply considering the snapshot problem in a speci¯c T2-slot, given
by:
PDAnon¡pst : max
s;u
EuÃl
£
Rl(Ãl; s; u; #s;u(Ã
l))
¤
: (3.9)
3.3.3 Approximate Solutions
It is easy to see that a closed-form expression of #s;u in terms of arbitrary (s; u) is
unattainable. This observation, along with the convolved nature of the uncertainties
involved, makes a direct joint optimization of PDAnon¡pst challenging. We therefore
take an alternative approach and obtain approximate solutions to the multi-timescale
scheduling problems. In light of the characteristics of practical power systems, we
impose the following conditions.
² Condition I: Wind generation is not su±cient to meet the total energy demand
in the system.
² Condition II: The uncertainty in the demand of opportunistic energy users is
signi¯cantly less than the uncertainty of wind generation.
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Condition I is motivated by the Renewable Portfolio Standards of U.S. [44], in
which most of the current state-by-state projected penetration levels of renewable
generations (including wind generation) are below 30%. Under such a penetration
level, it is unlikely that wind generation is su±cient to meet the overall load. We
then provide an explanation of Condition II. Since opportunistic energy users arrive
according to a Poisson process with rate ¸o, it follows that the number of active users
which accept the current price v, denoted as Na, is a Poisson random variable with
mean ¸oT2P(V ¸ v). Further, it is known that ¸oT2 is typically large, and hence, Na
could be approximated by a Gaussian random variable. Note that the demand of the
opportunistic energy users is given by Do = NaEo, and recall that the price elasticity
de¯ned in (3.5):
°o =
v
E[Do]
dE[Do]
dv
: (3.10)
Then, it follows from (3.5) that
P(V ¸ v) ¼ ®ov°o ; (3.11)
where ®o , v¡°omin is a normalizing constant, and vmin denotes the highest price that is
acceptable to all opportunistic energy users. Therefore, the demand of opportunistic
energy users has a Gaussian distribution N (qo(v); ¾2o(v)), with
qo(v) , ¸oT2®ov°oEo;
¾2o(v) , ¸oT2®ov°oE2o : (3.12)
Observe from (3.12) that the variance of the demand of opportunistic energy users is of
the same order as its mean. Further, wind generation and the demand of opportunistic
energy users are typically comparable regarding the mean, and it is observed that the
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uncertainty of wind generation is so high that the standard deviation is of the same
order as its mean. Therefore, we conclude that Condition II holds.
3.3.3.1 Approximate Solution to the Real-time Scheduling Problem
It is easy to verify that 1A = 0 holds under Condition I. Then, by using (3.12), (3.6)
reduces to
~Rl(Ãl; s; u; v) = uDt ¡ c1s+ c2Y + (v ¡ c2) qo(v)
¡ (2¼)¡1=2c¾o(v) exp
¡¡y2=2¢
¡ c (Y ¡ qo(v)) (1¡Q (y)) ; (3.13)
where Y,s+W¡Dt, y,Y¡qo(v)¾o(v) , c,cp¡c1+c2, and Q(¢) is the tail probability of the
standard normal distribution.
The demand of opportunistic energy users is said to be relatively inelastic
if ¡1·°o<0, i.e., the percentage change in demand is greater than that of price;
otherwise, it is relatively elastic. Since the price elasticity can have signi¯cant impact
on the demand of opportunistic energy users, we proceed to study real-time schedule
for di®erent cases of elasticity.
Proposition 3.3.1. Suppose Condition I and Condition II hold. When the de-
mand of non-persistent opportunistic energy users is relatively inelastic, i.e., ¡1·°o<0,
the real-time pricing policy is given by ~#s;u(Ã
l)=vcap.
Remarks: The proof is provided in Appendix A. Note that the above result is
intuitive, since, with the opportunistic energy users' energy demand being relatively
insensitive (inelastic) to the real-time price, the system operator can maximize pro¯t
by simply announcing the highest possible price, vcap.
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Proposition 3.3.2. Suppose Condition I and Condition II hold. When the
demand of non-persistent opportunistic energy users is relatively elastic, i.e., °o < ¡1,
the real-time pricing policy ~#s;u which maximize R^
l(Ãl; s; u; v) is given by
~#s;u(Ã
l) =
8>>>><>>>>:
°o(c1¡cp)
1+°o
if Y ¸ qo(°o(c1¡cp)1+°o )
°oc2
1+°o
if Y < qo(
°oc2
1+°o
)
q¡1o (Y ) o.w.
(3.14)
Remarks: The proof is provided in Appendix A. Note that the ¯rst case, i.e.,
Y¸qo(°o(c1¡cp)1+°o ), refers to a case of supply surplus, i.e., there is more supply than the
total demand from traditional and opportunistic energy users, and the second case is
tied with a case of supply de¯cit. Then, it is natural that the real-time price in the
¯rst case is lower so as to encourage the consumption of opportunistic energy users,
whereas the real-time price in the second case is higher. Note also that, in both
cases, when the demand of opportunistic energy users becomes increasingly elastic,
the real-time price progressively decreases to the minimum allowable prices, i.e., c1¡cp
and c2, respectively. This monotonic behavior of the real-time price with respect to
increasing elasticity comes at no surprise, since, as °o!¡1, the average demand of
opportunistic energy user qo(v)!0, i.e., the opportunistic energy users become more
and more thrifty. Therefore, the system operator has to o®er power at increasingly
cheaper prices, up to the lowest possible price. Therefore, when opportunistic demand
is elastic, the above pricing scheme could e®ectively manage opportunistic demand
so as to enhance the system reliability.
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3.3.3.2 Approximate Solution to the Day-ahead Scheduling Problem
Having established a closed-form real-time pricing policy for both elastic and inelastic
cases, a day-ahead schedule can be obtained via the single-stage optimization below:
~PDAnon¡pst : max
s;u
EWE
u
Dt
h
Rl(Ãl; s; u; ~#s;u(Ã
l)
i
: (3.15)
where Rl is given by (3.6) and the expectations depend on the exact stochastic models
assumed for wind generation and traditional users' energy demand.
Proposition 3.3.3. The optimal decision of ~PDAnon¡pst is
u¤ =
8><>: ucap if ¡ 1 · °t < 0°t
1+°t
c1 if °t < ¡1;
s¤ = argmax
s
©
(c2 ¡ c1)s+EvW;D [(v ¡ c2)Do
¡ c1B(s+W ¡ ®tu¤°t ¡ "t ¡Do)]g : (3.16)
Remarks: The proof is provided in Appendix A. Based on the results in
Proposition 3.3.1, it is easy to see that when opportunistic demand is inelastic, the
optimal procurement of base-load generation is given by:
s¤ = qo(vcap) + ®tu¤
°t ¡ W^ + F¡1Z (1¡ cp=c) ; (3.17)
where F¡1Z (¢) denotes the inverse of the of Z , "t ¡ "w. One key observation from
(3.17) is that the last term, F¡1Z (1¡ cp=c) that equals s¤ ¡ EW;D[D ¡W ] could be
regarded as spinning reserve, i.e., the additional generation beside those scheduled
to satisfy the expected net demand EW;D[D ¡W ]. Since F¡1Z (¢) is a non-decreasing
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function, it is clearly that F¡1Z (1¡ cp=c) becomes larger as cp decreases, or c2 ¡ c1
increases, or the variance of Z increases. In other words, more spinning reserve would
be scheduled when the spinning reserve cost is lower, or when the non-spinning reserve
cost is higher, or when the uncertainty in net demand is higher. For the elastic case,
s¤ could be solved using numerical methods, and similar conclusion on reserve can be
drawn.
3.4 Multi-timescale Scheduling with Persistent Opportunistic Energy Users
We now study multi-timescale scheduling when the opportunistic energy users are
persistent. We assume that the opportunistic energy users are persistent across both
T2 and T1 slots, and that the opportunistic energy users that arrived in the day leave
the system at the end of the day. Due to the persistent nature of the opportunistic
energy users, scheduling decisions in both T2 and T1-slots a®ect the system trajec-
tory and hence scheduling decisions in future slots across both timescales. Thus, the
scheduling problem involves hierarchically structured control [45], with the hierarchy
de¯ned across timescales. With this insight, we treat the scheduling problem as a
multi-timescale Markov decision process [46]. where the decisions made in the higher
level a®ects both the state transition dynamics and the decision process at the lower
level, while decisions at the lower level a®ect only the decisions made at the upper
level. Further, the MMDP in this study has the following special characteristics: the
two timescales do not overlap, since the upper level decisions (day-ahead) are made in
non real-time. Thus, the upper level decisions are made without any direct observa-
tion of the e®ect it has on the lower level system dynamics, and make decisions solely
based on stochastic understanding of the lower level process. These properties make
the rigorous formulation of the multi-timescale scheduling problem, with persistent
users, uniquely challenging. We now describe the problem in detail.
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For day-ahead scheduling, the system operator decides the energy supply pro-
curement sm and the price um for the mth T1-slot in the next day. Recall that the
expected amount of wind generation W^m is available in day-ahead. We de¯ne the sys-
tem state, Ãum, corresponding to the mth T1-slot in the next day as Ã
u
m = fW^m; P umg,
where P um denotes the number of persistent opportunistic energy users carried over
from the (m¡ 1)th T1-slot. During real-time scheduling, the system operator has the
knowledge of the wind generation, the demand from traditional energy users and the
number of persistent opportunistic energy users carried over from previous T2-slot.
Based on this information, it must decide a real-time price vk;m for the kth T2-slot
in the mth T1-slot, i.e., the (k;m)th T2-slot. We de¯ne the observable (observable
in real time) state of the system in (k;m)th T2-slot as Ã
l
k;m = fWk;m; Dtk;m; P lk;mg,
where Wk;m denotes the wind generation in the kth T2-slot in the mth T1-slot, Dtk;m
is the energy demand from traditional energy users in the (k;m)th T2-slot, condi-
tioned on the day-ahead price, as de¯ned in Section II A, P lk;m denotes the number
of persistent opportunistic energy users carried over from the previous T2-slot to the
(k;m)th slot. Having explicitly de¯ned the system states for the day-ahead schedul-
ing and real-time scheduling, we then introduce the optimality equations. With
~Xm = [X1;m; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; XK;m], we have
V um(Ã
u
m) = max
sm;um
n
E ~Wm; ~Dtm
h
max
~vm
©
E~P lm
KX
k=1
£
Rlk;m(fÃum; Ãlk;mg; sm; um; vk;m)
¤
+ EPum+1=P lK;mV
u
m+1(Ã
u
m+1)
ªio
(3.18)
As noted earlier, this is an MMDP over a ¯nite horizon, with sm; um being the upper
level (slower timescale) decisions and vk;m being the lower level decisions.
To mitigate the complexity of the MMDP problem, we exploit the structural
properties of the multi-timescale scheduling problem and recast it as a classic MDP.
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Proposition 3.4.4. With appropriately de¯ned immediate reward Rum and action
space aum, the two-level scheduling problem can be written as a classic MDP at the
slower time-scale, the Bellman equation of which is given by:
V um(Ã
u
m) = max
aum=fsm;um;³mg
n
Rum(Ã
u
m; a
u
m) + E
fÃum;aumg
Pum+1
V um+1(Ã
u
m+1)
o
; (3.19)
where ³m:fWk;m;Dtk;m ;P lk;mg!vk;m is a stationary mapping within the mth T1-slot,
and the various expectations used in the MDP formulation are de¯ned in (3.20).
E
fÃum;aumg
Pum+1
(:) = E
P l1;m
P l2;m
E
P l2;m
P l3;m
¢ ¢ ¢EP
l
K¡1;m
P lK;m
E
P lK;m
Pum+1
(:)
E
P lk;m
P lk+1;m
(:) = EWk;mEDtk;mENk;mE
fNk;m;P lk;mg
P lk+1;m
(:)
¦vk;m = P (V · vk;m)
E
fNk;m;P lk;mg
P lk+1;m
(:) =
Nk;m+P
l
k;mX
P lk+1;m=0
0B@ P lk;m +Nk;m
P lk+1;m
1CA
(1¡ ¦vk;m)P
l
k+1;m(¦vk;m)
(Nk;m+P
l
k;m¡P lk+1;m)(:) (3.20)
We now proceed to discuss the transformation of the two-level scheduling
problem from an MMDP to a classic MDP. In the two-level scheduling problem,
recall that the lower level decisions are essentially the mapping from the realizations
of wind generation, traditional users' energy demand and persistent opportunistic
energy users to the real-time price, i.e., ³k;m : fWk;m; Dtk;m; P lk;mg ! vk;m. Consider
a stationary real-time pricing policy within each T1 slot, i.e., ³1;m = ³2;m : : : ³K;m,
and denote this stationary mapping by ³m. Thus, vk;m = ³m(Wk;m; Dtk;m ; P
l
k;m). A
key step towards the above results is to view ³m as an action at taken day-ahead
scheduling, in addition to actions sm; um. With this insight, we can simplify the
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MMDP into a classic MDP, as discussed below. Note that in (3.4.4), V um(Ã
u
m) is
the expected net reward from slot m until slot M in day-ahead scheduling, and the
terminal reward is given by
V uM(Ã
u
M) = max
auM
RuM(Ã
u
M ; a
u
M): (3.21)
Note that the immediate reward corresponding to mth T1-slot is a function of the
realized values of wind generation mean (that is accurately forecast in day-ahead)
and the number of persistent opportunistic energy users carried over from previous
T1-slot. We now proceed to explicitly characterize the immediate reward R
u
m, for
m 2 f1; : : :Mg:
Rum(Ã
u
m; a
u
m) = V
l
k;m(fW^m; P lk;mg; aum)jk=1; (3.22)
where P l1;m = P
u
m by de¯nition, and for k 2 f1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K ¡ 1g
V lk;m(fW^m; P lk;mg; aum = fsm; um; ³mg)
= EW^mWk;mE
um
Dtk;m
Rlk;m(Ã
l
k;m; a
u
m)
+ E
P lk;m
P lk+1;m
V lk+1;m(fW^m; P lk+1;mg; aum); (3.23)
and V lK;m is given by
V lK;m(fW^m; P lK;mg; aum) = EW^mWK;mEumDtK;mR
l
K;m(Ã
l
K;m; a
u
m); (3.24)
where EW^mWK;m and E
um
DtK;m
are de¯ned using (1) and (2), respectively. Note that the
quantities Rlk;m and V
l
k;m can be regarded as the immediate reward and the net re-
ward at the lower level MDP, respectively. The quantity Rlk;m is a function of the
realizations of the wind generation, the demand from traditional energy users and
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the number of persistent opportunistic energy users carried over from the previous
T2-slot. More speci¯cally, (3.6) can be re-formulated as
Rlk;m(Ã
l
k;m; a
u
m) = umDtk;n +ENk;mE
fNk;m;P lk;m;vk;mg
Nak;m
[vk;mDok;m
+ (¡cpsm)1A + (¡²k;mcp ¡ (sm ¡ ²k;m)c1)1B
+ (¡c1sm + c2²k;m)1C ]; (3.25)
where Nk;m denotes the number of opportunistic energy users arriving at the (k;m)th
slot, which is Poisson distributed.
Summarizing, we have rigorously formulated the multi-timescale scheduling
problem as an MMDP with special characteristics, and shown that it can be recast
explicitly as an MDP with continuous state and action spaces. Using appropriate
discretization techniques, we can reformulate it as a classic discrete state and action
space MDP that can be solved optimally or near-optimally using various techniques
available in the literature [47].
3.5 Numerical Results
We now study, via numerical experiments, the performance of the proposed ap-
proach in the multi-timescale scheduling framework, through comparison with ex-
isting scheduling schemes in a benchmark smart grid system where all the energy
users are assumed to exhibit traditional response to the day-ahead prices u with the
same price elasticity °t. Therefore, the scheduling and pricing decisions (¹s
¤;¹u¤) of the
benchmark system could easily be obtained from (3.16) by neglecting the opportunis-
tic demand and real-time pricing, i.e., ¹s¤=¹®t¹u¤°t¡W^+F¡1Z (1¡cp=c) and ¹u¤ = u¤. The
performance metrics are the per unit generation cost, which is de¯ned as the ratio
of total generation cost to the total demand served, and system reliability metrics
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including loss of load probability (LOLP) and expected energy not served (EENS).
Further, we also discuss the impact on the dispatched base-load and fast-start gen-
erations.
In this numerical study, we focus only on the key parameters and investigate
their impact on the system performance, including the penetration level of wind gen-
eration ´w, the penetration level of opportunistic demand ´o and the uncertainty of
wind generation. Speci¯cally, as in literatures, the penetration level of wind genera-
tion ´w is de¯ned as the ratio of wind generation to the total energy supply over the
whole scheduling horizon. Similarly, the penetration level of opportunistic demand
´o is de¯ned as the ratio of opportunistic demand to the total energy demand. Data
for other system parameters are described as follows. For simplicity, we assume that
the penetration level of opportunistic demand is a constant across T1 slots.
3.5.1 Simulation Data
3.5.1.1 Stochastic Wind Generation
Wind generation data are collected from [66] and scaled according to the penetration
level ´w. The \point-forecast" W^m in (3.3) is provided using the Markov chain devel-
oped in [66]. For simplicity, the probability distribution illustrated in Fig. 3.2 is used
for "w. It is easy to see that the forecast error "wm has a support (¡3¸W^m; 3¸W^m),
and ¸ is exactly the MAPE. Therefore, the uncertainty of wind generation could be
controlled by varying ¸, which is viable by varying the number of states of Markov
chain. For day-ahead forecast, ¸ is usually around 20% [6].
3.5.1.2 Generation Cost
We adopt the approach in [48], which utilizes the heat rates of generators to compute
the generation cost. Here, base-load generators of coal type and fast-start generators
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Figure 3.2: PDF of wind generation forecast error in the mth T1-slot.
of #2 oil type are considered. Speci¯cally, c1=30.45$/MWh, c2=228.51$/MWh and
cp=15$/MWh.
3.5.1.3 Uncertain Demand
The hourly demand data in Table. 4 of [49] with peak value 8550 MW is used for
both systems. For given total hourly demand D, we set E[Dt]=D for the benchmark
system; for the multi-timescale scheduling system, traditional and opportunistic de-
mand are properly scaled by setting E[Dt]=(1¡ ´o)D and E[Do]=´oD, respectively.
For "t, a zero-mean normal distribution with standard deviation ~¾t that is 3% of
the expected demand E[Dtm ] is used by truncating over (¡3~¾t;3~¾t). Further, we use
°t=¡0:5, °o=¡2 and 0.05$/kWh as the price cap for both u and v.
3.5.2 Performance Evaluation and Discussion
We use the case of non-persistent opportunistic demand and the hour with peak de-
mand of 8550 MW as an illustrative example. Note that the metrics are computed
via Monte-carlo simulations by choosing wind generation and demand randomly ac-
cording to their distributions speci¯ed earlier.
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Figure 3.3: Per unit generation cost (¸ = 20%).
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Figure 3.4: Dispatched fast-start generation (¸ = 20%).
3.5.2.1 Per Unit Generation Cost
In Fig. 3.3, the per unit generation cost is plotted against various ´w. In the multi-
timescale scheduling system, the per unit generation cost decreases signi¯cantly with
´w, since wind energy is harvested \cost-free"; in contrast, in the benchmark system,
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the per unit generation cost is not really reduced. The reason is revealed in Fig. 3.4,
i.e., much more fast-start generation is dispatched in the benchmark system.
3.5.2.2 Reliability
In practice, usually, a ¯xed amount of active reserve is scheduled. One practical rule is
the \X+Y " rule [50], in which active reserve is R=X%D^+Y%W^ for given forecasted
demand D^ and wind W^ . As discussed earlier, part of s¤ is scheduled as spinning
reserve of amount SR=s¤¡E[D ¡ W ]. Therefore, adhering to a \3+10" rule, we
investigate the system reliability by considering NS=R¡SR fast-start generation as
active non-spinning reserve, quanti¯ed by LOLP, i.e., E[1fD¡s¤¡W>NSg], and EENS,
i.e., T1E[(D¡s¤¡W¡NS)+]. It is observed from the results illustrated in Fig. 3.5
that, for given penetration levels of wind generation, the proposed multi-timescale
scheduling approach achieves higher reliability with the same reserve requirement.
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Figure 3.5: System Reliability (¸ = 20%).
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3.5.2.3 Impact of Forecast Accuracy
We control the uncertainty of wind generation due to forecast error by varying ¸, and
investigate the impact on the fast-start generation that is necessary to maintain the
system reliability. It is observed in Fig. 3.6 that the fast-start generation requirement
increases with ¸ in all systems. For multi-timescale scheduling, this is because v keeps
¯xed and the opportunistic demand could not be reduced any further in the supply
de¯cit case of Proposition 3.3.2). Therefore, it is imperative to develop advanced
models and techniques to improve the forecast accuracy.
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Figure 3.6: Non-spinning reserve requirement (´w = 20%).
Summarizing, the above results suggest that the proposed multi-timescale
scheduling schemes have the potential to enhance the system reliability and reduce
the cost incurred by wind generation integration. Note also that, the bene¯t brought
by multi-timescale scheduling could be very limited if ´o is low, e.g., when ´o·10%,
as observed in Fig. 3.3- Fig. 3.6.
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3.6 Conclusion
Multi-timescale scheduling and pricing with traditional and opportunistic energy
users is investigated to address the challenge of integrating volatile wind genera-
tion into smart grids. Speci¯cally, when the opportunistic users are non-persistent,
we obtain closed-form solutions to the multi-scale scheduling problem, by assuming
two reasonable conditions. When the opportunistic energy users are persistent, we
formulate the scheduling problem as an MMDP and discussed its special character-
istics. We then show that the scheduling problem can be recast, explicitly, as a
classic MDP with continuous state and action spaces, the solution to which can be
found via standard MDP solution techniques. The optimal scheduling and pricing
decisions are characterized rigorously for both non-persistent model and persistent
model. Through numerical experiments, we demonstrate the potential bene¯t of the
proposed multi-timescale scheduling approach, when compared with existing system
and schemes.
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PART II
SYNCHROPHASOR DATA MINING AND INFORMATION
FUSION
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Chapter 4
A ROBUST DATA-MINING FRAMEWORK FOR ON-LINE DSA USING
ADAPTIVE ENSEMBLE DECISION TREE LEARNING
4.1 Introduction
Dynamic security assessment [51] can provide system operators important informa-
tion regarding the transient performance of power systems under various possible
contingencies. By using the real-time or near real-time measurements collected by
phasor measurement units (PMUs), online DSA can produce more accurate security
classi¯cation decisions for the present OC or imminent OCs. However, online DSA
still constitutes a challenging task due to the computational complexity incurred by
the combinatorial nature of N¡k (k=1;2;¢ ¢ ¢ ) contingencies and the massive scale of
practical power systems, which makes it intractable to perform power °ow analysis
and time domain simulations for all contingencies in real-time.
The advent of data mining techniques provides a promising solution to handle
these challenges. Cost-e®ective DSA schemes have been proposed by leveraging the
power of data mining tools in classi¯cation, with the basic idea as follows. First, a
knowledge base is prepared through comprehensive o²ine studies, in which a number
of predicted OCs are used by DSA software packages to create a collection of training
cases. Then, the knowledge base is used to train classi¯cation models that char-
acterize the decision rules to assess system stability. Finally, the decision rules are
used to map the real-time PMU measurements of pre-fault attributes to the security
classi¯cation decisions of the present OC for online DSA. The data mining tools that
have proven e®ective for DSA include decision trees [52{57], neural networks [58{60]
and support vector machines [61{63]. More recently, fuzzy-logic techniques [64] and
ensemble learning techniques [65{67] have been utilized to enhance the performance
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of these data mining tools in security assessment of power systems. Among various
data mining tools, DTs have good interpretability (or transparency) [68], in the sense
that the secure operating boundary identi¯ed by DTs can be characterized by using
only a few critical attributes and corresponding thresholds. As illustrated in Fig. 4.1,
a well-trained DT can e®ectively and quickly produce the security classi¯cation deci-
sions for online DSA, since only a few PMU measurements of the critical attributes
are needed. The high interpretability of DTs is amenable to operator-assisted preven-
tive and corrective actions against credible contingencies [69]. However, as discussed
in [70], there exists an \accuracy versus transparency" trade-o® for data mining tools.
In order to obtain a more accurate classi¯cation model from DTs, one possible ap-
proach is to use an ensemble of DTs at the cost of reduced interpretability. Examples
of ensembles of DTs for DSA are the multiple optimal DTs [56], random forest [65]
and boosting DTs [66].
When applying data-mining-based approaches to online DSA, there are two
main issues that can result in inaccurate security classi¯cation decisions. First, the
realized OCs in online DSA can be dissimilar to those in the initial knowledge base
prepared o²ine, since the predicted OCs might not be accurate and the OCs can
change rapidly over time. Second, it is possible that a system topology change may
occur during the operating horizon due to the forced outage of generators, trans-
formers and transmission lines. These factors can compromise the performance of
the classi¯cation model trained o²ine. To develop a robust data-mining-based on-
line DSA scheme, the initial knowledge base and the classi¯cation model have to be
updated in a timely manner to track these changed situations. However, there have
been limited e®orts directed towards handling OC variations and topology changes.
In the scheme proposed in [56], when the built DT fails to classify the changed OCs
correctly, a new DT is built from scratch or a sub-tree of the DT is replaced by
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a newly built corrective DT. Aiming to deal with possible topology changes, refer-
ences [59, 67] suggest creating an \overall" knowledge base that covers all possible
system topologies and choosing the attributes that are independent of topology for
data mining.
In this chapter, a robust data-mining-based DSA scheme using adaptive en-
semble DT learning is proposed to handle these challenges in a more e±cient manner.
Speci¯cally, the classi¯cation model for DSA is based on boosting multiple unpruned
small-height DTs1. Generally, the height of a DT is the maximal number of tests
that is needed for the DT to classify a case. For the sake of brevity, small DTs are
referred to as small DTs throughout. In o²ine training, the small DTs and their
voting weights are sequentially identi¯ed in a \gradient-descent" manner to minimize
the misclassi¯cation cost. The small DTs, together with their voting weights, are
then periodically updated throughout the operating horizon by using new training
cases that are created to account for any change in OC or network topology. Di®erent
from existing DT-based DSA schemes, the training cases are assigned di®erent data
weights by each small DT; and higher data weights are assigned to a new training case
if it is misclassi¯ed by the small DTs. The aforementioned techniques are utilized to
minimize the misclassi¯cation cost as new training cases are added to the knowledge
base, so that the classi¯cation model could smoothly track the changes in OCs or
system topology.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. A brief introduction to DTs
and their application to DSA are given in Section 4.2. The proposed scheme is
discussed in detail in Section 4.3. An illustrative example by using the IEEE 39-bus
test system is presented in Section 4.4. The proposed scheme is applied to the WECC
system in Section 4.5. Finally, conclusions are provided in Section 4.6.
1For the sake of abbreviation, small-height DTs are referred to as small DTs in the remainder
of this disseration
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4.2 Background on DT and Its Application to DSA
Internal node Leaf node
Decision
CSR
Training cases
Root node
Figure 4.1: A fully-grown DT of height 5 for the WECC system using an initial
knowledge base consisting of 481 OCs and three critical contingencies.
The data-mining framework for DSA was originally developed in [52], in which
DTs were introduced to perform DSA for power systems. A DT, as illustrated in
Fig. 4.1, is a tree-structured predictive model that maps the measurements of an
attribute vector x to a predicted value y^. When DTs are used for online DSA, the
attribute vector can consist of various PMU-measured variables and other system in-
formation, and the binary decision given by DTs represents the security classi¯cation
decision of an OC for a critical contingency (e.g., y^=+1 represents the insecure case,
and y^=¡1 for the secure case). Usually, bus voltage phase angles, bus voltage magni-
tudes and branch power/current °ows that are directly measured by PMUs are used
as numerical attributes. Fig. 4.1 illustrates the numerical and categorical attributes
used in a trained DT, in which an attribute with initial \V" stand for a bus voltage
magnitude, the attributes with initials \P", \Q", and \A" stand for an active power
°ow, a reactive power °ow, and a voltage phase angle di®erence between two buses,
respectively (the bus numbers in attribute names are di®erent from their real ones),
\CTNO$" stands for the index of contingency.
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In a DT, each non-leaf node tests the measurement of an attribute and decides
which child node to drop the measurements into, and each leaf node corresponds to a
predicted value. As shown in Fig. 4.1, in a DT for DSA, the predictive value of each
leaf node is either \S" or \I", in which \S" stands for secure cases and \I" for insecure
cases. Fig. 4.1 also illustrates the training cases that fall into each node, by using
dark bars for secure cases and bright bars for insecure cases. The number of non-leaf
nodes along the longest downward path from the root node to a leaf node is de¯ned
as the height of a DT. Given a collection of training cases fxn; yngNn=1, the objective
of DT induction is to ¯nd a DT that can ¯t the training data and accurately predict
the decisions for new cases. State-of-the-art DT induction algorithms are often based
on greedy search. For example, in the classi¯cation and regression tree (CART)
algorithm [71], the DT grows by recursively splitting the training set and choosing
the critical attributes (numerical or categorical) and critical splitting rules (CSR)
with the least splitting costs until some prede¯ned stopping criterion (e.g., the size
of tree or the number of training cases in a leaf node) is satis¯ed. In general, a fully-
grown DT that accurately classi¯es the training cases might misclassify new cases
outside the knowledge base. This feature of fully-grown DTs is usually referred to as
\over¯tting" [68]. In order to avoid over¯tting, DTs are usually pruned by collapsing
unnecessary sub-trees into leaf nodes. As illustrated in Fig. 4.1, in a pruned DT, some
leaf nodes do not have pure training cases, which is a result of either tree pruning or
early termination of tree growing [68]. By removing the nodes that may have grown
based on noisy or erroneous data, the pruned DT is more resistant to over¯tting than
a fully-grown DT without pruning, and thus can give more accurate security decisions
A major advancement in DT-based DSA schemes was made in [57], in which
the authors proposed to build a single DT to handle multiple contingencies, by using
the index of contingencies as a categorical attribute of the DT. It is worth noting that a
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DT built by using such an approach can give the security classi¯cation decisions of an
OC concurrently for all the critical contingencies in the knowledge base, which is more
e±cient and can identify the critical attributes that are independent of contingencies.
For example, the DT in Fig. 4.1, using CTNO$ as a categorical attribute, can give
security classi¯cation decisions of an OC for three critical contingencies, i.e., CT6,
CT45 and CT46, at the same time, and the critical attributes Q12;16, P7;2, Q7;9,
A11;9, A12;19, A5;12 and P36;7 can give security classi¯cation decisions independent of
contingence type for some cases.
4.2.1 Small DTs
(a) Small DT h1 (b) Small DT h2 (c) Small DT h3
Figure 4.2: The ¯rst three small DTs (J=2) for the WECC system, the voting weights
of which are 4.38, 3.04 and 0.93, respectively.
A small DT with tree height J is obtained by stopping the splitting of any
leaf node if the downward path from the root node to that leaf node has exactly
J non-leaf nodes. According to [72], a small DT is much less prone to over¯tting
compared to a fully-grown DT; therefore, the small DTs used in the proposed scheme
are built without pruning. Examples of small DTs are given in Fig. 4.2 with J=2. It
can be seen that the non-leaf nodes of h1 are exactly the same as the corresponding
nodes of the DT in Fig. 4.1. It is worth noting that the optimal choice of J is highly
dependent on the knowledge base, and should be decided based on a bias-variance
analysis [68], which will be discussed in the case study of Section IV. Note also that
di®erent from [68], the tree height, instead of the number of nodes, is used as the
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metric to quantify the tree size. The reason, which will be soon apparent, is to restrict
the number of nodes that will be revised when updating DTs to a value less than J .
4.2.2 Ensemble of DTs
In ensemble-DT-based DSA schemes, the security classi¯cation decision of an OC
vector x, denoted by HL(x), is made based on the voting of multiple DTs. For an
ensemble of DTs hl(l = 1;2;¢ ¢ ¢ ;L), there are two approaches to DSA classi¯cation:
deterministic and probabilistic. For the deterministic approach, the security classi¯-
cation decision is given by:
HL(x) =
8><>: +1; if
PL
l=1 alhl(x) ¸ 0
¡1; o.w.
(4.1)
where al (l = 1;2;¢ ¢ ¢ ;L) are the voting weights of DTs. To obtain probabilistic
classi¯cation decisions, the \logistic correction" technique [73] can be applied. Then,
the probability of an \Insecure" classi¯cation decision is given by:
Pr(HL(x) = +1jx) = 1
1 + exp(¡
LP
l=1
alhl(x))
(4.2)
In this chapter, deterministic classi¯cation decision is used to calculate the misclas-
si¯cation rate for case studies.
The existing methods for ensemble DT learning include bagging, random sub-
space method, boosting and random forest. Reference [74] compares these methods,
and ¯nds that boosting and random forest achieve signi¯cantly better performance
than the others. In previous work by the authors [66], an algorithm for boosting
DTs is developed in the context of avoiding over¯tting to noisy training data. In this
chapter, the boosting algorithm is employed in online DSA to deal with OC varia-
71
tions and possible topology changes. The algorithm for building the small DTs and
calculating the voting weights will be discussed in Section III.A.
4.2.3 Updating DTs
One existing approach for updating a DT without rebuilding it from scratch is the
e±cient tree restructuring algorithm [75], with the main idea summarized as follows.
When incorporating a new case, the DT remains unchanged if the new case is classi¯ed
correctly; otherwise, the non-leaf nodes along the path which the new case passes are
revised in a top-down manner. Speci¯cally, for each non-leaf node to be revised, a
new test is ¯rst identi¯ed by using the new case as well as the existing cases that
fall into the non-leaf node. If di®erent from the original test, the newly identi¯ed
test is then installed at the non-leaf node, followed by tree restructuring operations
recursively applied on the sub-tree corresponding to that non-leaf node (there are six
slightly di®erent restructuring operations for various structures of the sub-tree, which
are not discussed here). The motivation for these restructuring operations is that the
original test at the non-leaf node is highly likely to be the optimal tests for the two
child nodes after restructuring, which is usually the case when categorical attributes
are used by the test [75]; in this scenario, the two child nodes are exempted from
further update.
4.3 Proposed Scheme for Online DSA
The proposed scheme for online DSA, as illustrated in Fig. 4.3, consists of three steps,
with the details described below.
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Prepare a knowledge base 
consisting of N training cases 
Train small DTs and calculate the 
voting weights via boosting
Offline training 
Update small DTs and 
re-calculate the voting weights
Periodic update
Use PMU measurements to map 
the present OC to a security 
classification decision
Online DSA
Refined classification model
Initial knowledge base 
and classification model
DSA results
Incorporate new training cases 
(oc variations and topology change are 
accounted for) into knowledge base 
Figure 4.3: Proposed scheme for online DSA using adaptive ensemble DT learning.
4.3.1 O²ine Training
4.3.1.1 Initial Knowledge Base Preparation
First, NOC predicted OCs are generated day ahead for each period of the future
operating horizon (e.g., the next 24 hours) based on day-ahead load forecast and gen-
eration schedules; each period may span several hours, and can be divided according
to the hours of peak load, shoulder load and o®-peak load. Then, for each of the NOC
day-ahead predicted OCs, detailed power °ow analysis and time-domain simulations
are performed for K critical contingencies that are selected by the system operator
or based on prior experience. It is worth noting that the key focus here is on dealing
with OC variations and possible topology changes, and thus the selection or screen-
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ing of critical contingencies is beyond the scope of this study. By using speci¯ed
dynamic security criteria (e.g., transient stability, damping performance, transient
voltage drop/rise, transient frequency, relay margin), the day-ahead predicted OCs
are labeled as \Secure" or \Insecure" for each critical contingency.
As a result, an initial knowledge base that consists of N= NOC£K training
cases is obtained, in which each case is represented by a vector fx1;¢ ¢ ¢ ;xP ;yg, where
x1 is the index of a critical contingency, fx2;¢ ¢ ¢ ;xPg are the values of numerical at-
tributes obtained from power °ow analysis of an OC, and y is the transient security
classi¯cation decision of the OC for the critical contingency x1. Based on the previ-
ous studies [55{57], the following PMU-measured variables are selected as numerical
attributes:
² Branch active power °ows fPij; i2B or j2Bg
² Branch reactive power °ows fQij; i2B or j2Bg
² Branch current °ows (magnitude) fIij; i2B or j2Bg
² Bus voltage magnitudes fVi; i2Bg
² Bus voltage phase angle di®erences fAij,Ai¡Aj; i, j2B and i>jg,
where B denotes the set of PMU buses in the system. It is worth noting that only
raw measurements reported by PMUs are used as the numerical attributes in this
work; more generally, the variables computed using other system information may
also be used, e.g., the voltage at the bus connected to a PMU bus when the branch
impedance is constant [55].
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Figure 4.4: Boosting small DTs
4.3.1.2 Boosting Small DTs
The basic algorithmic °owchart of boosting small DTs is illustrated in Fig. 4.4. For
convenience, de¯ne HJ as the class of small DTs with height J , de¯ne FL as the score
of the weighted voting of the ensemble of small DTs, i.e., FL(x)=
PL
l=1alhl(x), and
de¯ne CN(FL) as the cost function of FL on the N training cases, given by:
CN(FL) =
1
N
NX
n=1
log2(1 + e
¡ynFL(xn)): (4.3)
It is observed from (4.1) and (4.3) that CN(FL) lies strictly above the misclassi¯cation
error rate of HL. Then, a primary objective of boosting is to minimize CN(FL), by
identifying the small DTs hl2HJ and their voting weights al2R+. An analytical
formulation is provided below:
PF : min
h1;¢¢¢ ;hL2HJ
a1;¢¢¢ ;aL2R+
CN(FL): (4.4)
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The convexity and the di®erentiability of CN(FL) with regard to FL make it possible
to solve PF in (4.4) by using a line search strategy [76], the details of which are
summarized as follows. A small DT hl is chosen to be the \gradient" of CN at
Fl¡1 projected onto HJ , and the voting weight al is computed as the \step size"
that minimizes CN(Fl¡1 + alhl). Then, the small DT hl is added to Fl¡1 to obtain
Fl=Fl¡1+alhl. The above steps are iterated, for l=1;2;¢ ¢ ¢ ;L, by using F0 as a zero
function. More speci¯cally, it is shown in [66] that the small DT hl can be obtained
by solving the following problem:
P(l)h : min
hl2HJ
1
N
NX
n=1
w(l)n 1fyn 6=hl(xn)g; (4.5)
where w
(l)
n ,(1+eynFl¡1(xn))¡1 is the positive data weight of the training case fxn;yng,
and 1fyn 6=hl(xn)g takes value 0 if the training case fxn;yng is correctly classi¯ed by the
small DT hl (otherwise, it takes value 1). By de¯nition of w
(l)
n , it is easy to observe
that the data weights are assigned adaptively by small DTs, in the sense that if the
training case fxn;yng is misclassi¯ed by the small DT hl, then w(l+1)n >w(l)n , i.e., the
training case has a higher data weight in the next round of the boosting process. It is
worth noting that highly skewed training data (e.g., the case in [65]) can be handled by
scaling up the weights of under-represented cases, such that
P
y=+1w
(l)
n =
P
y=¡1w
(l)
n .
As suggested in (4.5), the objective of P(l)h is to determine the small DT that has
the least misclassi¯cation error rate on the weighted training data. Thus, the small
DT hl can be obtained by employing the standard CART algorithm [71] subject to
the tree height J , and by using misclassi¯cation error rate as the splitting cost when
building the DT. Then, its positive voting weight is obtained by solving the following
problem:
P(l)a : min
a2R+
G
(l)
N (a); (4.6)
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where G
(l)
N (a),CN(Fl¡1 + ahl). Under the condition that hl is a \descent direction"
of CN(Fl¡1), it is easy to verify that G
(l)0
N (0)<0 and G
(l)00
N (a)>0 holds for any a2R+.
Therefore, G
(l)
N (a) has a unique minimum in R+ that can be found using standard
numerical solution methods (e.g., Newton's method).
4.3.2 Periodic Updates
4.3.2.1 New Training Case Creation
In the initial knowledge base prepared o²ine, the predicted OCs generated using day-
ahead forecast may not re°ect the actual system conditions, which is very likely to
be the case for power systems with high penetration of variable renewable generation
and distributed generation. Therefore, as the operating horizon is approached and
the data available to system operators is updated, it will be necessary to utilize
short-term forecast and schedules to generate newly changed OCs and add them
to the knowledge base on a slot-by-slot basis (one slot may span several minutes
depending on the processing speed [55]). Further, in case of a topology change, the
post-disturbance OCs should also be incorporated into the knowledge base. After
power °ow analysis of these newly changed OCs, new training cases are generated as
described in Section III-A-1. It is worth noting that during the operating horizon, it
is also likely that the knowledge base may need to be updated by incorporating new
contingencies of interest. The solution to this problem has been discussed in [66]. In
this work, the critical contingency list is assumed to remain unchanged during the
operating horizon.
4.3.2.2 Updating the Classi¯cation Model
Given the newly created training cases, the classi¯cation model is updated by using
one new case at a time. Speci¯cally, for the k-th new training case fxN+k; yN+kg,
the classi¯cation model is updated by incorporating fxN+k; yN+kg with a data weight
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w
(l)
N+k=(1+e
yN+kFl¡1(xN+k))¡1 into the small DT hl and recalculating the voting weight
al, iteratively for l = 1;2;¢ ¢ ¢ ; L.
A key step for incorporating a new training case into a small DT is to adopt
the method described in Section II-C. Since misclassi¯cation error rate is used as
the metric of splitting cost, as suggested in (4.5), it is easy to observe that there
exists a even simpler solution for updating the small DTs. Speci¯cally, a small DT
remains unchanged if the new case is correctly classi¯ed; otherwise, only the sub-
tree corresponding to the ¯rst non-leaf node that has a di®erent decision for the new
case is subject to update. It is worth noting that, since the tree height is J , the
total number of non-leaf nodes to be revised is at most J . After the small DT hl is
updated, its voting weight al is recalculated by minimizing G
(l)
N+k(a).
The process of updating the classi¯cation model is summarized in Algorithm 1.
It is useful to note that when the k-th new training case is used to update the small
DTs, the data weights of the previous N+k¡1 training cases calculated in Step 4 of
Algorithm 1 are di®erent from the data weights that were used in building or updating
the small DTs in the past rounds. Therefore, unlike the case in o²ine training, it
is possible that the updated small DT hl is not a \descent direction" of CN+k at
Fl¡1 any more. In order to detect and handle this situation, an extra step is used in
Algorithm 1. Speci¯cally, if
PN+k
n=1 w
(l)
n ynhl(xn)<0, then ¡hl is a \descent direction"
and used for weighted voting.
4.3.3 Online DSA
In real-time, when the synchronized PMU measurements are received, the pre-fault
values of the numerical attributes are retrieved and combined with the indices of
all critical contingencies to create K unlabeled cases, which will be used by the
classi¯cation model to give security classi¯cation decisions of the present OC for the
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Algorithm 1 Periodic updates using a new training case
1: Input: A new training case fxN+k; yN+kg.
2: Initialization: F0 = 0.
3: for l = 1 to L do
4: Recalculate the data weights of fxn; yngN+k¡1n=1 .
5: Incorporate fxN+k; yN+kg with weight w(l)N+k into hl.
6: Calculate " = 1
N+k
PN+k
n=1 w
(l)
n ynhl(xn).
7: if " < 0 then
8: hl Ã ¡hl.
9: end if
10: Recalculate al by minimizing G
(l)
N+k(a).
11: Fl Ã Fl¡1 + alhl.
12: end for
K critical contingencies. Speci¯cally, when an unlabeled case is processed by the
classi¯cation model, each of the small DTs uses the values of the attribute vector and
its CSRs to produce a binary decision. Finally, the binary decisions of all small DTs
are collected and used to give the security classi¯cation decisions of the present OC,
according to (4.1). It is worth noting that distributed processing technologies [77]
can be leveraged to speed up online DSA. Speci¯cally, the K unlabeled cases can be
classi¯ed separately by using K duplicates of the classi¯cation model, and in each
classi¯cation model, all small DTs can process the attribute vector of an unlabeled
case in a parallel manner.
From the above development, it can be seen that the proposed scheme illus-
trated in Fig. 4.3 is derived from those in previous work [55{57], with the following
major modi¯cations. a) The classi¯cation model is obtained via boosting multiple
small unpruned DTs instead of a single fully-grown DT after pruning. It is suggested
that boosting algorithms can lead to better model ¯tting and the produced classi-
¯cation model is quite resistant to over¯tting [72]. Thus, boosting small DTs has
great potential to deliver better performance in terms of classi¯cation accuracy. b)
Unequal data weights are assigned to the training cases adaptively by small DTs. In
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: PMU placement
Figure 4.5: The IEEE 39-bus system with 8 PMUs
periodic updates, misclassi¯ed new training cases can have higher data weights than
those classi¯ed correctly. This will speed up adapting the small DTs to newly changed
OCs. c) The small DTs are gracefully updated by incorporating new cases one at a
time, whereas rebuilding DTs is used in [55{57]. d) The DT and the knowledge base
are updated only when the new cases are misclassi¯ed in [55{57]; whereas all new
training cases are incorporated into the knowledge base in the proposed scheme.
4.4 An Illustrative Example
The IEEE 39-bus test system [78] is used as an illustrative small system. As illustrated
in Fig. 4.5, 8 PMUs are installed in the system, according to the placement design
provided in [79]. In what follows, the main steps of the proposed approach, including
attribute selection, knowledge base preparation and ensemble small DT learning,
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will be demonstrated by using the IEEE 39-bus test system. Finally, the results of
robustness test on changed OCs will be presented.
4.4.1 Knowledge Base
4.4.1.1 Attribute Selection
Based on the PMU placement and system topology in Fig. 4.5, 111 numerical at-
tributes are selected according to the rules described in Section III-A, including:
² 8 bus voltage magnitudes at the 8 PMU buses;
² 75 branch active/reactive power °ows and current °ows, which take any of the
8 PMU buses as either a from-bus or a to-bus of the branch;
² 28 bus voltage phase angle di®erences, which are computed from the 8(8¡1)
2
pairs
of phase angles.
4.4.1.2 OC Generation and Contingencies
The OC speci¯ed in [78] is used as the base OC. To enrich the knowledge base, more
OCs are generated by randomly changing the bus loads (both active and reactive)
within 90% to 110% of their original values in the base OC. For each generated
OC, limit checking is carried out by using the power °ow and short circuit analysis
tool (PSAT) [80], so that any generated OC with pre-contingency overloading or
violation of voltage magnitude/angle limits is not included in the knowledge base.
Further, transient stability assessment is carried out for the 30 N¡2 contingencies
listed in Table. II of [81]. These N¡2 contingencies, which can lead to stressed system
conditions, are identi¯ed by exhaustive search among all possible N¡2 contingencies.
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Figure 4.6: Ensemble small DT learning with di®erent tree heights for the IEEE
39-bus test system.
4.4.1.3 Transient Stability Assessment Tool and Criteria
The transient security assessment tool (TSAT) [80] is used to assess the transient
performance of the generated OCs. The time-domain simulation is executed for 10
seconds with a step size of 0.5 cycle. The power angle-based stability margin is used
as the transient stability index (TSI), de¯ned as:
´ =
360¡ ±max
360 + ±max
£ 100; ¡ 100 < ´ < 100; (4.7)
where ±max is the maximum angle separation of any two generators in the system
at the same time in the post-fault response. In case of islanding, the above value
is evaluated for each island and the smallest value is taken as the TSI. During the
simulation time, whenever the margin ´ turns out to be negative, i.e., the rotor angle
di®erence of any two generators exceeds 360 degree, the case is labeled as transiently
insecure.
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4.4.2 O²ine Training
4.4.2.1 Choice of J and L
V -fold cross validation (V=10) is carried out to determine the optimal tree height J
and the optimal number of small DTs L. Speci¯cally, the training cases in the initial
knowledge base are randomly partitioned into V subsets of equal size. For given ¯xed
J and L, a classi¯cation model is trained by using V¡1 subsets, and tested using the
other subset. The training process is then repeated V times in total, with each of the
V subsets used exactly once as the test data. Finally, the misclassi¯cation error rate
obtained by V -fold cross validation is calculated by averaging over the V classi¯cation
models. The results of the above procedure for di®erent tree heights (J=1; 2; 3) are
illustrated in Fig. 4.6. It can be seen that as L increases, the misclassi¯cation error
rate of each classi¯cation model decreases and reaches a plateau at some L. Then,
when L grows larger, each classi¯cation model incurs a larger variance and hence a
higher misclassi¯cation error rate. On the other hand, a larger tree height J implies
a larger variance of classi¯cation model [68], which is also observed in Fig. 4.6. Based
on these observations, J=2 is chosen, and L=15 at which the misclassi¯cation error
rate drops below 1% and reaches a plateau is selected.
4.4.2.2 Ensemble Small DT Learning
When the optimal tree height J and the optimal number of small DTs L are deter-
mined, the algorithm described in Section III-A-2 is used to build the ensemble of
small DTs. Speci¯cally, for l = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; L, the data weights w(l)n are ¯rst computed
according to (5). Then, the training cases together with their data weights are used
by the CART algorithm to build a small DT hl with height J , by using weighted
misclassi¯cation rate as the cost function, as shown in (5). Note that each small
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(a) Trained small DT h1 (CSR1 repre-
sents the critical splitting rule: CTNO$
= (CT1, CT2, CT3, CT7, CT11, CT12,
CT15, CT16, CT17))
(b) Small DT h1 updated with changed
OCs (CSR2 represents: CTNO$ = (CT1,
CT2, CT3, CT4, CT7, CT8, CT12,
CT15, CT16, CT19))
(c) Small DT h1 rebuilt with changed
OCs (CSR3 represents: CTNO$ = (CT1,
CT2, CT3, CT4, CT7, CT9, CT11,
CT15, CT17))
Figure 4.7: The ¯rst small DT h1 (J=2) for the IEEE 39-bus test system.
DT gives security classi¯cation decisions for all critical contingencies. Further, the
voting weight of hl is calculated by numerically solving (6). Then, the ensemble of
small DTs are obtained. It is worth noting that, di®erent from the V -fold cross vali-
dation procedure, the entire training set (not a subset) is used by each small DT of
the ensemble.
4.4.3 Robustness Testing
4.4.3.1 Changed OCs
In the IEEE 39-bus test system, generator G1, together with transmission lines (39,
9) and (39, 1), represents the equivalent to the external system of the New England
area [78]. It is now assumed that the capacity of G1 reduces from 1100 MW to
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900 MW, which could be the result of either the loss of a transmission corridor or
a generator tripping outside the New England area. Therefore, the OCs will change
due to generation rescheduling. By setting the capacity of G1 to 900 MW, changed
OCs are generated by rescheduling generation and re-solving power °ows for each
OC in the initial knowledge base. These changed OCs will be utilized to test the
robustness of the proposed approach.
4.4.3.2 Robustness Testing Results
First, 200 OCs are generated to create the initial knowledge base consisting of 6000
(200 OCs £ 30 contingencies) training cases. Accordingly, another 200 changed OCs
are generated, in which 100 OCs are used to update the small DTs and the other
100 OCs are used for robustness testing. In the proposed approach, Algorithm 1 is
applied to update each of the 15 small DTs by using the 3000 (100 OCs £ 30 con-
tingencies) new cases. To illustrate the change of small DTs, the ¯rst small DT h1 is
used as an example. Speci¯cally, h1 obtained in o²ine training and updated with the
100 changed OCs by using the proposed approach are illustrated in Fig.4.7(a) and
Fig.4.7(b), respectively. It is observed that due to the changed OCs and generation
rescheduling, the critical attribute in the root node of h1 changes from the voltage
phase angle di®erence between bus 2 and bus 26, A 2 26, to the active power °ow
between bus 17 and bus 18, P 17 18. The CSRs of the non-root nodes change accord-
ingly, as a result of the recursive procedure of the CART algorithm. The small DT h1
rebuilt with the 100 changed OCs is illustrated in Fig.4.7(c), which has the same CSR
at the root node as the small DT updated by using the proposed approach. Since the
small DTs h1 obtained by updating and rebuilding are di®erent at non-root nodes,
the other small DTs, h2 to h15 are also di®erent. This is because the ensemble DT
learning algorithm sequentially updates/builds the small DTs, in which each small
DT depends on the previous small DTs.
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Table 4.1: Misclassi¯cation Error Rate of Robustness Testing
secure cases insecure cases overall
Proposed 0.68% 0.36 % 0.55%
Small DTs (rebuilding) 0.59% 0.38% 0.54%
Small DTs (no updating) 10.68% 6.85% 9.57%
The proposed approach is compared with two benchmark approaches: 1) small
DTs rebuilt by using the 100 changed OCs together with the initial 200 OCs, 2) small
DTs without updating. The test results of the three approaches are presented in Ta-
ble. 4.1. It can be seen that the proposed approach achieves comparable performance
to the benchmark approach by rebuilding small DTs. The test results also suggest
that when OCs change, the small DTs have to be updated in order to track the
variation of OCs.
4.5 Application to the WECC System
The test power system used in this case study is part of the Western Electricity
Coordinating Council (WECC) system. It consists of over 600 buses (of which 33 are
PMU buses), 700 transmission lines and 100 generators.
4.5.1 Knowledge Base
4.5.1.1 OC Generation
The OCs used in the case study are generated by using real-life data of power °ows,
bus loads and generator power outputs that were recorded every 15 minutes during
a 2008 summer peak day. The overall load pro¯le is illustrated in Fig. 4.8. Based on
the variations of the aggregate load, each period for o²ine training is chosen to span
8 hours, and the peak load period 12:00 Hrs-20:00 Hrs is investigated in this case
study. Basically, there are three sets of generated OCs used in this case study: day-
ahead predicted OCs, short-term predicted OCs and realized OCs. The day-ahead
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predicted OCs are used to create the initial knowledge base, the short-term predicted
OCs are used to create the new training cases to update the knowledge base and the
classi¯cation model, and the realized OCs are used for testing purposes only.
Figure 4.8: Aggregate load of recorded OCs and generated OCs by interpolation.
In what follows, the procedure for generating the three OC sets is discussed
in detail. The realized OCs include the 33 recorded OCs and another 448 OCs
that are generated by interpolation, as illustrated in Fig. 4.8. Speci¯cally, following
the method in [57], both the active and reactive load of each load bus for every
minute of the investigated period are obtained by linear interpolation based on the
two closest recorded OCs, and the generator power outputs are adjusted as needed to
ensure valid OCs. To enrich the initial knowledge base, a day-ahead predicted OC is
obtained by randomly changing the bus loads within 90% to 110% of the loads of the
corresponding realized OC, by using a uniform distribution. Similarly, a short-term
predicted OC is generated by uniformly randomly changing the bus loads within 97%
to 103% of the loads of the corresponding realized OC. After solving the power °ows
for each OC using the power °ow and short circuit analysis tool (PSAT) [80], 481 OCs
are generated for each of the three OC sets. Note that di®erent from the day-ahead
predicted OCs, the short-term predicted OCs and the realized OCs are time-stamped.
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4.5.1.2 Critical Contingency Selection
A contingency list, which was created by the regional grid operator to account for
possible outages of transmission lines, three-winding transformers and generators that
could have signi¯cant impact, is used here. Speci¯cally, the contingency list consists
of 1 N¡4 contingency, 8 N¡3 contingencies, 172 N¡2 contingencies, and 0 N¡1
contingencies (i.e., no N¡1 contingencies lead to insecure conditions). The power
angle-based stability margin de¯ned in (4.7) is used as the transient stability index.
After performing transient security assessment by using TSAT for all realized OCs
and adhering to the above security criteria, three N¡2 contingencies which lead to
transiently insecure cases are selected as the critical contingencies in the knowledge
base. Each of the three N¡2 critical contingencies is initiated by a \three-phase
short circuit to ground" fault at a bus which is cleared after 5 cycles, by tripping a
transmission line that connects the bus and by disconnecting a generator that will go
out of step as a result of the line tripping.
4.5.1.3 Case Creation
Combining the three sets of generated OCs with their transient security classi¯cation
decisions for the three critical contingencies, N=1443 cases are created for the initial
knowledge base, for updating and for testing, respectively. Based on the interconnec-
tion structure of the 33 PMU buses, 799 numerical attributes are identi¯ed using the
rules described in Section III-A; thus P=800. For each case, the values of the 799
numerical attributes are obtained from the power °ow solutions. Then, the initial
knowledge base is organized into an N£(P+1) array.
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4.5.2 O²ine Training
The initial knowledge base as an N£(P+1) array is ¯rst used by the CART algorithm
to build the small DTs. Following the procedure described in Section III-D, it is
found that J=2 and L=35 give the best results of V -fold cross validation. The ¯rst
three small DTs built from the initial knowledge base are illustrated in Fig. 4.2.
For comparison, a fully-grown single DT with pruning is also built, as illustrated in
Fig. 4.1 (in order to give a concrete impression of DTs and small DTs used for DSA,
Fig. 4.1 and Fig. 4.2 were presented in Section II).
4.5.3 Online DSA Simulation
Slot  tSlot  t-1
Generate short-term 
predicted OCs
Use new training cases to 
update the classification model
TSA
Collect current OCs
TSA
On-line DSA and 
record test resultsTesting
Updating
Figure 4.9: Flowchart for testing online DSA with periodic updating.
The online DSA is simulated iteratively on a slot-by-slot basis, as illustrated
in Fig. 4.9. Generally, each slot spans M minutes. Since it is su±cient to perform
security assessment of a short-term predicted OC for the three N¡2 critical contin-
gencies, M=1 is chosen here. In case of more critical contingencies or a larger test
system, a longer slot can be chosen. In online DSA, a third scheme in which the
classi¯cation model is obtained by boosting small DTs but updated by rebuilding is
compared with the two aforementioned schemes.
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4.5.3.1 OC variations in sub-period 12:00 Hrs-16:00 Hrs
In each slot of this sub-period, the 3M test cases created from the M realized OCs
with time-stamps falling into this slot are collected, and then used as the present OCs
for online DSA to assess the performance of the classi¯cation model updated so far.
Meanwhile, another 3M new training cases created from the short-term predicted OC
for the next slot are incorporated into the knowledge base to update the classi¯cation
model.
4.5.3.2 Topology change in sub-period 16:00 Hrs-20:00 Hrs
At the peak hour 16:00 Hrs, a topology change is imposed on the test system, and
assumed to last for the remaining hours of the day. Speci¯cally, among the 178 con-
tingencies that do not incur transient instability for all realized OCs, the contingency
which has the least positive margin averaged over all realized OCs is chosen; as a
result, a transmission line is removed and a generator is disconnected from the test
system. Then, the new training cases and test cases during the latter sub-period are
created using an approach similar to those used in the former sub-period, but by
using a di®erent system topology.
4.5.4 Test Results and Discussion
Throughout the entire horizon of the above online DSA simulations, the misclassi-
¯cation error rate and the computation time for updating in each slot are recorded
and summarized in Table 4.2 and Fig. 4.10, respectively.
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4.5.4.1 Classi¯cation Accuracy
As illustrated in Table 4.2, the two boosting-based schemes turn out to be more
accurate than the single-DT-based scheme for both simulation sub-periods, and the
performance of the proposed scheme is quite close to the scheme based on boosting
small DTs with rebuilding.
4.5.4.2 Computation Requirement
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Figure 4.10: Computation time for updating/rebuilding (executed in MATLAB on a
workstation with an Intel Pentium IV 3.20 GHz CPU and 4GB RAM).
The computation time required by updating the classi¯cation models using
new OCs is illustrated in Fig. 4.10. It is clear that the proposed scheme requires the
lowest computation time. Further, as the number of new OCs increases, the proposed
scheme becomes less time-consuming than the other two schemes. The reason is
that for each new OC, the two benchmark schemes rebuild DTs from scratch, while
the graceful update of small DTs is carried out in the proposed scheme. Further,
according to the CART algorithm [71], it is known that the sorting operation of the
CART algorithm dominates the computational burden of DT building/rebuilding.
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Table 4.2: Misclassi¯cation Error Rate of Online DSA
Scheme
Sub-period 12-16 Hrs Sub-period 16-20 Hrs
secure insecure
overall
secure insecure
overall
cases cases cases cases
Proposed 2.41% 1.03% 1.67% 2.54% 1.08% 1.74%
A single DT
2.71% 1.80% 2.22% 2.26% 2.73% 2.5%
(rebuilding)
Boosting
1.81% 1.03% 1.39% 2.26% 0.82% 1.5%
(rebuilding)
When updating small DTs, the sorting operation is skipped [75]. Therefore, the
proposed scheme has a much lower computational burden.
4.6 Conclusion
In this study, a data-mining-based online DSA scheme is proposed to handle the OC
variations and topology changes that are likely to occur during the operating hori-
zon. The proposed scheme is applied to a practical power system, and the results
of a case study demonstrate the performance improvement brought by boosting un-
pruned small DTs over a single DT. Compared to single DTs, the classi¯cation model
obtained from ensemble DT learning often have higher accuracy, and lend themselves
to cost-e®ective incorporation of new training cases. The results presented here also
provide an insight into the possibilities of other ensemble DT learning techniques,
e.g., random forest, in handling the challenges of online DSA.
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Chapter 5
ROBUST ON-LINE DSA WITH MISSING SYNCHROPHASOR DATA
5.1 Introduction
DSA provides system operators with important information, e.g., transient security of
a speci¯c operating condition under various contingencies. Given a knowledge base,
DTs can identify the attributes and the thresholds that are critical to assessing the
transient performance of power systems [52, 54]. With the advent of synchrophasor
technologies, a signi¯cant amount of e®ort has been directed towards online DSA,
by using PMU measurements directly for decision making [55{57, 66]. Upon a dis-
turbance, by applying pre-determined decision rules to the PMU measurements of
critical attributes, DTs can give security classi¯cation decisions in real-time. In the
online DSA schemes proposed in [55{57,66], security classi¯cation decision regions are
¯rst characterized by DTs in o²ine training, and then the real-time PMU measure-
ments of critical attributes are used to obtain timely security classi¯cation decisions
of the current OCs.
Previous studies on PMU measurement-based online DSA implicitly assume
that WAMS provide reliable measurements. However, in online DSA, PMU measure-
ments can become unavailable due to the unexpected failure of the PMUs or phasor
data concentrators (PDCs), or due to loss of the communication links. Recently, it
has been widely recognized that PMU failure can be an important factor that im-
pacts the performance of WAMS. For example, AESO's newest rules on implementing
PMUs [82] require that the loss or malfunction of PMUs, together with the cause and
the expected repair time, has to be reported to the system operator in a timely
manner. In the report [83], the deployment of redundancy is suggested by PMU
manufacturers to reduce the impact of single PMU failure. Loss of PMUs has also
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been taken into account when designing WAMS and PMU placement [84]. Moreover,
the delivery of PMU measurements from multiple remote locations of power grids
to monitoring centers could experience high latency when communication networks
are heavily congested, which could also result in the unavailability of PMU measure-
ments. Therefore, it is urgent to design DT-based online DSA approaches that are
robust to missing PMU measurements.
Intuitively, one possible approach to handle missing PMU measurements is to
estimate the missing values by using other PMU measurements and the system model.
However, with existing nonlinear state estimators in SCADA systems, this approach
may compromise the performance of DTs. First, the scan rate of SCADA systems
is far from commensurate with the data rate of PMU measurements, and thus using
estimated values from SCADA data may result in a large delay for decision making.
Second, SCADA systems collect data from remote terminal units (RTUs) utilizing a
polling approach. Following a disturbance, it is possible that some post-contingency
values are used due to the lack of synchronization, which can lead to inaccurate
security classi¯cation decisions of DTs. It is worth noting that future fully PMU-
based linear state estimators [85] can overcome the aforementioned limitations; but
this is possible only when there is a su±cient number of PMUs placed in system.
With this motivation, data-mining based approaches are investigated in this chapter,
aiming to use alternative viable measurements for decision making in case of missing
data.
In DTs built by the CART algorithm [71], missing data can be handled by
using surrogate. However, a critical observation in this study is that when PMU
measurements are used as attributes, most viable surrogate attributes have low asso-
ciations with the primary attributes. Clearly, the accuracy of DSA would degrade if
surrogate is used. This is because a DT is essentially a sequential processing method,
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Figure 5.1: Three-stage ensemble DT-based approach to online DSA with missing
PMU measurements
and thus the wrong decisions made in earlier stages may have signi¯cant impact on
the correctness of the ¯nal decisions. Thus motivated, this chapter studies applying
ensemble DT learning techniques, including random subspace methods and boosting,
to improve the robustness to missing PMU measurements.
Aiming to develop a robust and accurate online DSA scheme, the proposed
approach consists of three processing stages, as illustrated in Fig. 5.1. Speci¯cally,
given a collection of training cases, multiple small DTs are trained o²ine by using
randomly selected attribute subsets. In near real-time, new cases are used to re-check
the performance of small DTs. The re-check results are then utilized by a boosting
algorithm to quantify the voting weights of a few viable small DTs (i.e., the DTs
without missing data from their attribute subsets). Finally, security classi¯cation de-
cisions of online DSA are obtained via a weighted voting of viable small DTs. More
speci¯cally, a random subspace method for selecting attribute subsets is developed by
exploiting the locational information of attributes and the availability of PMU mea-
surements. Conventionally, the availability of a WAMS is de¯ned as the probability
that the system is operating normally at a speci¯ed time instant [86]. In this study,
the availability of PMU measurements is de¯ned similarly, i.e., as the probability that
PMU measurements are successfully collected and delivered to a monitoring center.
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The developed random subspace method guarantees that a signi¯cant portion of small
DTs are viable for online DSA with high likelihood. Further, a boosting algorithm is
employed to assign the viable small DTs with proper voting weights that are quan-
ti¯ed by using the results from performance re-check, leading to the high robustness
and accuracy of the proposed approach in case of missing PMU measurements. The
proposed approach is applied to the IEEE 39-bus system with 9 PMUs. Compared
to o®-the-shelf DT-based techniques (including random forests (RFs) with and with-
out using surrogate), the proposed ensemble DT-based approach can achieve better
performance in case of missing PMU measurements.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. An introduction to DTs
with application to DSA is given in Section 5.2. Section 5.3 focuses on the random
subspace method for selecting attribute subsets. The proposed three-stage approach
is presented in detail in Section 5.4. A case study is discussed in Section 5.5. Finally,
conclusions are given in Section 5.6.
5.2 Background on DTs
A decision tree is a tree-structured model that maps the measurements of the at-
tributes x2X to a predicted value y^2Y [71]. In a DT, a test on an attribute (thus
called the primary attribute of the internal node) is installed at each internal node
and decides which child node to drop the measurements into. Further, each leaf node
of the DT is assigned a predicted value, and the measurements are thus labeled with
the predicted value of the leaf node which it sinks into. The path from the root node
to a leaf node speci¯es a decision region in the attribute space corresponding to that
leaf node. Speci¯cally, the length of the longest downward path from the root node
to a leaf node is de¯ned as the height of a DT.
96
5.2.1 Application of DTs in DSA
DTs with binary predicted values (i.e., Y=f§1g) are used in DSA. Speci¯cally, y^=+1
represents that an OC is classi¯ed as insecure under a given contingency. The nu-
merical attributes used by DTs in DSA include voltage magnitudes, voltage phase
angles and power/current °ows. Moreover, the index of contingencies is used as a
categorical attribute. In DSA, a collection of training cases are ¯rst created by apply-
ing DSA packages (e.g., DSAToolsTM [80]) to NOC known OCs for a given list of NC
contingencies. Then, the training cases fxn; yngNn=1, where N=NOC£NC , are used
by the CART algorithm [71] to build a DT that ¯ts the training data. Intuitively, if
the DT ¯ts the training data well and the new OCs in online DSA are similar to the
OCs corresponding to the training cases, the trained DT can give accurate security
classi¯cation decisions for the new OCs in online DSA.
In this study, small DTs, which have a small height J are used. Generally,
a small DT could have lower accuracy than a fully-grown DT, but is less prone to
over¯tting when the training data is noisy [72], and multiple DTs are usually combined
together to improve the classi¯cation accuracy.
5.2.2 Handling Missing Data by using Surrogate in DTs
A surrogate split at an internal node is the one that \mimics" the primary split most
closely, i.e., gives the most similar splitting results for the training cases. Usually,
the similarity is quanti¯ed by the association between the surrogate split and the
primary split [71]. The signi¯cance of a surrogate split that has a high association
(i.e., over 0.9) with the primary split is that the DT could still use the surrogate split
at this internal node to give almost the same decisions when the PMU measurement
of the primary attribute is missing.
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The performance of surrogate in DT-based DSA is evaluated via a case study,
in which a single DT is built by using the same knowledge base for voltage mag-
nitude violation analysis as in [66]. It is observed that co-located attributes (i.e.,
the attributes measured by the same PMU) would often be unavailable at the same
time when the PMU fails, which implies that co-located attributes cannot be used
as surrogate for each other in online DSA. Therefore, a modi¯ed CART algorithm
in which co-located attributes are excluded from surrogate searching is used to build
a single DT and identify the surrogate attributes. The results regarding the perfor-
mance of the surrogates identi¯ed by both the modi¯ed CART algorithm and the
CART algorithm are given in Table 5.1. Two key observations are drawn. First,
the results obtained by the modi¯ed CART algorithm suggest that all non-co-located
surrogates have relatively low associations with the primary ones. The low asso-
ciation could be explained by the complex coupling structure of the attributes in
power systems. According to the de¯nition of surrogate, high association relies on
the dependency between the surrogate and the primary attributes, i.e., the surrogate
attribute gives similar decisions to the primary attribute on all the training cases
regardless of any other attribute. However, in power systems, one attribute (i.e.,
voltage magnitude, voltage phase angle or power/current °ow) is coupled with many
other non-co-located attributes, as dictated by the AC power °ow equations and the
network interconnection structure. Second, it is observed in Table 5.1 that the surro-
gate attributes found by the CART algorithm are mostly co-located with the primary
attributes. This observation signi¯es the redundancy between co-located attributes
when used for splitting the training cases, and thus sheds lights on exploiting the
locational information to create the attribute subsets, as described in Section III.
1Bus numbers are given in the subscripts of attributes, but are di®erent from the real ones of
the practical system. For example, Qf204;207g and Qf207;209g are co-located; they are measured by
the same PMU at bus 207.
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Table 5.1: A case study on the surrogates of DTs
node
primary by modi¯ed CART by CART
attribute1 surrogate assoc. surrogate assoc.
1 Vf217g Vf207g 0.76 Vf207g 0.76
2 Qf204;207g Qf212;216g 0.33 Qf207;209g 0.50
3 Qf204;207g Vf209g 0.28 Qf207;209g 0.64
4 If211;204g Pf008;011g 0.62 Pf209;211g 0.83
5 Pf210;201g Pf211;062g 0.87 Pf231;201g 0.87
6 Qf005;033g Qf801;999g 0.71 Qf801;999g 0.71
7 Pf213;222g Qf207;211g 0.85 Pf222;223g 0.85
8 Qf041;060g If011;051g 0.50 If011;051g 0.50
9 Pf211;062g Pf213;216g 0.50 If062;211g 0.75
10 Pf236;219g Qf230;052g 0.42 Pf236;207g 0.68
5.2.3 Ensemble DT Learning
Ensemble DT learning techniques (bagging, random subspace methods, boosting,
RF [74]) combine multiple DTs to obtain better prediction performance. Studies
(e.g., [87]) have shown that using random subspace methods can lead to improved
accuracy and generalization capability, if the DTs are trained from a variety of com-
pact and non-redundant attribute subsets. Usually, the attribute subsets used by DTs
are selected in a randomized manner. For example, in the random decision forest al-
gorithm [88], each DT is built by using an attribute subset that is randomly selected
from all possible candidate attribute subsets with equal weights. For online DSA, it
is observed that additional system information on the attributes could be utilized to
create and select the attribute subsets. First, the candidate attribute subsets could be
signi¯cantly re¯ned by exploiting the locational information of attributes. Further,
by putting more weights on the attribute subsets that have higher availability when
randomly selecting attribute subsets, the resulting small DTs would be more likely
to be robust to possibly missing PMU measurements.
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Figure 5.2: Wide area monitoring system consisting of multiple areas
5.3 Random Subspace Method for Selecting Attribute Subsets
A key step of the random subspace method is to identify a collection of candidate
attribute subsets S and determine the weight ps that dictates how likely a candidate
attribute subset s2S is to be selected. In this study, by exploiting the locational
information of attributes and the availability of PMU measurements, the random
subspace method adheres to the following two guidelines:
² G1: Co-located attributes do not co-exist within an attribute subset.
² G2: The average availability of the selected attribute subsets should be su±-
ciently high.
Further, for a power system consisting of K areas, the corresponding WAMS is as-
sumed to have a hierarchical architecture [89]. As illustrated in Fig. 5.2, each area of
the power system has a PDC that concentrates the PMU measurements of this area
and submits them to the monitoring center.
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5.3.1 Candidate Attribute Subsets
The candidate attribute subsets are created based on the three following speci¯c rules:
1) Within a candidate attribute subset, all the attributes are from the same area. 2)
In area k (k=1;¢ ¢ ¢ ;K), three categories of pre-fault quantities measured by PMUs
are used as the numerical attributes:
² Category 1: voltage magnitude Vi, for i2IPMUk ;
² Category 2: active power °ow Pij, reactive power °ow Qij and current magni-
tude Iij, for i2IPMUk and j2N (i);
² Category 3: phase angle di®erence µij, for i;j2 IPMUk .
where IPMUk denotes the collection of the buses with PMU installation within area k,
and N (i) denotes the collection of the neighbor buses of bus i. An attribute subset
of area k is created by including one voltage or °ow measurement from each bus
i2IPMUk and all phase angle di®erence measurements from this area. 3) The index
of contingencies is included as a categorical attribute in any attribute subset.
The criteria used in creating the attribute sets are elaborated below. By re-
stricting the attributes of a subset to be the PMU measurements within the same
area, the impact of some scenarios, i.e., when a PDC that concentrates PMU mea-
surements within an area fails, is signi¯cantly reduced, since the small DTs using
the PMU measurements from the other areas could still be viable. For a given bus,
since Category 1 and Category 2 PMU measurements are co-located, it su±ces to
include only one of them in an attribute subset so that the redundancy within an
attribute subset is minimal. Further, all measurable phase angle di®erences are in-
cluded. This is because theoretical and empirical results (e.g., in [56]) suggest that
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angle di®erences contain important information regarding the level of stress in OCs,
and thus are more likely to be the attributes critical to assessing transient instability.
It is also worth noting that the Category 2 attributes from two di®erent buses are
unlikely to be redundant, in the sense that they are the measurements from di®erent
transmission lines, given the fact that PMUs could provide power °ow measurements
and it is usually unnecessary to place PMUs at both ends of a transmission line to
achieve the full observability of power grids.
For convenience, let Sk denote the collection of candidate attribute subsets of
area k. Then, the size of Sk is given by
Mk =
Y
i2IPMUk
(3deg(i) + 1); (5.1)
where deg(i) denotes the degree of bus i, i.e., the number of buses that connect with
bus i. Then, S=SKk=1Sk is the collection of candidate attribute subsets.
5.3.2 Randomized Algorithm for Selecting Attribute Subsets
It is plausible to develop the randomized algorithm so as to achieve maximum ran-
domness of the selected attribute subsets by maximizing the entropy of the weight
distribution fps;s2Sg. Without any other information of attribute, equal weights is
usually used by existing random subspace methods (e.g., [90], [91]). Here, by adher-
ing to guideline G2, an additional constraint is that the average availability of the
randomly selected attribute subsets is above an acceptable level A0. As a result, the
weight distribution can be determined by solving the following problem:
Ps : maxfps;s2Sg
X
s2S
pslog2p
¡1
s (5.2)
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s.t.
X
s2S
psAs ¸ A0; (5.3)
X
s2S
ps = 1; (5.4)
where As denotes the availability of an attribute subset s. According to the rules for
creating the candidate attribute subsets, it is easy to see that each of the attribute
subsets of an area consists of exactly two measurements from each PMU within this
area. Therefore, the availability of an attribute subset s of area k, which was formally
de¯ned in Section I as the probability that the measurements of s are successfully
delivered to the monitoring center, equals that of the WAMS within area k, i.e.,
As = Ak; 8s 2 Sk: (5.5)
In availability analysis of WAMS (e.g., in [86]), it is usually assumed that the avail-
ability of PMUs, PDCs and communication links are known (e.g., estimated from
past operating data) and independent from each other. Under these assumptions,
the availability of the WAMS within area k is given by:
Ak =
Y
i2IPMUk
(APMUi A
link
i ) ~A
PDC
k
~Alinkk ; (5.6)
where APMUi , A
link
i , ~A
PDC
k and
~Alinkk denote the availability of the PMU at bus i,
the communication link from the PMU at bus i to the PDC, the PDC and the
communication link from the PDC to the monitoring center, respectively. It is worth
noting that (3) and (4) are derived for the case illustrated in Fig.2, and thus may
not be directly applicable to the cases with measurement redundancy. For example,
when multiple dual use PMU/line relays are utilized in substations, the availability of
bus voltage phasor measurements can be enhanced. The procedure for analyzing the
availability of WAMS in case of redundancy can be found in the literature (e.g., [92]).
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By taking (5.5) into account, it follows that the solution to problem Ps in (5.2)
has the following property.
Proposition 5.3.1. The optimal solution to Ps in (5.2) takes the following form:
p¤s = p
¤
k=Mk; 8s 2 Sk; (5.7)
where Mk is the size of Sk as de¯ned in (5.1), and fp¤k;k=1;¢ ¢ ¢ ;Kg is the solution to
the following problem:
~Ps : min
p1;¢¢¢pK
KX
k=1
pklog2(pk=Mk); (5.8)
s.t.
KX
k=1
pkAk ¸ A0; (5.9)
KX
k=1
pk = 1: (5.10)
Proof: Since Ps maximizes a concave function with a±ne constraints, the Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are necessary and su±cient for a solution to be op-
timal. Therefore,
(1 + lnp¤s)=ln2¡ ¸¤As + ¹¤ = 0; 8s 2 S (5.11)
where ¸¤ and ¹¤ are the KKT multipliers for the two constraints of Ps. Then, by
taking the equality in (5.5) into account, it is easy to verify that p¤s have the same
value for all s2Sk. De¯ne pk=Mkps for s2Sk, then Ps reduces to ~Ps.
The above result leads to the following implementation of the randomized
algorithm, as summarized in Algorithm 2. Further, it is also observed from (5.11)
that the attribute subsets which have higher availability are assigned higher weights.
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Algorithm 2 Randomized algorithm for selecting an attribute subset
1: Calculate Mk and Ak according to (5.1) and (5.6), respectively, for k = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K.
2: Find fpk; k = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Kg by solving ~Ps in (5.8).
3: Select an area k among the K areas with weight pk.
4: For the chosen area k, select an attribute subset s from Sk with weight 1=Mk.
5.4 Proposed Approach for Online DSA with Missing PMU Measurements
First, L small DTs are trained o²ine by using randomly selected attribute subsets.
In case of missing PMU measurements in online DSA, ~L (~L·L) viable small DTs are
identi¯ed, and are assigned di®erent voting weights. Speci¯cally, the results of perfor-
mance re-check in near real-time are utilized to quantify these voting weights. Finally,
the security classi¯cation decisions for the new OCs in online DSA are obtained via
weight voting of the ~L viable small DTs.
5.4.1 O²ine Training
Given a collection of training cases fxn; yngNn=1 and candidate attribute subsets S, a
primary objective of o²ine training is to obtain small DTs fh1;¢ ¢ ¢ ;hLg so that the
majority voting of them, i.e., FL(x) =
PL
l=1 hl(x) could ¯t the training data. The
iterative process to obtain a FL is summarized in Algorithm 3. In the l-th iteration,
a small DT hl is ¯rst obtained by solving the following problem:
P(l)DT : min
hl
1
N
NX
n=1
1fyn 6=hl(xln)g; (5.12)
where xln denotes the measurements of the attribute subset sl. It is well-known
that the problem in (5.12) is NP-complete [93]. Here, the CART [71] algorithm
is employed to ¯nd a sub-optimal DT, by using misclassi¯cation error rate as the
splitting cost function. It is clear from (5.12) that equal weights, i.e., 1
N
, are assigned
to all training data. When historical data that identi¯es potential weak spots of the
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system is available, these data can be integrated by assigning higher weights, and by
replacing 1
N
with unequal data weights.
Algorithm 3 O²ine training using the random subspace method
1: Input: Training cases fxn; yngNn=1, "0 2 (0; 1).
2: Initialization: F0 = 0.
3: for l = 1! L do
4: Select an attribute subset sl by using Algorithm 2.
5: Find a small DT hl by solving P(l)DT in (5.12) using the CART algorithm.
6: Fl Ã Fl¡1 + hl.
7: end for
5.4.2 Near Real-time Performance Re-check
In near real-time, a more accurate prediction of the imminent OC in online DSA can
be made. Then, a collection of new cases f~xn; ~yng ~Nn=1 are created in a similar manner
to that in o²ine training and used to re-evaluate the accuracy of the L small DTs.
The re-check results are then utilized by the boosting process in online DSA. In case
of variations between the OCs used in o²ine training and the new OCs in online
DSA, near real-time re-check is also a critical step to make sure that the small DTs
still work well.
5.4.3 Online DSA
The results of near real-time re-check f~hl(~xln); ~yng ~Nn=1; 8l=1;¢ ¢ ¢ ;~L are utilized to
choose a few viable small DTs to be used in online DSA and calculate the corre-
sponding voting weights via a process of boosting small DTs. In order to make
best use of existing DTs, the viable small DTs in online DSA include the small DTs
without any missing PMU measurement and non-empty degenerate small DTs.
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Figure 5.3: Degeneration of a small DT as a result of missing PMU measurements of
attribute x1 when node (x1<S1) is originally assigned +1.
5.4.3.1 Degenerate Small DTs
A degenerate small DT is obtained by collapsing the subtree of an internal node with
missing PMU measurement into a leaf node. Speci¯cally, a small DT degenerates to a
non-empty tree if the PMU measurements used by the internal nodes other than the
root node are missing, an example of which is illustrated in Fig. 5.3. Further, since
each internal node of the original small DT is also assigned a decision in building
the DT, the new leaf node of the degenerate small DT is assigned the same decision
as the original internal node. Therefore, for a non-empty degenerate small DT, the
re-check results on the ~N new cases could be easily obtained.
5.4.3.2 Weighted Voting of Viable Small DTs
Let ~H be the collection of viable small DTs. Then, weighted voting of the viable small
DTs in ~H is utilized to obtain the security classi¯cation decisions of online DSA, due
to the following two reasons. First, in case that some small DTs degenerate to empty
trees and the accuracy of non-empty degenerate small DTs degrades, weighted voting
could improve the overall accuracy compared to majority voting, provided that the
voting weights are carefully assigned based on the re-check results of the viable small
DTs. Second, even though all the small DTs are viable, choosing the small DTs with
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proper voting weights based on their accuracy can still be a critical step to guarantee
accurate decisions. This is because small DTs trained o²ine ¯t the training cases
that are created based on day-ahead prediction, while the re-check results on the ~N
new cases contain more relevant information on assessing the security of the imminent
OCs in online DSA.
In the proposed approach, weighted voting of small DTs in ~H is implemented
via a boosting process. Following the method in [66], initially with ~F0 as a zero
function, a small DT ~hl2 ~H is ¯rst identi¯ed and added to ~Fl¡1, i.e.,
~Fl = ~Fl¡1 + al~hl; (5.13)
iteratively for l=1;2;¢ ¢ ¢ ;~L, so that the cost function, i.e.,
C^( ~F~L) =
1
~N
~NX
n=1
log2(1 + e
¡~yn ~F~L(~xn)); (5.14)
is minimized in a gradient descent manner. In the boosting process, ~hl is identi¯ed
by solving the following problem:
~P(l)DT : min
hl2 ~H
1
~N
~NX
n=1
w(l)n 1f~yn 6=~hl(~xln)g; (5.15)
and the data weights and voting weight are given by
8><>:
w
(l)
n = 1
1+e~yn
~Fl¡1(~xn)
n = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ~N
al = argmin
a2R+
gl(a)
(5.16)
where gl(a), C^( ~Fl¡1+a~hl). Boosting viable small DTs in online DSA is summarized
in Algorithm 4.
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Algorithm 4 Boosting viable small DTs for online DSA
1: Input: Re-check results f~hl(~xln); ~yng ~Nn=1; 8l = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; ~L,
2: Initialization: ~F0 = 0.
3: for l = 1! ~L do
4: Calculate the data weights according to (5.16).
5: Find a small DT ~hl from viable DTs by solving ~P(l)DT in (5.15).
6: Calculate the voting weight al according to (5.16).
7: ~Fl Ã ~Fl¡1 + al~hl.
8: end for
5.4.4 Further Discussion
Through detailed complexity analysis, it is shown that the low computational com-
plexity of the online processing renders that the time criticality of online DSA would
not be compromised when the proposed approach is used. Speci¯cally, the compu-
tationally intensive part of the online processing stage is the boosting process that
consists of calculating the data weights w
(l)
n , solving ~P(l)DT and calculating the voting
weights al of small DTs. According to (5.16), calculating the data weights requires
evaluating ~Fl for the new cases, which could be easily obtained from the re-check re-
sults of the small DTs. Therefore, it is easy to see that the complexity in calculating
the data weights is O( ~N). Solving ~P(l)DT boils down to searching for the small DT in
~H that has the least weighted misclassi¯cation error. Since the re-check results of the
small DTs in ~H for the new cases are already known, the optimal small DT could
be found by comparing the weighted misclassi¯cation errors of the small DTs in ~H.
Therefore, the complexity in solving ~P(l)DT is O(~L ~N). In the l-th iteration of the boost-
ing process, the voting weight is obtained by minimizing gl(a). It is easy to verify that
g0l(0)<0 and g
00
l (a)>0 holds for a2R+. Therefore, gl(a) has a unique minimum in R+
that could be found by using standard numerical methods (e.g., Newton's methods).
Further, since gl(a) is convex, standard numerical methods could ¯nd the minimum
in a few iterations. In each iteration, ~Fl¡1+a~hl needs to be evaluated for all the ~N
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new cases. Therefore, the complexity in calculating the voting weight for a small DT
is O( ~N). Summarizing, the overall computational complexity of the boosting process
is O(~L2 ~N).
The proposed approach above relates to that in [66] in the following sense:
small DTs are utilized in both approaches; new cases are used in near real-time for
accuracy guarantee by both approaches; the security classi¯cation decisions of online
DSA are both obtained via a weighted voting of small DTs. However, the two ap-
proaches are tailored towards di®erent application scenarios. The approach proposed
here is more robust to missing PMU measurements, while the approach in [66] could
give accurate decisions with less e®ort in o²ine training when the availability of PMU
measurements is su±ciently high. The major di®erences of the two approaches are
outlined as follows. First, the small DTs in the proposed approach are trained by
using attribute subsets for robustness, whereas the entire set of attributes is used
in [66]. Second, the usage of new cases in near real-time is di®erent. In [66], the new
cases are used to update the small DTs, whereas in the proposed approach, the new
cases are only used to re-check the performance of viable small DTs so as to quantify
the voting weights.
5.5 Case Study
5.5.1 Test System
The IEEE 39-bus system [78] is used as the test system which contains 39 buses, 10
generators, 34 transmission lines and 12 transformers. Particularly, G1 represents
the aggregated generation from the rest of eastern interconnection [78]. In this case
study, the test system is assumed to consist of three areas. The three areas together
with the PMU placement are illustrated in Fig. 5.4. It is worth noting that the PMU
placement guarantee the full observability of the test system when zero-injection buses
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Figure 5.4: The IEEE 39-bus system in three areas and PMU placement
are taken into account.
5.5.2 Knowledge base
The knowledge base only consists of the OCs that are both pre-contingency secure
and N¡1 secure. The cases in the knowledge base are created from the combinations
of the \PMU measurements" of the OCs and their transient security classi¯cation
decisions for a few selected N¡2 contingencies. In this case study, the power °ow
solutions of an OC are used as the \PMU measurements."
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5.5.2.1 OC Generation
The OC given in [78] is used as the base OC. Following the method in [57], more OCs
are generated for o²ine training, by randomly changing the bus loads (both active
and reactive) within 90% to 110% of their original values in the base OC; for the
OCs generated for near real-time re-check and online DSA test, the bus loads varies
from 97% to 103% of their original values in the base OC. The rationale for the above
percentage values is that o²ine training is usually carried out day/hours ahead, and
thus the predicted OCs can have a larger prediction error than those in near real-
time. The power °ows of each generated OC are solved using the PSAT software [80],
followed by a limit check such that the generated OCs with any pre-contingency
overloading or voltage/angle limit violations are excluded from the knowledge base.
5.5.2.2 Contingencies
The loss of any of the 46 components (i.e., the 34 transmission lines, the 9 generator-
transformer pairs and the 3 transformers at (11,12), (12,13) and (19,20)) is considered
as an N¡1 contingency. Due to the large number of possible N¡2 contingencies,
only a few of them are selected. Intuitively, a severe impact on the security of power
systems is more likely if a second component gets overloaded after the loss of the ¯rst
component. As such, the N¡2 contingencies are selected in the following manner.
First, each of the aforementioned 46 components is removed from the test system.
Then, power °ows are re-solved and limit check is re-run for the base OC using PSAT.
The ¯rst removed component together with any overloaded component are regarded
as the removed pair of an N¡2 contingency. As a result, 15 pairs are identi¯ed, as
listed in Table 5.3.
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Table 5.2: Data used by Algorithm 1 for the system in Fig. 5.4.
Area Placement
Number of attributes
Mk Ak pkCat. 1 Cat. 2 Cat. 3
1 8, 13, 39 3 24 3 700 b 0.28
2 18, 25, 29 3 24 3 700 b 0.28
3 16, 20, 23 3 30 3 1120 b 0.44
5.5.2.3 Transient Security Assessment
TSAT [80] is used to assess the transient performance of the OCs that are pre-
contingency secure. To create a contingency in TSAT, the \three-phase short circuit
to ground" fault is applied at either of the two terminal buses of the ¯rst removed
component with a primary clearing time of 4 cycles. Therefore, 92 N¡1 contingencies
and 30 N¡2 contingencies are created. The \power angle-based stability margin"
de¯ned in TSAT [80] is used as the stability index.
5.5.3 Performance Evaluation
Three other approaches are used as benchmarks, including a single DT using sur-
rogate, an RF using surrogate, and an RF without using surrogate. Following [91],
unpruned DTs are used in RFs; in RFs, all training cases are used to build a single
DT; in each split of DTs, a number of log2P + 1 attributes are randomly selected
(where P=96 according to Column 3 of Table III); the optimal number of DTs in
the forest is determined through out-of-bag validation [91]. Speci¯cally, for the for-
mer two benchmark approaches, surrogate attributes are obtained from those which
are not co-located with the primary attributes; for the third benchmark approach,
degenerated DTs are used.
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5.5.3.1 Attribute Subsets
The hypothetical WAMS for the test system has a hierarchical architecture simi-
lar to that in Fig. 5.2. Based on the evaluation results of the reference [94], it is
assumed that all the PMUs have the same availability a (a2 [0.979975,0.998920]),
and all the communication links from PMUs to PDC have the same availability
Alink=0:999. Further, the availability of the PDC and the communication link from
the PDC to the monitoring center is assumed to be 1. Let b=(0:999a)3, and thus b2
[0.938299,0.993776]. Then, it follows that when A0·b, the solution to ~Ps in (6) exists,
as given in Table 5.2. In what follows, the data in Table 5.2 is explained in detail.
Speci¯cally, column 2 provides the indices of PMU buses, which can also be seen from
Fig.4. Column 3 contains the number of attributes for the three categories de¯ned
in Section III.A. Take area 1 for example, there are 3 voltage magnitude attributes,
24 transmission line (including power °ow and current magnitude) attributes, and
another 3 attributes from voltage phase angle di®erence. Given the system topology
and availability information,Mk in column 4 and Ak in column 5 are calculated using
(1) and (4), respectively. Then, pk is obtained by solving (6).
5.5.3.2 O²ine Training
NOC=200 generated OCs which are both pre-contingency and N¡1 contingency se-
cure are used for o²ine training. Combining the generated OCs with their transient
security classi¯cation decisions for the NC=30 selected N¡2 contingencies, are used
to generate the N=6000 cases in the knowledge base. The size and the number
of small DTs are determined by bias-variance analysis [68] and v-fold cross valida-
tion [56]. In this case study, L=40 and J=3 are used by the proposed approach; 45
DTs are used in the two RF-based approaches.
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Table 5.3: The ¯rst and second removed components of the selected N¡2 contingen-
cies
line( 4,14), line( 6,11) line( 6,11), line( 4,14) line( 6,11), line(13,14)
line( 6,11), line(10,13) line(10,11), line(10,13) line(10,13), line( 6,11)
line(10,13), line(10,11) line(13,14), line( 6,11) line(13,14), line(10,11)
line(16,21), line(23,24) line(21,22), line(23,24) line(21,22), line(22,23)
line(21,22), line(16,24) line(23,24), line(16,21) line(23,24), line(21,22)
5.5.3.3 Near Real-time Re-check
By following the procedure described in Section V.B, 100 OCs are generated for
performance re-check. The DTs trained o²ine are applied to the new cases; the
classi¯cation results are compared with the actual security classi¯cation decisions of
the new cases. Then, these re-check results are used by Algorithm 4 to quantify the
voting weights of DTs.
5.5.3.4 Online DSA Test
Another 100 OCs are generated for testing, by following the procedure described in
Section V.B. Recall that the availability of the PDCs and the communication links
connecting PDCs is 1, and then it can be seen from Fig. 5.2 and Fig. 5.4 that the total
number of failure scenarios can be reduced to 512 (29, since there are 9 pairs of PMUs
and links). Online DSA test is repeated for all failure scenarios, by identifying the
missing PMU measurements and viable small DTs, calculating the voting weights
of viable small DTs, and evaluating the misclassi¯cation error rate. The overall
misclassi¯cation error of online DSA is calculated by:
¹e( ~F ) =
512X
k=1
Prob(­(k))e( ~F j­(k)); (5.17)
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Figure 5.5: Performance of online DSA in case of missing PMU measurements
Table 5.4: Misclassi¯cation error rate when b=0.94.
Scheme Secure cases Insecure cases overall
A single DT 8.92% 8.63% 8.74%
RF with surrogates 5.14% 5.81% 5.33%
RF without surrogates 4.52% 4.17% 4.28%
Proposed 2.36% 1.92% 2.03%
where, ­(k) denotes the k-th failure scenario, Prob(­(k)) denotes the probability for
­(k) to happen, which can be easily calculated by using the assumed availability, and
e( ~F j­(k)) denotes the misclassi¯cation error rate of ~F in the failure scenario ­(k)
(e( ~F j­) is set to be 1 when all PMUs fail). The test is performed for various values
of b, and the test results are illustrated in Fig. 5.5. It is observed that the benchmark
approaches are comparable to the proposed approach only around b=1. However, the
gaps become more signi¯cant as b decreases. More speci¯cally, the misclassi¯cation
error rates when the availability b=0.94 are shown in Table 5.4, for \Secure" and
\Insecure" cases respectively.
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5.5.3.5 Impact of Measurement Noise
In reality, PMU data can contain measurement noise. Following the approach in [95],
numerical experiment is carried out to study the impact of measurement noise on the
performance of the proposed approach.
For convenience, let V ]µV and I]µI denote a voltage phasor and a current
phasor, respectively; let ~V]~µV and ~I]~µI be the corresponding measurement. For
PMUs complying with IEEE C37.118 standard [96], the PMU measurements should
have a total vector error (TVE) less than 1%, i.e.,
j
~V ]~µV ¡ V ]µV
V ]µV
j < 1% (5.18)
j
~I]~µI ¡ I]µI
I]µI
j < 1% (5.19)
Let nV and nI denote the measurement noise, respectively. In order to obtain PMU
measurements that comply with the above speci¯cations, nV and nI are randomly
generated, by using the following density functions (note that other density functions
can be also used) that are properly scaled and truncated from the standard complexity
Gaussian distribution:
f(nV ) =
8><>:
9
¼(1¡e¡9)10¡4V 2 e
¡ 9jnV j
2
10¡4V 2 if jnV j · 10¡2V
0 o:w:
(5.20)
f(nI) =
8><>:
9
¼(1¡e¡9)10¡4I2 e
¡ 9jnI j
2
10¡4I2 if jnI j · 10¡2I
0 o:w:
(5.21)
Then, it is clear that all noisy measurements have TVE not more than 1%, and
are complex Gaussian distributed within their support. The generated random mea-
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Figure 5.6: Impact of measurement noise.
surement noise is added to the both training and testing data. The test results are
provided in Fig. 5.6.
5.6 Conclusion
A data-mining approach has been proposed to mitigate the impact of missing PMU
measurements in online DSA. In particular, the various possibilities of missing PMU
measurements in online DSA can make o®-the-shelf DT-based techniques (e.g., a sin-
gle DT, RF) fail to deliver the same performance as expected. The proposed ensemble
DT-based approach exploits the locational information and the availability informa-
tion of PMU measurements in randomly selecting attribute subsets, and utilizes the
re-check results to re-weight the DTs in the ensemble. These special treatments de-
veloped from a better characterization of power system dynamics guarantee that the
proposed approach can achieve better performance than directly applying o®-the-shelf
DT-based techniques.
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Chapter 6
A DEPENDENCY GRAPH APPROACH FOR FAULT DETECTION AND
LOCALIZATION USING SYNCHROPHASOR DATA
6.1 Introduction
One of the primary challenges on securing power systems has been the early detection
and localization of fault events so as to mitigate their impacts on the overall stability
of the power grid. It has been well recognized that a lack of \situational awareness" is
often the main reason for large-scale fault events that begin with failures in one area
and eventually propagate to other regions, e.g., the 2003 blackout that spread across
the eastern United States and Canada. However, today's power systems are not
equipped with adequate fault detection and localization mechanisms against various
malicious attacks and natural physical events [97]. There is therefore an urgent need
to enhance the situational awareness, so that corrective actions can be taken promptly
to avoid cascading events.
Traditionally, in SCADA systems, critical buses in the transmission system
are monitored using the data measured at RTUs. These measurements could pro-
vide only a snapshot of power systems, i.e., the static or quasi-dynamic status. In
contrast, WAMS [98], in which the measurements are made at a much ¯ner granu-
larity, is designed to enhance the system operator's real-time situational awareness.
In a WAMS, the current, voltage and frequency phasor at the monitored buses are
collected by PMUs, together with the time stamps provided by GPS. After process-
ing these highly synchronized measurements, the system operator is able to observe
not only the steady-state, but also the dynamic state of the entire power system.
The availability of synchronized measurements has enabled a new level of situational
awareness. Indeed, recent years have witnessed a surge of various WAMS-based appli-
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cations, e.g., voltage and frequency instability analysis [56], fault diagnosis [99{101],
and the detection of cascading failures [102].
It is known that the fault localization of transmission lines is challenging [97],
due to the massive scale, global coupling and time-varying system states. Speci¯cally,
the complexity of fault localization, if not taken care of carefully, can be extremely
high, since it involves a large volume of PMU measurements from a massive-scale
transmission system. Moreover, in power systems, given the bus injections, the volt-
age and phase angle of a bus are determined by the states of neighboring buses and
the electrical connectivity, as described by Kircho®'s law. The inherent dependency
between the states of buses dictates that the PMU measurements are spatially corre-
lated and coupled. Accordingly, anomalies in the PMU measurements at the buses of
a transmission line might be the consequence of failures at other lines. Further, due to
stochastic events in power systems, the abnormal trajectories of PMU measurements
might be the result of a sudden change in the power injections from load or genera-
tion, other than the failure of transmission lines. In light of the stochastic nature of
power systems, bus injections and branch °ows could be volatile across various time
scales, which could be even more phenomenal in smart grids that are supposed to
integrate a large number of distributed generations and renewable energy resources.
A main objective of this study is to devise a decentralized fault localization
scheme that can capture the latent dependency and the uncertainty of power systems.
We note that Markov random ¯elds (MRFs) and graphical models [103] o®er a con-
venient platform to characterize the dependency between a large number of random
variables, and thus, have found various applications in many ¯elds (see [104{106]
and the references therein). In particular, based on the Hammersley-Cli®ord Theo-
rem [107], graphical models have shown great potential for designing decentralized
algorithms for large scale inference problems.
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In this chapter, we will explore decentralized network inference using graphical
models to address the following challenges in the fault detection and localization of
transmission lines: 1) the computational complexity of large scale inference problems;
2) the global coupling and correlation between the PMU measurements; and 3) the
uncertainty of system states caused by stochastic load and generation.
6.2 Dependency Graph Models for PMU Data
6.2.1 Background on Dependency Graph
A random ¯eld X on a ¯nite set S with p sites is a collection of random variables
Xs; s 2 S, with values in state space ¤, and a con¯guration x 2 ¤S onX is a collection
of the values of the random variables. For a site s 2 S in a Markov random ¯eld, its
neighborhood Ns is a subset of S such that the following Markov property holds [108]:
Xs?XSnfs[NsgjXNs ; (6.1)
i.e., given XNs , Xs is conditionally independent of the other random variables. It is
worth mentioning that the neighborhood of Xs is non-trivially not unique, and Ns is
said to be minimal [108] if none of Xt; t 2 Ns, satis¯es the pairwise Markov property:
Xs?XtjXSnfs;tg: (6.2)
In what follows, we use Ns to denote the minimal neighborhood of site s. Note that
this neighborhood relation is symmetrical, i.e., t 2 Ns if and only if s 2 Nt.
The dependency graph G = (S;E) of MRF X is obtained by placing an edge
fs; tg 2 E between each pair of sites s and t that are in each other's minimal neigh-
borhood. We use the standard notation in graph theory, namely s » t, to denote
this adjacency relation in undirected graph, otherwise it is s 6» t. A clique c in G
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is a subset of S, either with cardinality jcj = 1 or such that any two sites in c are
neighbors in the dependency graph. Let C denote the collection of cliques in G.
According to the Hammersley-Cli®ord theorem [107], under the positiveness
condition, i.e., PX(x) > 0 for any con¯guration x 2 ¤S, the probability distribution
of MRF X can be expressed in terms of potential functions. A potential function on
clique c is a measurable mapping Vc : ¤
S ! R, that depends only on the variables
fXs; s 2 cg, i.e., if two con¯gurations x1;x2 2 ¤S agree on the values of the sites
contained in c, then Vc(x1) = Vc(x2). An irreducible potential function Vc is either
zero everywhere on ¤S or could not be represented as a sum of non-zero potential
functions on other cliques that are the subsets of c [108].
A Gaussian Markov random ¯eld is a MRF that has probability distribution
X » N (0;J¡1), where J is the information matrix of the GMRF. Without loss of gen-
erality, we consider zero-mean GMRFs, and the diagonal entries of J are normalized
to 1. It is clear that the positiveness condition is satis¯ed by GMRFs, accordingly, the
probability distribution of GMRFX can be expressed in terms of non-zero irreducible
potential functions on the singleton and pairwise cliques [109]:
PX (x) =
1
Z
exp
8<:¡X
i2S
Vfig (xi)¡
X
(i;j)2E
Vfi;jg (xi; xj)
9=; ; (6.3)
where, the partition function is given by
Z = (2¼)p=2 jJj¡1=2 ; (6.4)
and potential function on singleton clique fig is given by
Vfig(xi) =
1
2
Jiix
2
i ; (6.5)
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Figure 6.1: The IEEE 14-bus system and the dependency graph of the phase angles
and potential function on pairwise clique fi; jg is given by
Vfi;jg(xi; xj) = Jijxixj: (6.6)
One key observation from (6.5) and (6.6) is that each site or edge in the dependency
graph of a GMRF corresponds to a non-zero entry of the information matrix, vice
versa, i.e., for GMRF X, i » j if and only if Jij 6= 0.
6.2.2 Gaussian Markov Random Field for Phase Angles
The DC power °ow model [110] is often used for the analysis of power systems in nor-
mal steady-state operations, where the power °ow on the transmission line connecting
bus i to bus j is given by
Zij = bij(Xi ¡Xj); (6.7)
where Xi and Xj denote the phase angles at bus i and bus j, respectively, and bij,
the inverse of line inductive reactance, measures the electrical connectivity between
bus i and bus j. Further, the power injection to bus i, which is equal to the algebraic
sum of the power °owing away from bus i, is given by
Zi =
X
j 6=i
Zij =
X
j 6=i
bij (Xi ¡Xj): (6.8)
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It follows that the phase angle at bus i can be represented as
Xi =
X
j 6=i
rijXj + ¯Zi; (6.9)
with ¯ ,
³P
j 6=i bij
´¡1
and rij , ¯bij.
Existing probabilistic power °ow approaches [111] usually model the load °ows
at buses as random variables, to account for the random disturbances and uncertainty
of various load pro¯les. Some of these approaches [111,112] model the aggregated load
°ow injection at buses as Gaussian random variables. Following these approaches, we
assume that during the observation window of fault diagnosis applications, the °ow
injection originating from the aggregated load requests of a large number of users can
be well approximated by Gaussian random variables.
According to [113], branch °ows can be expressed as linear combinations of
the power injection at buses. It follows that branch °ow Zij could also be modeled
as a Gaussian random variable. Since the phase di®erence of buses would not be too
large in order to drive branch °ows [114], the linear relationship shown in (6.7) implies
that the di®erence of phase angles across a bus can be approximated by a Gaussian
random variable truncated within [0; 2¼). In power systems, since the phasor is ¯xed
at the slack bus, we assume that, under steady-state, the phase angles at non-slack
buses can be approximately modeled as Gaussian random variables.
In a nutshell, based on (6.9), the conditional distribution of Xi can be speci¯ed
in the form of a conditional auto-regression (CAR) model [115], i.e.,
Xi jX¡i » N
³X
j 6=i
rijxj; 1
´
; (6.10)
with X¡i denoting the random variables on Snfig. Here, we abuse the notation and
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use Xi jX¡i to denote the conditional distribution of Xi given fXj = xj; j 6= ig, and
the distribution is normalized to highlight the conditional correlations. It is shown
in [115] that under the condition that I¡R is positive de¯nite, GMRF X follows
the joint distribution N (0; (I¡R)¡1), with R , [rij] as the matrix consisting of
conditional correlation coe±cients. Note that for each Xi, its conditional correlation
coe±cients frij; j 6= ig are proportional to fbij; j 6= ig. Through building the de-
pendency graph of phase angles on the topology of power systems, as illustrated in
Fig. 6.1, we observe that, similar to the susceptance matrix B , [bij], the conditional
correlation matrix R also re°ects the electrical distance between buses. Intuitively,
the change of the electrical connectivity of buses would result in a di®erent conditional
correlation coe±cient between phase angles; particularly, rij vanishes if a line outage
takes place between bus i and bus j.
6.3 Decentralized Network Inference for Fault Detection and Localization
In light of the computational complexity of fault localization brought by massive
scales, a fault detection is performed ¯rst. Speci¯cally, let E0 be the edge set, §0
denote the covariance matrix of the GMRF, and R0 be the conditional correlation
matrix when the power system is under normal conditions. Mathematically, the
proposed fault detection approach boils down to hypothesis testing on the change of
the conditional correlation coe±cients, with null and alternate hypothesis given by
8><>: H0 : rij = r
0
ij 8fi; jg 2 E0
H1 : rij 6= r0ij 9fi; jg 2 E0
(6.11)
It can be shown that the above null hypothesis is equivalent to that of § = §0. Then,
it su±ces to apply standard change detection methods (see, e.g., [116]). Further, if
H1 is accepted, jE 0j locators are deployed to localize all the possible faults:
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±ij (dij; ") =
8><>: 0 if dij 6 "1 o:w: 8 fi; jg 2 E 0; (6.12)
where, dij ,
¯¯¯
r^ij
r0ij
¡ 1
¯¯¯
; 8 fi; jg 2 E0 , are computed using the conditional correla-
tion coe±cient r^ij estimated from PMU measurements, and " > 0 depends on the
signi¯cant level of fault events.
In performing the above change detection and localization using PMU mea-
surements, we notice a few challenging issues. First, the change of rij cannot be
localized by using the measurements of Xi and Xj only. Note that the measurements
of Xi and Xj form a su±cient statistic of the unconditional correlation coe±cient ½ij,
which relates to the conditional ones globally, as described by the walk-sum expres-
sion [117]:
½ij =
1X
l=0
¡
Rl
¢
i;j
=
1X
l=0
'
³
i
l¡! j
´
; (6.13)
where, '
³
i
l¡! j
´
is de¯ned as the walk on G from site i to j with length l. It is
clear that ½ij depends on the products of the conditional correlation coe±cients over
all the possible walks from i to j, and therefore, the change of ½ij can be the result
of the changes of other entries of R. To tackle this issue, a feasible solution is to
obtain a complete estimate of R from the global measurements. This boils down to
obtaining J^, the estimate of J, from the sample covariance matrix §^. However, §^¡1
cannot be directly used for change localization, since §^¡1 usually does not have the
same sparsity as J, due to noisy measurements or the small number of measurements.
In related work [118], the estimation of the information matrix of a GMRF is
often treated as a constrained optimization problem that maximizes the likelihood:
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P : maximize log
¯¯¯
J^
¯¯¯
¡ tr
³
J^§^
´
subject to J^ij = 0; (i; j) =2 E0:
(6.14)
However, solving P requires centralized computation and global measurements. As
noted in [118], the computational complexity could be very high for large-scale prob-
lems and current algorithms are not scalable. Also worth mentioning is that the
estimation of J generally requires the number of measurements at least to be compa-
rable to the size of X.
We ¯rst devise a decomposition scheme using the multiresolution transform of
GMRFs. As noted above, in the traditional multiresolution analysis of GMRFs in re-
lated work (e.g., in image processing) where the dependency structure of the original
GMRF, usually built on lattice graphs, is irreversibly lost due to transform operations
(e.g., subsampling [106] and block-averaging [104]). In contrast, the devised scheme
can perfectly reconstruct the original GMRF from the sub-¯elds. Accordingly, a de-
centralized network inference algorithm using message passing is designed, to achieve
a global solution for fault detection and localization. Compared to the centralized al-
gorithm, the proposed approach has the following salient features. 1) The number of
samples, required for the estimation of information matrix using local measurements,
is proportional to the size of the largest sub-¯eld other than that of the complete
GMRF. 2) The dimension of the subproblems is much smaller, signi¯cantly reduc-
ing the overall computational complexity. Recall that, in the centralized algorithm,
a hypothesis testing for fault detection is employed before the fault localization to
mitigate the potential computational complexity incurred in estimating R. In con-
trast, in the decentralized network inference, we directly perform fault localization
based on (6.12). Speci¯cally, for a power system consisting of several subsystems,
we decompose the fault localization problem into multiple subproblems, in which the
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inference can be carried out based on local measurements. Accordingly, the GMRF
is decomposed into corresponding sub-¯elds, and the sites of the GMRF are classi¯ed
into border sites and inner sites, of which the latter are not connected to the other
sub-¯elds. Further, the edges in the original dependency graph are classi¯ed into
tie-line edges which connect di®erent sub-¯elds, border-line edges which connect the
border sites of the same sub-¯eld, and inner-line edges which have at least one end
as inner site. We note that a direct decomposition of the GMRF, by grouping the
sites into disjoint subsets, is not capable of capturing the dependency between the
sub-¯elds. With this insight, we construct an additional sub-¯eld by grouping all the
border sites in the dependency graph.
In solving the subproblems, a key challenge is that the dependency graphs of
the sub-¯elds are no longer the same as in that of the original GMRF. Indeed, as
discussed in [106,108], the decomposition of MRF would result in a \loss of locality".
Consequently, for a GMRF, the information matrices of the sub-¯elds would have
di®erent sparse patterns and non-zero entries from the corresponding blocks of J.
Therefore, the knowledge of local information matrix is not su±cient to detect and
localize all the faults in the corresponding subproblem.
To tackle the above challenge, we devise a decomposition scheme that can
perfectly reconstruct the information matrix of the original GMRF from those of
the sub-¯elds. We ¯rst show that for the information matrices of the sub-¯elds, the
entries corresponding to the inner sites, inner-line edges, and tie-line edges remain
the same as in J after the decomposition. Then, message passing between the sub-
¯elds is employed to \reconstruct" the entries corresponding to the border sites and
the border-line edges, that changed due to decomposition.
In what follows, we ¯rst study the two-scale decomposition of a GMRF, and
demonstrate that J can indeed be reconstructed from the information matrices of the
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Figure 6.2: The two-scale decomposition of GMRF X
sub-¯elds through message passing. Then, we extend the study to the multiscale
decomposition of GMRFs.
6.3.1 Two-scale Decomposition of GMRF
Simply put, the two-scale decomposition partitions S into K disjoint subsets Sk,
k = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K, at the lower scale, and creates one additional subset B at the
higher scale by grouping all of the border sites, as shown in Fig. 6.2. For notational
convenience, let XSk be the sub-¯eld on Sk, k = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K, and XB be that on
B. Further, we use ~Gk, ~Ck, and Jk to denote the dependency graph, the collection
of cliques, and the information matrix of XSk , respectively, for k = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K, and
~GB, ~CB, and JB for those of XB.
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Recall that, for a GMRF, the non-zero entries of the information matrix are
the coe±cients of clique potential functions. By exploring the information matrices of
the K+1 sub-¯elds, we ¯nd that 1) the o®-diagonal entries of JB and J corresponding
to the same tie-line edge have the same value; 2) for Jk, k 2 f1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Kg, and J, the
o®-diagonal entries corresponding to the same inner-line edge have the same value,
and the diagonal entries corresponding to the same inner site have the same value.
The above results are summarized in the following two lemmas on the dependency
graphs and clique potential functions of the K+1 sub-¯elds, and the proofs are given
in Appendix C.
Lemma 6.3.1. a) Let i and j be two border sites contained in di®erent sub-¯elds,
then i » j in ~GB if and only if i » j in G.
b) Let c be a clique in C with a non-zero irreducible potential function. If c contains
two sites connected by a tie-line edge, then c 2 ~CB, and the corresponding potential
function is given by ~V c (xB) = V c (xB; a ¹B), for any con¯guration a ¹B 2 ¤SnB on
XSnB.
Lemma 6.3.2. a) Let i be an inner site, and j be another site in the same sub-¯eld
XSk , k 2 f1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Kg, then i » j in ~Gk if and only if i » j in G.
b) Let c be a clique in C with a non-zero irreducible potential function. If c contains
an inner site of Sk, k 2 f1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Kg, then c 2 ~Ck, and the corresponding potential
function is given by ~V c (xSk) = V c
¡
xSk ; a ¹Sk
¢
, for any con¯guration a ¹Sk 2 ¤SnSk on
XSnSk .
Further, in order to enable the complete reconstruction of J, we consider
the border sites, the border-line edges, and the corresponding potential functions.
For notational convenience, let Bk and Ik be the set of the border sites and inner
sites in Sk, respectively, and XBk and XIk the corresponding random ¯elds, for k =
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1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K. Note that B = [Kk=1Bk. Without loss of generality, GMRF X could be
organized as
X =
264 XB
XI
375 ;
with
XB =
266664
XB1
...
XBK
377775 XI =
266664
XI1
...
XIK
377775 :
Then, J consists of four block matrices JBB, JBI , JIB, and JII , with the border-line
edges and border sites corresponding to the diagonal blocks of JBB. According to
Lemma 6.3.2, the non-zero entries of JBI , JIB, and JII have the same value as those of
Jk; k = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K corresponding to the same inner-line edge or inner site. Another
key observation on the block matrices of J and JB is given by the following result.
Proposition 6.3.1. The k-th diagonal blocks of JBB is given by
[JBB]kk = [JB]kk + [JBI ]kk [JII ]
¡1
kk [JBI ]
T
kk ; (6.15)
where, [ ¦ ]kk retrieves the k-th diagonal block of an information matrix.
Proposition 6.3.1 indicates that the entries of J corresponding to the border-
line edges and border sites could be computed from JB, and the entries of J that
corresponds to the inner-line edges and inner sites. Combining Lemma 6.3.1, Lemma
6.3.2 with Proposition 6.3.1, we conclude that J could be completely reconstructed
from JB and Jk; k = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K, through message passing between the sub-¯elds.
For large-scale GMRFs, even if the size of each sub-¯eld XSk is moderate, the size
of XB could still be very large, which makes the estimation of JB intractable. This
problem could be solved by applying further decomposition on XB.
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Figure 6.3: The multiscale decomposition of GMRF X
6.3.2 Multiscale Decomposition of GMRF
According to Lemma 6.3.1, one characteristic of the proposed two-scale decomposition
of GMRFs is that the tie-line structure of G is preserved in ~GB. Accordingly, the
two-scale decomposition could be applied to XB, the newly created sub-¯eld at the
higher scale, recursively as needed.
In general, for the L-scale decomposition, we ¯rst perform a hierarchical clus-
tering on S, as illustrated in Fig. 6.3. For notational convenience, we use the super-
script as the index of scale. Speci¯cally, S(2) is used to denote the set of sites at the
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second scale, instead of B in the two-scale decomposition scenario. Suppose that S(l)
is obtained by grouping the border sites of the K(l¡1) disjoint subsets of S(l¡1). To
obtain S(l+1), we re-group the scale-l sites into K(l) disjoint subsets of S(l), such that
each pair of sites in the same subset of S(l¡1) are still contained in the same subset
of S(l). In each scale-l subset S
(l)
k , the sites and edges are re-classi¯ed according to
the same rule as in the two-scale decomposition, and then S(l+1) could be obtained
by grouping all the border sites of S(l). As a result, the entire set of sites S is par-
titioned into the disjoint subsets of scale-1 inner sites, ..., scale-(L ¡ 1) inner sites,
and scale-(L¡ 1) border sites, and the entire set of edges E into those of the scale-1
inner-line edges, ..., scale-(L¡1) inner-line edges, scale-(L¡1) border-line edges, and
scale-(L ¡ 1) tie-line edges which are also scale-L edges since we cease clustering at
the scale L.
Summarizing, once the information matrices J
(l)
k of the sub-¯elds XS(l)k
; k =
1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K(l), across all L scales are known, the complete J could be obtained by
performing the reconstruction procedure recursively from the top to the lowest scale,
using Proposition 6.3.1, for the reconstruction at each scale. With this insight, we
design a decentralized network inference algorithm via using message passing for the
estimation of the information matrix.
6.3.3 Decentralized Network Inference using Message Passing
Simply put, if all the buses of the power system are observable, we ¯rst perform
a multiscale decomposition on X based on the hierarchical topology of the power
system. Once the estimates of the information matrices of sub-¯elds are obtained, a
complete J^ could be reconstructed from the estimated information matrices of sub-
¯elds. For each scale l, l = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; L, we assume that there is an inference center at
each sub-¯eld X
S
(l)
k
, k = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K(l). Let F (k; l) be the collection of the indices of
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the sub-¯elds that are located at the lower scale of X
S
(l+1)
k
. Then, the procedure of
the decentralized estimation of the information matrix is summarized in Algorithm
5.
Algorithm 5 Decentralized estimation of J using message passing
Local estimation: Estimate the information matrices of all the sub-¯elds based
on local measurements, by solving the subproblem P lk using the dependency graph
of X
S
(l)
k
.
Down-top message passing: For l = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; L ¡ 1, the inference centers of
X
S
(l)
f
, f 2 F (k; l), submit J^(l)f to that of XS(l+1)k .
Top-down reconstruction: For l = L ¡ 1; L ¡ 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; 1, the inference center of
XS(L) reconstruct J^
(l) from J^(l+1) and J^
(l)
k , k = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K(l).
Top-down message passing: The inference center of XS(L) broadcast J^, i.e., J^
(1)
to the inference centers of all the sub-¯elds.
We note that in some practical scenarios, the power system is not completely
observable, e.g., due to the failures of some PMUs. As a result, the complete J^ is not
obtainable. However, fault diagnosis could still be performed for a sub-¯eld under
mild conditions. To this end, we have the following result.
Corollary 6.3.1. The measurements at a sub-¯eld XSk and its neighbor sites form
a su±cient statistic for Jkk.
The above result indicates that the information matrix of the interior of an
observable island can be estimated from the measurements of the island only. To get
a more concrete sense, suppose sub-¯eld XS3 and its neighbor sites are observable in
Fig. 6.2. We ¯rst construct an extended sub-¯eld ¹XS3 as the concatenation of XS3
and its neighbor sites, as shown in Fig. 6.4. Then, according to Corollary 6.3.1, J33
is same as the block of the information matrix of ¹XS3 , that corresponds to XS3 .
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Figure 6.4: The extended sub-¯eld for the fault diagnosis of S3
6.4 Numerical Results
6.4.1 Decentralized Estimation of Information Matrix
In what follows, we perform numerical experiments to evaluate the proposed decen-
tralized estimation algorithm. Following the approach in [119], we consider a GMRF
with p = 300 sites uniformly distributed on a 40£ 40 grid. Any two sites i; j are con-
sidered to be neighbors whenever their Euclidean distance d(i; j) is less than a cut-o®
value d0. Further, the conditional correlation coe±cients of adjacent sites are param-
eterized as rij =
°
d2(i;j)
. We choose ° 2 [0; 1] such that (I¡R) is positive de¯nite.
We generate i.i.d samples and perform the estimation procedure. For the multiscale
estimation, we apply the clustering algorithm in [120] and group the GMRF into 16
clusters at the second scale, and 4 clusters at the third scale. The accuracy of estima-
tion is quanti¯ed by the Kullback-Leibler (KL) distance between the true distribution
N0(0;J¡1) and the distribution N1(0; J^¡1) that is estimated from measurements:
D (N0jjN1) = 1
2
³
log det
³
JJ^¡1
´
+ tr
³
J¡1J^
´´
: (6.16)
We vary the values of d0 and ° to generate various simulation cases with di®erent
graph density and strength of conditional correlations. As shown in Fig. 6.5 and
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Figure 6.5: The performance of estimation algorithms (° = 0:5)
Fig.6.6, the numerical results indicate that the KL distances decrease approximately
in a power law against the number of samples, and the proposed decentralized al-
gorithms have comparable accuracy with the centralized one. For d = 6, graph for
the sub-¯eld at the 2nd scale is so dense that further clustering gives no gains. They
also indicate that the accuracy of the estimation algorithms does not depend on the
topology of graph, or the strength of conditional correlations.
6.4.2 Fault Localization
In order to evaluate the e®ectiveness of the proposed approach, we run simulations on
the IEEE 300-bus system. Following the Monte Carlo methods, we consider the fault
detection and localization in a 20-second observation window, i.e., n = 1200 samples
are simulated since phasors are measured at up to 60 samples per second according
to the speci¯cations of PMU. Power injections to buses are generated randomly, and
then the branch °ows and phasors at buses are solved using the MATPOWER [121]
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Figure 6.6: The performance of estimation algorithms (d0 = 4)
simulation package. We take the solution of the phasors as the measurements collected
from the IEEE 300-bus system by PMUs .
Based on the locators de¯ned in (6.12), we specify the detection rules for the
two categories of fault events: line outage and the change of physical parameter. In
the event of a line outage between the buses i and j, Xi and Xj become conditionally
un-correlated, and then, we could use the following rule for the identi¯cation of line
outage: Line outage at fi; jg, if r0ij À ² and r^ij < ², where ² ¿ 1 is a small value.
For the fault event of a parameter change (i.e., caused by physical damages), the
increase of the electrical distance between buses would result in less conditionally-
correlated phase angles. Therefore, we could use the following rule for identifying
these faults: Line fi; jg with parameter change, if r0ij=r^ij > ´, where ´ > 1 depends
on the signi¯cant level of the fault events to be detected.
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Figure 6.7: The top-scale sub-¯eld of the IEEE 300-bus System
6.4.2.1 Decomposition of the IEEE 300-bus System
We perform a two-scale decomposition on the graph of the phase angles in the IEEE
300-bus System, as shown in Fig. 6.7. Since the IEEE 300-bus system contains three
management areas, we take the three areas as the sub-¯elds at the lower scale, and
the top-scale sub-¯eld is obtained by grouping all the border sites of the sub-¯elds at
the lower scale. It is worth noting that only the tie-line edges are shown in Fig. 6.7,
and the border sites in each sub-¯eld form a complete subgraph.
6.4.2.2 Testing cases for line outage
We test a case of line f26,27g outage. To simulate the line outage, we exclude the
failed line from solving the power °ows. Once an estimate of the information matrix
of the GMRF are obtained from the measurements of phase angles, the conditional
correlation coe±cients are computed, as shown in Table 6.1. It indicates that the
conditional correlation coe±cient between the phaosr angles at the buses 26 and 27
turns into a small value. Thus a decision rule with ² = 0:05 could detect this line
outage.
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Table 6.1: A case of line f26,27g outage
line Area Reactance
Con. Cor. Coef.
r^0 r^
Bus 26
f25,26g 1 0.071 0.61 0.62
f26,27g 1 0.12 0.36 0.03
f26,320g 1 0.13 0.34 0.39
Bus 27
f20,27g 1 0.186 0.23 0.25
f26,27g 1 0.12 0.36 0.03
6.4.2.3 Testing cases for the change of physical parameter
We test a case that both line f26,27g and line f199,200g have parameter change. In
this case, we double the reactance of the faulted transmission lines to simulate an
increase of electrical distance. The results are summarized in Table 6.2. Note that if
we choose ´ = 1:3, then the faulted lines are detected.
Table 6.2: A case of parameter changes at line f26,27g and f199,200g
line Area
Reactance Con. Cor. Coef.
1=b0ij 1=bij r' r
Bus 26
f25,26g 1 0.071 0.071 0.61 0.72
f26,27g 1 0.12 0.24 0.36 0.21
f26,320g 1 0.13 0.13 0.34 0.39
Bus 27
f20,27g 1 0.186 0.186 0.23 0.43
f26,27g 1 0.12 0.24 0.36 0.21
Bus 199
f199,200g 2 0.135 0.27 0.53 0.38
f199,210g 2 0.102 0.102 0.68 0.75
Bus 200
f199,200g 2 0.135 0.27 0.53 0.38
f200,210g 2 0.128 0.128 0.58 0.63
f200,248g 2 0.22 0.22 0.38 0.41
6.5 Conclusion
A dependency graph approach is proposed for the fault detection and localization of
transmission lines in large scale power systems. Then, the fault diagnosis is performed
through the change detection and localization in the conditional correlation matrix
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of the GMRF. In particular, in order to mitigate the complexity, a decentralized
algorithm based on multiresolution transform of GMRFs is devised. The proposed
decentralized algorithms can be useful in some practical scenarios, e.g, when the
PMU measurements from multiple utilities are incompatible (not synchronized or at
di®erent sampling frequencies).
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Chapter 7
Future Research
7.1 Impact of Communication QoS on the Performance of Special Protection
Schemes
Special protection schemes (SPS), also known as remedial action schemes (RAS),
are typically contingency-related schemes that are designed to initiate pre-planned,
corrective action upon disturbance and abnormal operating conditions are detected
[122]. SPS actions may include load shedding, generator tripping, or change in system
con¯guration (e.g., shunt banks inserting, capacitor bypassing) to maintain system
frequency stability and acceptable voltages levels. The trigger of SPS is usually
a logical combination of the status signals that are collected from multiple remote
substations.
With this insight, it is obvious that the overlay communication system can
have signi¯cant impact on the performance of SPS. First, the reliability of the com-
munication system determines the availability of these input signals. Further, large
latency incurred by wide-area communication may lead the failure of SPS to meet
the timing requirement of correction actions. Therefore, it is necessary to perform
reliability analysis and risk assessment of SPS under a two-layer framework, i.e., a
power system with an overlay communication system.
Basically, the communication system for wide-area protection system can be
divided into two parts: intra-substation communication and inter-substation com-
munication. The task of intra-substation communication network, i.e., a local area
network (LAN), is to collect the status data of lines and switchgears and report it
to the server within the substation; and inter-substation communications aim to de-
liver the needed status data in a timely manner to the control center or the site of
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SPS. Inter-substation communications can be implemented through dedicated point-
to-point communication technologies, e.g., microwave and optical-¯ber, or through a
wide-area network (WAN). Reliability and latency analysis will be carried out for both
parts of the communication system, and for all possible implementation scenarios.
7.2 Near Real-time Prediction and Quanti¯cation of Extreme Ramp-down Events
of Wind Farm Generation
Ramp events of wind farm generation refer to the rapid change in the farm's aggre-
gate power output [123]. Ramp is usually characterized by the magnitude of change
and the length of the considered time interval. Extreme ramp-down events, e.g., a
reduction of 20% of the rated capacity in 10 minutes, can have signi¯cant impact on
the e±ciency of wind generation integration and power system reliability if ancillary
services are not su±cient. This kind of low probability high impact events have to be
taken into account in wind farm generation forecast and power system operations.
A vast majority of existing forecasting methods, which are built on time-series
analysis or Markovian models, may not be appropriate to handle extreme ramp-down
event Time-series analysis approaches, e.g., ARMA model based approaches, implic-
itly assume that wind farm generation is a stationary or quasi-stationary process,
thus cannot capture the non-stationarity of the rapid change of wind farm generation
when extreme ramp-down events occur. Markovian models, e.g., Markov chains, may
also fail when extreme ramp-down events are under-represented in the historic data
that is used to estimated the transition probabilities.
Thus motivated, near real-time prediction of extreme ramp-down events and
quanti¯cation of ramp magnitude will be studied in a new framework. In this frame-
work, individual turbine's power output, combined with neighborhood graph obtained
by using the geographical information, will be utilized to predict the occurrence of ex-
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treme ramp-down events, by using tools from graphical learning and inference. From
the extensive measurement data, two major causes of extreme ramp-down events are
identi¯ed: steep wind speed drop, and diversion of wind direction combined with
speed drop. For the latter case, real-time detection of wind direction change is more
challenging, since there is limited number of MET towers even for large wind farms.
Further, when quantifying the ramp magnitude, wake e®ect needs to be accounted
for when predicting individual turbine's power output.
7.3 Data Security and Privacy in Smart Grids
Besides reliability of power systems, another key objective of smart grids is to improve
the e±ciency of the electricity grid, by using ICTs that enabling two-way communica-
tions between end-users and utilities. It is thus obvious that data containing detailed
usage information of end users will be collected by utilities and/or third parties; the
utility can provide real-time pricing and billing information to smart meters and other
end-user devices. From the perspective of utilities, AMI and the overlay information
system will allow for a more °exible monitoring and control on the distribution grid.
Undoubtedly, incorporating smartness to a critical electricity distribution grid
imposes stringent requirements on data security and privacy. A security breach of
the information system of distribution management system can have severe impact
on the reliability of distribution grid. With regards to privacy, the metering data
collected by the utility contains a signi¯cant amount of information about individual
end-users. The potential implications of data privacy have already been identi¯ed
as another most important issue of smart grid, besides interoperability, by National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [124].
It is thus urgent to deploy data security and privacy protection and assur-
ance schemes into the overlay information infrastructure. Speci¯cally, the following
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aspects needs to be taken into account. 1) Communication security: two-way infor-
mation exchange will require new ways of secure communications between end-users
and utilities, as well as new ways to build secure communication networks within the
home area. 2) Implementation security: With a huge number of small devices em-
bedded in electricity appliances are getting networked, implementation security issues
become signi¯cant. Conventionally, those devices are not equipped with protection
schemes against network-based attacks, and the limited hardware and software re-
sources of these devices make implementation of security solutions what are designed
for larger computer systems impossible. Thus, new implementation security schemes
are required. 3) Privacy: The amount of smart metering data collected from individ-
ual end-users is unprecedented, and leads to massive concerns about users privacy.
Flexible privacy-conserving technologies are required to balance the tradeo® between
end-user privacy and data usage. 4) Grid Architectures: The smart grid combines
architectural requirements that are inherently contradictory. On one side, grid pro-
tection and control schemes always put more wights on the availability of data. On
the other side, this particular privacy related and security critical data require ad-
equate protection schemes. New architectures need to be designed to accommodate
both privacy and dependability.
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3.1
Dt and W usually have continuous, symmetrical and unimodal probability distribu-
tions. Since ¾2Y À ¾2o , intuitively, there exists a ¯nite constant c0 ¸ 0, such that:
P (fY ¡ qo(v) · ¡c0¾o(v)g [ fY ¡ qo(v) ¸ c0¾o(v)g) ¼ 1; (A.1)
and
Q(¡c0) ¼ 1; Q(c0) ¼ 0; exp(¡c20=2) ¼ 0: (A.2)
If Y ¡ qo(v) ¸ c0¾o(v), (3.13) boils down to:
~Rl(Ãl; s; u; v) = (v ¡ (c1 ¡ cp)) qo(v) + (c1 ¡ cp)Y
+ uDt ¡ c1s; (A.3)
When Y ¡ qo(v) · ¡c0¾o(v), (3.13) simpli¯es to
~Rl(Ãl; s; u; v) = (v ¡ c2) qo(v) + uDt ¡ c1s+ c2Y: (A.4)
It is clear that (A.3) and (A.4) are unimodal for v 2 [vmin; vcap], both with peaks at
v = vcap. This yields the real-time pricing policy: ~#s;u(Ã
l) = vcap.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3.2
When the demand of non-persistent opportunistic energy users is relatively elastic,
i.e., °o<¡1, ¾o(v) can be expected to be much smaller than that in the inelastic
case under the same real-time prices. With this insight, we resort to the \certainty
equivalence" techniques. By approximating Do by its mean qo(v), the net pro¯t is
given by:
R^l(Ãl; s; u; v) = uDt ¡ c1s+ c2Y + (v ¡ c2) qo(v)
¡c(Y ¡ qo(v))+: (A.5)
Clearly, (A.5) is a piece-wise polynomial in v. Thus, the optimal v could be easily
obtained, as summarized in Proposition 3.3.2.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3.3
We ¯rst show that ~#s;u depend on S and u only through s¡EuDt [Dt]. For convenience,
de¯ne s0 = s ¡ EuDt [Dt]. Since Y = s0 +W ¡ "t, it is clear from Proposition 3.3.1
and Proposition 3.3.2 that the real-time pricing policy ~#s;u depends on the day-ahead
decision only through s0. We denote this policy as ~#s0 : (W; "t) ! v. With this
insight, by using the change of variable technique in (3.13), the objective function of
~PDAnon¡pst can be rewritten as
EWE
u
Dt
h
Rl(Ãl; s0; u; ~#s0(W; "t))
i
= f1(u) + f2(s
0) + c2EW [W ]; (A.6)
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where
f1(u)
¢
= ®t(u¡ c1)u°t ; (A.7)
f2(s
0) ¢= EW;"tE
~#s0 (W;"t)
Do
£
(~#s0(W; "t)¡ c2)Do
¡ c1B (s0 ¡ "t ¡Do +W )
¤
+ (c2 ¡ c1)s0: (A.8)
Let F denote the solution space for the objective function of ~PDAnon¡pst de¯ned in
(A.6). Then,
F = f(u; s0);u ¸ 0; s0 ¸ ¡®tu°tg: (A.9)
It can be veri¯ed that u¤ de¯ned in the proposition statement maximizes f1(u). De¯ne
s00 = ¡®tu¤°t , and let s0¤ maximize f2(s0). If we show that (u¤; s0¤) belongs to the
solution space F , then (u¤; s0¤) optimizes the day-ahead scheduling problem in (A.6).
Since u¤ ¸ 0, it is now su±cient to show that s0¤ ¸ s00. A su±cient condition to
establish this is given by
f2(s
0) · f2(s00); 8 s0 · s00: (A.10)
Under condition A, wind generation is not su±cient to meet the total energy demand
when day-ahead price is u¤, thus:
W < (¡s00 + "t) +Do: (A.11)
Therefore,
W + s0 < "t +Do; 8 s0 · s00: (A.12)
It follows that 1) W + s < Dt +Do, i.e., there is no scheduled energy surplus, thus
1B = 0 in (A.6); 2) Using the preceding statement, recalling the de¯nition of Y ,
we see that Y < qo(
°oc2
1+°o
). Thus, from Proposition 3.3.2, the optimal real-time price
#s0(W; "t) turns out to be a constant
°oc2
1+°o
, i.e., independent of the system state and
the day-ahead decisions, when the opportunistic energy users are relatively elastic.
Also, for the relatively inelastic case, we know from Proposition 3.3.1 that the optimal
real-time price is a constant vcap. Letting v0(°o) denote this constant real-time price
for both the elastic and inelastic cases, respectively, we have
f2(s
0) = (c2 ¡ c1)s0 + (v0(°o)¡ c2)qo(v0(°o)); 8 s0 · s00: (A.13)
Therefore, f2(s
0) · f2(s00); 8 s0 · s00, and (u¤; s0¤) indeed lies in the feasible region
F and hence optimizes the day-ahead scheduling problem in (A.6). The optimal
day-ahead decision, S¤, can now be computed using s0¤ and u¤.
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B.1 Derivation for e^(HL)·CN(FL)
By de¯nition, the misclassi¯cation error rate of HL is given by:
e^(HL) =
1
N
NX
n=1
1fyn 6=HL(xn)g: (B.1)
In the case that yn = HL(xn),
1fyn 6=HL(xn)g = 0 < log2(1 + e
¡ynFL(xn)): (B.2)
And in the case that yn 6= HL(xn), it is easy to see that ynFL(xn) < 0. Then,
1fyn 6=HL(xn)g = 1 < log2(1 + 1) < log2(1 + e
¡ynFL(xn)): (B.3)
In sum, we have
e^(HL) =
1
N
NX
n=1
1fyn 6=HL(xn)g <
1
N
NX
n=1
log2(1 + e
¡ynFL(xn)) = CN(FL): (B.4)
B.2 Derivation for Convexity of CN(FL)
Let FL and F
0
L be two functions in the linear closure of HJ . For ® 2 [0; 1],
CN(®FL + (1¡ ®)F 0L) =
1
N
NX
n=1
log2(1 + e
¡yn(®FL(xn)+(1¡®)F 0L(xn))) (B.5)
It is easy to see that log2(1 + e
¡x) is convex with regard to x. Then,
log2(1 + e
¡yn(®FL(xn)+(1¡®)F 0L(xn))) ·
®log2(1 + e
¡ynFL(xn)) + (1¡ ®)log2(1 + e¡ynF
0
L(xn)): (B.6)
Combining the above two equations, we have
CN(®FL + (1¡ ®)F 0L)
· 1
N
NX
n=1
®log2(1 + e
¡ynFL(xn)) +
1
N
NX
n=1
(1¡ ®)log2(1 + e¡ynF
0
L(xn))
= ®CN(FL) + (1¡ ®)CN(F 0L): (B.7)
Therefore, CN(FL) is convex.
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B.3 Derivation for Di®erentiability of CN(FL)
Using tools of functional derivatives, the derivative of CN(FL) is given by
OCN(FL) ,
d
d®
CN(FL + ®1x) j®=0
= lim
®!0
1
®
(CN(FL + ®1x)¡ CN(FL))
= lim
®!0
1
®
1
N
NX
n=1
log2
Ã
1 + e¡yn(FL(xn)+1fx=xng)
1 + e¡ynFL(xn)
!
=
1
N
NX
n=1
d
d®
log2
³
1 + e¡yn(FL(xn)+1fx=xng)
´
j®=0
= ¡ 1
N ln2
NX
n=1
yn1fx=xng
1 + eynFL(xn)
: (B.8)
Therefore, CN(FL) is di®erentiable. Further, for any two functions FL and F
0
L in the
linear closure of HJ , we have
k OCN(FL)¡ OCN(F 0L) k
=k ¡ 1
N ln2
NX
n=1
yn1fx=xng
µ
1
1 + eynFL(xn)
¡ 1
1 + eynF
0
L(xn)
¶
k
=
1
N ln2
max
n
j 1
1 + eynFL(xn)
¡ 1
1 + eynF
0
L(xn)
j (B.9)
It is clear that 1
1+ex
is Lipschitz continuous with regard to x with Lipschitz constant
1. Thus,
j 1
1 + eynFL(xn)
¡ 1
1 + eynF
0
L(xn)
j·j ynFL(xn)¡ ynF 0L(xn) j=
j FL(xn)¡ F 0L(xn) j·k FL ¡ F 0L k; (B.10)
Therefore,
k OCN(FL)¡ OCN(F 0L) k·
1
N ln2
k FL ¡ F 0L k; (B.11)
i.e., CN(FL) is Lipschitz di®erentiable with Lipschitz constant
1
N ln2
.
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B.4 Derivation for Convergence of FL
Using Lemma 3 of [125], for any ® · 0, we have
CN(Fl)¡ CN(Fl+1) ¸ CN(Fl)¡ CN(Fl + ®hl+1)
¸ ¡®hOCN(Fl); hl+1i ¡ 1
2N ln2
®2 k hl+1 k2
¸ N ln2hOCN(Fl); hl+1i
2
2 k hl+1 k2 : (B.12)
Therefore, the boosting process either halts on a ¯nite round L¤ with hOCN(FL¤);
hL¤+1i¸ 0, or FL would converge to some function in the linear closure of HJ with
lim
L!1
hOCN(FL); hL+1i = 0.
B.5 Derivation for Uniqueness of the minimum of G
(l)
N (a)
Based on (4.3), the derivatives of G
(l)
N (a) are given by:
d
da
G
(l)
N (a) = ¡
1
N ln2
NX
n=1
ynhl(xn)
1 + eyn(Fl¡1(xn)+ahl(xn))
; (B.13)
d2
da2
G
(l)
N (a) =
1
N ln2
NX
n=1
eFl¡1(xn)+ahl(xn)
(1 + eFl¡1(xn)+ahl(xn))
2 : (B.14)
Under the condition that hl is a \descent direction" of CN(Fl¡1), i.e.,
hhl;OCN(Fl¡1)i = ¡ 1
N ln2
NX
n=1
ynhl(xn)
1 + eynFl¡1(xn)
< 0: (B.15)
It thus follows that G
(l)0
N (0) < 0. Further, it is clear from (B.14) that G
(l)00
N (a) > 0
holds for any a2R+. Therefore, G(l)N (a) has a unique minimum a¤ in R+, at which
G
(l)0
N (a
¤) = 0.
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C.1 Proof of Lemma 6.3.1
In what follows, by leveraging the Hammersley-Cli®ord Theorem [107], we ¯rst ex-
plore the dependency graph and potential functions of the additional sub-¯eld XB.
Following the approach in [108], we de¯ne
CB = fc 2 C : c ½ Bg;
Ck = fc 2 C : c \ Ik 6= ©g ; (C.1)
for k = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K. That is, any clique in CB is comprised of border sites only, and
any clique in Ck would contain an inner site in Ik. Further, C = CB[
µ
K[
k=1
Ck
¶
. Then,
for a con¯guration xB on B, its probability is given by
PXB (xB) =
Z
¸2¤SnB
1
Z
exp
(
¡
X
c2C
V c (xB; ¸)
)
d¸: (C.2)
Note that for any c 2 CB, the potential function does not depend on con¯guration on
SnB, and for any c 2 Ck, its potential function depends only on XIk . It follows that,
(C.2) can be rewritten as
PXB (xB) =
1
Z
exp
(
¡
X
c2CB
V c (xB; a ¹B)
)
KY
k=1
Z
¸2¤Ik
exp
(
¡
X
c2Ck
V c
¡
xB; ¸; a ¹BnIk
¢)
d¸; (C.3)
where a ¹B 2 ¤SnB and a ¹BnIk 2 ¤SnfB[Ikg are arbitrary con¯gurations on XSnB and
XSnfB[Ikg, respectively. For k = 1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K, de¯ne:
Vk (xB) = ¡ ln
Z
¸2¤Ik
exp
(
¡
X
c2Ck
V c
¡
xB; ¸; a ¹BnIk
¢)
d¸: (C.4)
Then, (C.3) can be rewritten as
PXB (xB) =
1
Z
exp
(
¡
X
c2CB
V c (xB; a ¹B)¡
KX
k=1
Vk (xB)
)
: (C.5)
Note that based on the de¯nition in (C.4), potential function Vk (xB) depends only
on the con¯guration on the border sites in Bk.
\ ) ". We prove the contrapositive, i.e., if i 6» j in G, then i 6» j in ~GB.
For notational simplicity, we use X¡i to denote XBni, and x¡i the corresponding
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con¯guration. By de¯nition, i 6» j in ~GB refers to that for any xi; xj 2 ¤ and
x¡ij 2 ¤Bnfi;jg:
PrfXi = xi; Xj = xjjX¡ij = x¡ijg =
PrfXi = xijX¡ij = x¡ijgPrfXj = xjjX¡ij = x¡ijg: (C.6)
Under the positiveness condition, it su±ces to show that
PrfXi = xi; Xj = xjjX¡ij = x¡ijg =
PrfXi = xijX¡i = x¡igPrfXj = xjjX¡j = x¡jg: (C.7)
Without loss of generality, we assume that i 2 Bm and j 2 Bq with m; q 2 f1; 2;
¢ ¢ ¢ ; Kg and m 6= q. Based on (C.5), the right hand side and the left hand side of
(C.7) are expanded further as in (C.8).
Pr fXi = xi; Xj = xjjX¡ij = x¡ijg =
1
Zij (x¡ij)
exp
(
¡
X
c2CB :i2c or j2c
V c (xB; a ¹B)¡ Vm (xB)¡ Vq (xB)
)
;
Zij (x¡ij) =Z
¸2¤2
exp
(
¡
X
c2CB :i2c or j2c
V c (x¡ij; ¸; a ¹B)¡ Vm (x¡ij; ¸)¡ Vq (x¡ij; ¸)
)
d¸;
Pr fXi = xijX¡i = x¡ig = 1
Zi(x¡i)
exp
(
¡
X
c2CB :i2c
V c (xB; a ¹B)¡ Vm (xB)
)
;
Zi (x¡i) =
Z
¸2¤
exp
(
¡
X
c2CB :i2c
V c (x¡i; ¸; a ¹B)¡ Vm (x¡i; ¸)
)
d¸;
Pr fXj = xjjX¡j = x¡jg = 1
Zj(x¡j)
exp
(
¡
X
c2CB :j2c
V c (xB; a ¹B)¡ Vq (xB)
)
;
Zj (x¡j) =
Z
¸2¤
exp
(
¡
X
c2CB :j2c
V c (x¡j; ¸; a ¹B)¡ Vq (x¡j; ¸)
)
d¸:
(C.8)
Plugging (C.8) in (C.7), it follows that a necessary and su±cient condition for (C.7)
to hold is:
Zij (x¡ij)
Zi (x¡i)Zj (x¡j)
exp
8<:¡ Xfi;jgµcV c (xB; a ¹B)
9=; = 1: (C.9)
Note that if i 6» j in G, then there are no cliques in G that contain both i and j.
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Actually, the set fc 2 CB : fi; jg µ cg is the null set. In this scenario, it is easy to
show that Zij (x¡ij) = Zi (x¡i)Zj (x¡j), since fc 2 CB : i 2 cg and fc 2 CB : j 2 cg
are disjoint. Thus, (C.9), (C.7), and (C.6) hold, i.e., the pairwise Markov property
between site i and j in the additional sub-¯eld XB is proved .
\ ( ". We prove this part by contradiction. If i » j in G, according to
Proposition 3 of [108], there exists a clique c0 2 C such that fi; jg µ c0 and V c0 is
non-zero and irreducible. Further, since sites i and j are contained in di®erent border
sets, all the sites in c0 are the border sites of X. Therefore, we have c0 ½ XB.
On the other hand, since i 6» j in ~GB, then c is not a clique of ~GB. According
to the property of GMRF X as a Gibbs random ¯eld, potential functions on non-
clique c0 is zero everywhere on ¤
B. However, observe from (C.5) that the potential
function Vk(xB) only depends on the sites in Bk, thus, the potential function on non-
clique c in ~GB is exactly equal to that on clique c in G with any given con¯guration
a ¹B on SnB. It follows that V c0 (xB; a ¹B) is zero for any xB 2 ¤B, which contradicts to
the fact that V c0 is non-zero and irreducible. Therefore, the contradiction is proved,
i.e., if i » j in G, then i » j in ~GB.
If a clique c of G contains two sites that are connected by a tie-line edge, then
all the sites in c are border sites. Further, based on Lemma 6.3.1(a), we conclude
that c is also a clique of ~GB.
Now, based on (C.5), we express PXB(xB) using only non-zero irreducible
potential functions. Further, since V c is non-zero and irreducible, therefore, the
probability distribution of XB could be expressed in terms of the potential function
on c, denoted as ~V c. Note that in (C.5), the potential function Vk only depends on the
sites in Bk. Thus, it is easy to show that ~V c is irreducible and, ~V c(xB) = V c(xB; a ¹B)
for any given con¯guration xB on XB,
C.2 Proof of Lemma 6.3.2
Similarly, we ¯rst explore the dependency graph and the clique potential functions of
the sub-¯eld XSk , k 2 f1; 2; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; Kg. De¯ne C¹Ik = CnCIk . Further, the probability of
a con¯guration xSk on XSk is given by
PXSk (xSk) =
Z
¸2¤SnSk
1
Z
exp
(
¡
X
c2C
V c (xSk ; ¸)
)
d¸: (C.10)
Observe that if c 2 CIk , then all the sits in c is contained in Sk, this is because inner
sites are not connected to other sub-¯eld. Therefore, the potential function of c does
not depend on the con¯guration on SnSk. Then, (C.10) could be rewritten as
PXSk (xSk) =
1
Z
exp
8<:¡ X
c2CIk
V c
¡
xSk ; a ¹Sk
¢9=;
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Z
¸2¤SnSk
exp
8<:¡ X
c2C¹Ik
V c (xSk ; ¸)
9=;d¸; (C.11)
where, a ¹Sk 2 ¤SnSk is any given con¯guration on XSnSk . For convenience, de¯ne:
V^k (xSk) = ¡ ln
Z
¸2¤SnSk
exp
8<:¡ X
c2C¹Ik
V c (xSk ; ¸)
9=;d¸: (C.12)
It follows that in this case, (C.2) can be rewritten as
PXSk (xSk) =
1
Z
exp
8<:¡ X
c2CIk
V c
¡
xSk ; a ¹Sk
¢¡ V^k (xSk)
9=; : (C.13)
Observe from (C.12) that V^k(xSk) depends only on the con¯guration on XBk . Using
(C.13), we can complete the proof of the lemma using a similar procedure as in that
of Lemma 6.3.1.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 6.3.1
Recall thatXB denotes the additional sub-¯eld, in which the border sites are arranged
in accordance with the sub-¯elds. Then, according to [109], the information matrix
JB is given by
JB = JBB ¡ JBIJ¡1II JTBI : (C.14)
It is clear that the o®-diagonal blocks of JBI are zero matrices, because a border
site and an inner site are not connected if they are contained in di®erent sub-¯elds.
Similarly, JII is also block diagonal. Therefore,
JBI = diag ([JBI ]11; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; [JBI ]KK) ;
JII = diag ([JII ]11; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; [JII ]KK) : (C.15)
Plugging (C.15) in (C.14), we obtain that
[JB]kk = [JBB]kk ¡ [JBI ]kk[JII ]¡1kk [JBI ]Tkk; (C.16)
for k = 1; ¢ ¢ ¢ ; K. Then Proposition 6.3.1 follows.
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